

BREAD, FREEDOM, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE:
THE ROLE OF YOUTH IN THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION OF 2011

© 2014
By Elise M. Luers

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion
of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies
at the Croft Institute for International Studies
The University of Mississippi

University, Mississippi
April 2014

Approved:

Advisor: Dr. Vivian Ibrahim

Reader: Dr. William Schenck

Reader: Dr. John Sonnett

Acknowledgements

There are so many people in my life that need to be credited for the completion and success of this paper. First and foremost are my parents, Cdr. Dan and Karla Luers. Without their endless love, encouragement, and faith in all the crazy things I do, I never would have taken the incredible opportunity to study abroad in Egypt. It was their support that truly made my research, and my dream, possible.

I would also like to thank Dr. John Sonnett, my third reader, for providing me with the tools and the know-how to conduct research (even if it was a semester too late) and above all else, for providing me with the courage to believe in my own dream. Before taking his class, the idea of a senior thesis seemed looming and ominous. I did not think I had the ability, the time, or the intellect to do it. Yet, through his methods class, I learned that I was more than capable of writing a 90 page paper. Dr. Sonnett never stopped encouraging me. He truly gave me the bravery and the confidence I needed to believe in my own dream.

This thesis also could never have come to pass without the incessant advice, critique, and every so often, necessary butt-kicking of my first reader, Dr. Vivian Ibrahim. Her knowledge of the country, the revolution, and of literature on the subject is immeasurable. She has been my rock through this entire ordeal. I owe so much to her. The long hours, the meetings, the time spent reading and re-reading, commenting and editing - those are hours she too spent on this paper. Her contribution to this work goes beyond words can express. She made my dream a reality.

Finally, I would like to thank the Croft Institute for making this thesis a requirement to graduate. It pushed me farther than I would have dared go otherwise. It forced me to venture beyond my own limits, my own expectations. Now, I carry the knowledge that I can accomplish amazing things if I put in the work. And you, the reader, hold in your hands a paper that I can always be proud of; my work, my dream, come true.

Table of Contents

Table of Visual Aids.....	4
I. Introduction.....	5
II. Literature Review.....	13
2.1 Defining Revolution.....	13
2.1.1 <i>Language of Revolution</i>	16
2.2 Ahnal Shabaab (We Are The Youth):	18
2.3 The Youth Movement.....	25
2.3.1 <i>Horizontal and Vertical Movements</i>	29
2.3.2 <i>Organizing the Youth Movement</i>	31
2.3.3 <i>The April 6 Movement</i>	32
2.3.4 <i>We Are All Khaled Said</i>	33
2.3.5 <i>Social Media in the Youth Movement</i>	33
2.3.6 <i>Where There is No Vision the People Perish</i>	34
III. Methodology.....	38
3.1 Survey Format.....	38
3.2 Distribution of Surveys.....	38
3.3 Coding.....	39
3.4 Shortcomings.....	40
IV. Data Analysis.....	43
4.1 General Overview.....	43
4.2 Involvement and the Tier System.....	45
4.2.1 <i>Social Media and Technology</i>	51
4.3 Young People and Women, Recipe for a Revolution?.....	55
4.3.1 <i>Women's Role in the Revolution</i>	59
4.4 The Future Belongs to Those Who Believe in the Beauty of their Dreams.....	63
4.5 Without Fear There Can Not Be Courage.....	73
4.5.1 <i>The Effect of Post-Revolution Hindsight</i>	77
VI. Conclusion.....	82
Bibliography.....	86
Appendix.....	91

Table of Visual Aids

Figure	Description	Pg.
1.1	Age Pyramid (Egypt) depicting the total population per age group by gender in the year 2013	23
1.2	Age Pyramid (US) depicting the total population per age group by gender in the year 2013	24
2.1	Diagram explaining the inclusive, "horizontal" reach of <i>Horizontal</i> movements across existing <i>Vertical</i> movements	30
2.2	Diagram depicting the factor of time for <i>Horizontal</i> vs <i>Vertical</i> movements	36
4.1	Pie chart depicting how technology was used by respondents to get involved in the Egyptian Revolution	53
4.2	Bar chart of age vs. participation in the Egyptian Revolution	56
4.3	Bar chart depicting the number of active women vs. active men in the Egyptian Revolution	57
Table 1	Table depicting women's representation in Egyptian politics by percentage of membership in the Egyptian Parliament	62
4.4	Pie chart depicting why active participants chose to get involved in the Egyptian Revolution	66
4.5	Pie chart depicting why active women chose to participate in the Egyptian Revolution	71
4.6	Pie chart depicting why non-active participants chose not to get involved in the Egyptian Revolution	75

I. Introduction

When Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser rose to power in Egypt during the 1952 overthrow of King Farouk, an informal social contract between the Egyptian people and the new military ruler was born. The citizens of Egypt would cede the political arena to Nasser, the ruling party, and his successors so long as the regime provided material prosperity and security.¹ Decades later, under the thirty-year presidency of Hosni Mubarak, stemming from 1981 and well-into the new millennium, that social contract was shattered.

By 2010 inflation had steadily increased by more than 10% each year for nearly a decade. Food prices had risen 37% - all while public sector workers, civil servants, and pensioners saw their incomes remain largely stagnant. At the time of the January 2011 Egyptian Revolution, more than 40% of the population had fallen below the poverty line.² In fact, "At least 90% of the unemployed [were] aged less than 30 years and many more [were] affected by underemployment."³ In 2008, unemployment among university graduates reached 25%.⁴ These young people will be the focus of this thesis. Egyptian youth, to be defined in the following chapter, suffered a great deal from the economic issues plaguing the country in 2010 and early 2011.

Along with its failure to provide satisfactory prosperity, the party of the Mubarak regime, known as the National Democratic Party (NDP), also failed to maintain a sense of security within Egypt. Emergency Law has been present in Egypt since 1967, when it was enforced during the

¹ Haas, M. L., & Lesch, D. W. (2013). *The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East*. (pp. 35-59). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

² Ibid.

³ Handoussa, H. United Nations Development Programme and the Institute of National Planning, Egypt, Human Development Project. (2010). *Egypt Human Development Report 2010*. Retrieved from website: http://www.undp.org/Portals/0/NHDR_2010_english.pdf

⁴ Haas, M. L., & Lesch, D. W. (2013). *The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East*. (pp. 35-59). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Arab-Israeli War. The law was reinstated following Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat's assassination in 1981 and was continuously extended every three years for the next thirty years. In addition to Emergency Law, internal security forces were given even greater authority and power following the deadly terrorist attacks of the 1990s. Mubarak's regime responded to these attacks by granting the security services extensive authority to arrest and detain citizens with few legal constraints. Abuse of these powers quickly took hold and grew in frequency.⁵ Citizens suspected of a crime were beaten at local police stations and those suspected of incitements against the regime were subjected to long imprisonment without trial.

The lack of security and economic troubles undoubtedly shook the faith of young people in the governing capabilities of Mubarak and the NDP. Therefore, the Egyptian youth, as this thesis will explore, many educated at the university level, facing unemployment, poverty, and such blatant disregard for human rights, began addressing their grievances publicly as early as 2004 through the social movement "Kifaya" or "enough." However, it was not until the tragic death of Khaled Said, 28, who was beaten to death for possession of evidence proving the corruption of Mubarak's police forces, and the successful removal of Tunisian President Zine el-Abedin Ben Ali, that participation in protests and street demonstrations grew substantially. In order to discuss and explore the involvement of young people in the revolution, this thesis will address the question "*What was the role of the youth in the Egyptian Revolution of 2011?*"

The "Jasmine Revolution" in Tunisia provided Egyptian revolutionaries with hope and an inspiring example of how to successfully topple their 30 year-long dictatorship. This Tunisian revolution was sparked on December 17th, 2010 when Mohammed Bouazizi, a young fruit vendor, set himself on fire to protest his treatment at the hands of Tunisian authorities when his

⁵ Haas, M. L., & Lesch, D. W. (2013). *The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. pp. 35-59.

only means of living - his fruit cart - was confiscated because he lacked a vendor's permit.⁶

Following the incident, initial demonstrations broke out in Bouazizi's rural hometown then spread to other areas of the country. A brutal security crackdown followed: the government responded by arresting demonstrators and activists, and by shutting down the internet. Yet, the protestors rallied and while closing in on government buildings in the heart of Tunis (the nation's capital) less than a month after Bouazizi's self-immolation, on January 14th, 2011, Ben Ali and his family fled Tunisia for Saudi Arabia.

With the success of the Tunisian youth, the sacrifice of Mohammed Bouazizi, and the death of one of their own at the forefront of their minds, Egyptian youth rallied as well. In response to Khaled's brutal murder, young men and women used social media and word of mouth to call for numerous demonstrations and protests starting in June of 2010 and continuing until the massive "Day of Revolt" on January 25th, 2011, Police Appreciation Day, to protest police brutality. Tens of thousands marched towards Tahrir Square, the long-time symbolic place of protest and demonstration in the heart of downtown Cairo, and towards various squares across the country to answer the call, and they did not leave.

On Thursday, the 27th, cell phone satellites were shut down and access to the Internet was blocked by the Egyptian government in the hopes of preventing communication among the revolutionaries. Yet, the plan to leave organizers in the dark failed. On Friday, the 28th of January, the number of protestors swelled to create a "Friday of Anger," during which demands for Mubarak's resignation were first voiced. On that day "[H]undreds of thousands of Egyptians took to the streets, breaking through cordons of heavily armed riot police and through the

⁶ *The 'Spark' That Started it All*. (2013, October 04). Retrieved from <http://guides.library.cornell.edu/content.php?pid=259276&sid=2163144>

psychological barriers of their own fear of challenging the regime of Hosni Mubarak."⁷ In response, the regime opened the prisons, dismissed police forces and deployed the military to break up the protests. As Rania Abouzeid in Cairo wrote for *TIME World* magazine:

"[T]housands of inmates escaped from at least four jails across the country."⁸ According to Shoa Abdelaty, deputy director of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, these prison breaks were no coincidence and "It look[ed] like there were clear instructions form the Interior Ministry, specifically its central Prisons Department, to instigate some sort of chaos to destabilize the country."⁹ Even a three star police officer, speaking to *TIME* on condition of anonymity, alleged that Presidential Guard officers were also involved in the chaos of January 28th, demanding that he and his colleagues open the jail cells.¹⁰

The chaos continued until the 11th of February, the "Friday of Departure" when Mubarak announced his resignation. Mubarak left control of the country in the hands of the Supreme Council of Egyptian Armed Forces (SCAF) headed by Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein El-Tantawi. A year and a half later, on June 24th 2012, Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi was elected President by popular mandate. He would be sworn into the office six days later on June 30th, 2012.

This thesis will explore the role of youth in the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. It will discuss and answer the question: "*What was the role of the youth in the Egyptian Revolution of 2011?*" Through the collected quantitative data, qualitative responses, and after thorough research in the existing literature, this thesis contends that the role of youth during the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 was critical to the revolution and that the youth developed a social

⁷ Abouzeid, R. (2011, March 16). Did Prison Breakout Reveal a Plan to Sow Chaos in Egypt?. *TIME*.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

movement which in and of itself highly influenced the direction of the revolution. To confirm this hypothesis, this thesis will first discuss the organization and leadership within the Youth movement and how that affected the outcome of the revolution. Then it will define and explore the terms "active" and "involved" and how respondents took part in the revolution by revealing the first hand, qualitative accounts of survey respondents. The large role of social media and technology will be questioned and explored as well. Next, this thesis will analyze the demographics of the revolution, especially the activism of young people against other age groups, and women versus men. This thesis will also explore the rationale behind involvement in the revolution: the top five reasons for becoming an active participant and conversely, the top five reasons for not participating. Going further, this thesis will also question whether those that chose to not be an active participant would have changed their role in the revolution if given the opportunity. Lastly, as a jumping point for further research, this thesis will conclude by discussing how or if the role of youth and the Youth movement affected the rise of Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the possible future of Egypt. To accomplish these goals, forty-four mixed method surveys were conducted in Alexandria, Egypt in the spring of 2013.

Before beginning research or conducting surveys on this topic I made the following hypotheses:

- ☐ **H1:** The youth were the most active generation in the revolution per capita and thus played a vital role in the revolution
- ☐ **H2:** The youth formed a Youth movement which was comprised of certain attributes that led the Youth movement to be considered a *Horizontal Movement*.
- ☐ **H3:** Weaknesses in the Youth movement (such as lack of leadership) led to the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood after the resignation of Hosni Mubarak
- ☐ **H4:** A majority of respondents in the older generations approved of or viewed the government of Hosni Mubarak neutrally and thus decided not to take an active role in the revolution

- **H5:** Women played a small but important, behind the scene role in the revolution through actions within the two least physically involved active groups (Tier 2 and Tier 3 – see section 4.2)
- **H6:** The two most popular means of involvement for active participants in the revolution were street demonstrations and the organization of demonstrations
- **H7:** Social media was especially vital to respondents who were involved in the two least physically demanding groups of activists (Tier 2 and Tier 3 – see section 4.2) and the revolution was successful in forcing the resignation of Mubarak because of it.
- **H8:** Active participants in the revolution chose to get involved because of three ideals based on the chant "Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice"
- **H9:** Non-active participants did not get involved due to fear or because family members would not allow their participation in the revolution.

To explain the hypothesis connected with the title of this thesis further; عيش, حرية, عداالة

اجتماعية *Ayesh, horiya, 'adala igtama'iyah* or "Bread, Freedom and Social Justice" was a

popular chant recited by demonstrators during the 18 days of revolution from January 25th -

February 11th, 2011. Each of these four words represented a demand of the Mubarak regime or

the next leader to come to power. First mentioned in the chant was عيش *Ayesh* or bread. As

mentioned earlier, the economic situation within Egypt was grim - food prices and inflation were

rising as jobs became more difficult to find. Bread represented the demand for better economic

opportunities and the struggle for many Egyptians to "put food on the table." Additionally, in the

Egyptian dialect of Arabic, عيش also means "life." By using the term, protestors implied that as

well as jobs and economic stability, demonstrators were demanding better living standards and

quality of life. حرية *horiya* or freedom, represented a demand for democracy and the end of

Mubarak's 30 year, one-party rule over Egypt. Freedom can also represent the demand for social

freedoms and liberties which had been taken away by the enactment of the Emergency Law.

Finally, عداالة اجتماعية *'adala igtama'iyah* or social justice, represented the demand of

protestors for better human rights, equality under the law, and representation by a fair and just legal system. The combination of these four words, and what these words represent, are the ideals upon which I predicted to be the reasons for youth taking to the streets and demanding Mubarak's resignation and are the reason they were chosen as the title for this thesis.

The contents of this thesis and the hypotheses presented are important because focusing on these questions will provide readers with not only a basic understanding of the various actors within the revolution, but with *why* the youth in particular were so important in determining both *how* the revolution was conducted and in shaping the outcome of the revolution itself. Also, it will address why these young people were so willing to die for the resignation of Mubarak and why they were so willing to take the unfamiliar course towards an Egypt without Hosni Mubarak at the helm. And *how* were they planning to overthrow such a man, who had control over a large army and a brutal police force and who had been in power for 30 years (1981-2011)? The events of the Egyptian Revolution and, more broadly, of the Arab Spring - including the removal of several leaders across the North African and Middle Eastern region in 2011 - will undoubtedly affect foreign policy and foreign relations with the region for years to come. With the shift in power dynamics, ideals, and politics in the Arab World as a result of these uprisings, it is imperative for policy-makers around the globe and informed citizens alike to have an understanding of *who*, *why* and *how* the events in Egypt in 2011 took place. It is vital that these leaders of the revolution and the reasons for their involvement are recognized. Additionally, political leaders will do well to understand how activists conducted, and continue to carry out, the Egyptian Revolution, for activists may well continue to determine the future of Egypt's government. Considering the United States' high level of interest in the region, it is also

important for American foreign policy makers to recognize that these revolutionaries will greatly influence Egyptians' attitudes towards America and Americans for years to come.

II. Literature Review

2.1 Defining Revolution:

First, it is important that the terms used throughout this thesis are defined and highlighted. Thus far the term "revolution" has been used to describe the events of Egypt in early 2011, however, it should be noted that this is a point of debate within the literature on the subject. Although there are multiple types of revolutions to consider, this thesis will focus on social and political definitions of the term. For example, in her article, "France, Russia, China: A Structural Analysis of Social Revolutions," political scientist and sociologist Theda Skocpol defines social revolutions as those with a thoroughgoing structural transformation and a massive class upheaval.¹¹ In other words, social revolutions require more change than a political revolution. Social revolutions, as Skocpol claims, by their nature have a more demanding definition than their political counterparts. To explain this Skocpol refers to quotes by both Samuel P. Huntington and Vladimir Lenin as the basis for her definition of social revolutions:

As Huntington points out, social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of socio-economic and political institutions, and - as Lenin so vividly reminds us - social revolutions are accompanied and in part effectuated through class upheavals from below. It is this combination of thoroughgoing structural transformation and massive class upheavals that sets social revolutions apart from coups, rebellions, and even political revolutions and national independence movements.¹²

Skocpol claims that both widespread structural change and large scale actions on the part of lower classes are what set uprisings, coups, rebellions and even *political* revolutions apart from true *social* revolutions. For a social revolution there has to be more than the removal of a

¹¹ Skocpol, T. (1976). France, Russia, China: A Structural Analysis of Social Revolutions. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 18(2), 175-210.

¹² Ibid.

political leader: The entire system or framework of the government must be altered. In a social revolution, the lower classes demand and inspire revolution; their involvement is what forces others to participate. Skocpol makes the argument that, based on this definition, only three successful social revolutions have truly taken place throughout history: in France (1789), Russia (1917), and China (1911-49). She goes on to describe what each of these three "true" social revolutions were able to accomplish that sets them apart from every other would-be revolution; namely, the

...extreme rationalization and centralization of state institutions, the removal of a traditional landed upper class from intermediate (regional and local) quasi-political supervision of the peasantry, and the elimination or diminution of the economic power of a landed upper class."¹³

Thus, under Skocpol's definition, a successful social revolution must go far beyond changing just one or two political institutions; rather, it must affect *all* aspects of society: every class, every position of power, even the entire structure of the government itself. It is not enough to merely replace the regime's leaders, rather, the whole system, the entire regime, must be transformed. It was clear, even in 2011, that the entire Mubarak regime was not being overthrown or removed by the revolution. Mubarak, the face of the failing economy and enabler of police brutality, was being replaced. But the structure surrounding his position remained mostly undisturbed; all those that advised and supported Mubarak - his Cabinet, his Upper and Lower Houses, the state controlled media, police officials, army generals, etc - were not affected. Only the name of the person who represented all that was wrong with the system in place was affected. Especially because the state controlled media remained in operation, the same propaganda and the same censorship of events continued on incessantly even after Mubarak's resignation. Even though the protestors chanted "The people want the fall of the

¹³ Ibid.

regime" many rules such as the State of Emergency Law were still enforced, and many leaders, such as officials from Mubarak's regime and high-ranking military officers, were still in charge.

However, since her research on defining social revolutions was conducted in the late 1970s, Skocpol did not include the events of the Arab Spring in her observations. Political scientist and Professor Joshua Stacher of Kent State University, therefore, applied Skocpol's definition of "revolution" to the events of early 2011 in Egypt and even took it one step further. He determined that, based on Skocpol's definition, those events did not qualify as a "true" social revolution because the entire system was not overthrown or involved. Going further, as he discussed in a roundtable entitled *On the Language of the Revolution in Egypt*, Stacher insisted that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) used the presidential elections as a stepping stone to strengthen the military's position within Egypt. In the article, Stacher argued that rather than a revolution, "What had effectively emerged from the supposed process of 'democratic transition' that had begun back in February 2011 with the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak was a coup..."¹⁴ There is a valid argument to be made for labeling the events in Egypt as a *coup* instead of a *revolution* considering that following Mubarak's resignation on February 11th 2011, Field Marshall Mohammed Hussein El-Tantawi, Chairman of the SCAF, was handed control of Egypt. SCAF leaders were intended to remain in office no more than 6 months, enough time to generate the required stability necessary to hold presidential elections. However, Tantawi (and the army's) rule over Egypt lasted for nearly 17 months. There is little doubt that the army had been granted a great deal of power following Mubarak's departure and that they were certainly slow to relinquish that control. The political discourse and steps necessary to hold elections were tackled at a painstakingly slow speed. It took nearly a year before the State of

¹⁴ Sedra, P., Springborg, R., Stacher, J., Sabra, A. & Colla, E. (2012, August 12). Roundtable on the Language of Revolution in Egypt. Jadaliyya, Retrieved from <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6552/roundtable-on-the-...1>

Emergency was even *partially* lifted, even though it was promised that the law would be entirely lifted within six months of the army's assumption of power. The army did not want to take the steps necessary to complete the election process or to discontinue the State of Emergency Law because it would mean the end of their rule.

2.1.1 Language of Revolution Despite the arguments set forth by Skocpol and Stacher, this thesis will be using the term "revolution" to describe the events that have taken place in Egypt since early 2011. First, the distinction between “political” and “social” revolution allows for this. Politically, the events in Egypt *do* comprise a revolution, as the survey respondents describe (see Chapter 4). There *was* rapid change in the political governance of Egypt; however, as discussed above, the events did not extend to all of Egyptian society. The term “revolution” will also be used because, throughout Egypt, it is not uncommon to hear the word “ثورة” *thawra(h)* or “revolution” being used to describe the 18 days of protests, demonstrations, and other similar events that led to the resignation of President Mubarak. This especially holds true in the collected data. Activists use the term for a reason. These participants believe they have brought change to their government, that they were successful in at least some sense, and it means something to them to call it a “revolution” instead of a “coup,” “rebellion,” “uprising,” etc. Even though the political system remained largely intact following Mubarak's resignation, the lives of the Egyptian people were generally unchanged, and the army did gain certain powers in the President's absence, it was the actions of the people that forced the end of Mubarak's 30 year rule and demanded free and fair elections.

The argument put forth by this thesis in labeling the events in Egypt as a “revolution” thus aligns with the concept of “Language of Revolution” as discussed by historian Paul Sedra. Sedra argues that using the term “revolution” carries a great deal more meaning and value behind

it than merely how it is used in the political science literature of writers such as Skocpol and Stacher. In similar political science literature, set models and criteria are used to determine what exactly defines a revolution. Yet, what Sedra and this research argue is that by replacing the term "revolution" with words such as "coup," "rebellion" or "uprising," scholars undermine all that the revolutionaries and activists believe and worked for. Such terminology depreciates the emotion and the pride that participants recall as they describe their 18 days in Tahrir Square, outside of Quaid Ibrahim Mosque, or in downtown Port Said. Most importantly, by removing the term "revolution" from the analysis of Egypt in 2011, scholars detract from and undermine how participants describe these events in their own literature of the revolution – in the Language of Revolution. Even though the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 does not contain all the attributes of a true *social* revolution as Skocpol describes and there is solid evidence to support Stacher in deeming it a "coup," it should still be referenced to as a revolution for the sake of those who participated in it and because Egyptians use the term themselves to define it. As Paul Sedra writes:

I insist on the language of revolution in large part because Egyptians still use this language of revolution themselves. And frankly, I think it is vital that they continue to use this language—not from an analytical standpoint, but from a political one. I fear that to abandon the language of revolution would be tantamount to abandoning the hopes, the ideals, and the expectations that accompanied the ouster of Mubarak.¹⁵

It is important to note that even though the revolution was only a political revolution; the ideas expressed by Sedra and by respondents reflect a desire for a truly social revolution. This idea will be addressed in further detail in section 4.5.1 of this thesis.

¹⁵ Sedra, P., Springborg, R., Stacher, J., Sabra, A. & Colla, E. (2012, August 12). Roundtable on the Language of Revolution in Egypt. Jadaliyya, Retrieved from <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6552/roundtable-on-the-..1>

Therefore, to eliminate confusion, to reflect the views of survey participants, and to be in alignment with the emotion behind the term, this thesis will be using “revolution” to describe the events of 2011 and on, as well.

2.2 Ahnal Shabaab (We are the Youth):

"[I] believe that the government was counting on the people giving up and being weak but the government didn't care about the most important element which was the youth" (#30).

This thesis contends, along with Respondent #30, that the youth's role in the Egyptian Revolution was vital in its success of removing Hosni Mubarak from the presidency and has greatly affected the direction of the revolution since. The youth of Egypt are the main focus of this thesis and as such will be explored, discussed, analyzed and observed. But why the youth? Who are they? What makes them so important to deserve such focus and attention?

In literature on the Egyptian Revolution the youth are consistently cited as the instigators, force, key, and voice of the revolution. In her entry in "*Diaries of an Unfinished Revolution*," Egyptian activist and writer Yasmine El-Rashidi states that "The testimonies [included in her book] make it clear how popular uprisings led to protest movements that in turn became revolutions. This latter stage of development [was] initiated by the children of the middle classes..."¹⁶ Egyptian youth formed the Youth movement which demanded the resignation of Hosni Mubarak (see section 2.3).

UNESCO reports that while only 66.4% of adult Egyptians (15 and older) were literate in 2006, 84.9% of youth (15-24) were literate.¹⁷ Even though a vast majority of these young Egyptian men and women are highly educated, however, this education meant little when the

¹⁶ Al-Zubaidi, L., & Cassel, M. (2013). Introduction and Cairo, City in Waiting. *Diaries of an Unfinished Revolution: Voices From Tunis to Damascus*. New York: Penguin Group.

¹⁷ UNESCO. (2011). *UIS Statistics in Brief*. Retrieved from http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=121&IF_Language=en&BR_Country=2200

unemployment rate for 15-24 year olds was at 24.8%.¹⁸ What these statistics reveal is an Egypt that was comprised of a majority of young, intelligent persons who, when faced with unemployment and economic hardship, were subject to immense frustration, and in time, a desire for change. As *Journal of Economic Perspectives* authors Campante and Chor argue, it was the increase in education combined with poor labor markets which poised Egypt for revolution.¹⁹ This combination, among other issues, led a great deal of young people to rise against the corrupted and failing Mubarak regime. According to El-Rashidi, Egypt's youth activist population was "itching to revolt"²⁰ and "[o]nce skulking, were now handing out flyers, forming political parties and collectives, chanting, discussing, planning, hoping, for those better lives."²¹

The youth were even recognized for their importance in the revolutions by Egyptian national weekly newspapers such as the English language version of Al-Ahram Weekly. In a special news section written for the week of 10-16 January 2013, Al-Ahram offered a full page article titled "Youth Activism and the Arab Future." In this article, political commentator and author Nabil Abdel-Fattah emphasized the vital role played by youth, recognizing the existence of the Youth movement, and claiming it was their actions that shaped the outcome of the revolution. For example, Abdel-Fattah wrote: "[T]he dynamics of the youth movement were central to the Arab revolutionary uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia."²² He went on to describe in more detail how virtual/practical political exercises such as the 6 April Movement and the "We are all Khaled Said" Facebook page "[S]ubsequently became the avenue through which the 18-30 year old generation of youth activists spear-headed the uprising [that] led to the downfall and

¹⁸ US Government - CIA, (2013). *The World Factbook*. Retrieved from U.S Government - CIA website: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html>

¹⁹ Campante, F. R., & Chor, D. (2012). Why Was the Arab World Poised for Revolution? Schooling, Economic Opportunities, and the Arab Spring. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 26(2), 167-188. doi: 10.1257/jep.26.2.167

²⁰ Ibid. Page 58

²¹ Ibid Page 64

²² Abdel-Fattah, N. (2013, January 10). Youth Activism and the Arab Future. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, p. 9.

eventual prosecution of Mubarak and some of the key figures in his regime."²³ Overall, Nabil Abdel-Fattah claims that "A new Arab youth was key to the Arab Spring revolutions"²⁴ of which Egypt was a large part.

In literature on the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, it is also clear that the 2011 Revolution was not the first time youth were involved in demonstrations and actions against the Mubarak regime. For example, Kifaya, a social movement literally meaning "enough," was founded in 2004 by 300 Egyptian intellectuals from various ideological backgrounds. This movement was cited to have informed and inspired the emergence of youth activism online on Facebook and Twitter starting in 2008.²⁵ The April 6th Youth Movement, as well, named for its call for a general strike on April 6th, 2008, represented young Egyptians of varying political orientations and was the first opposition group to make use of Facebook.²⁶

In short, youth were clearly the focus of numerous articles, books, and news stories on the 2011 Egyptian Revolution and thus their role was impossible to ignore. Literature on the youth and its attempt to remove Mubarak as far back as 2004 is numerous and has existed for years. It was this constant repetition and emphasis of the youth and their role in the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 throughout this literature which sparked the idea for this thesis.

For the purposes of this thesis it is also necessary to recognize the cultural distinction between "youth" as considered by American scholars and as considered by everyday Egyptians and to describe what it is that constitutes a "youth." In traditional Western literature, "youth" is considered a demographic, a set age. However, in Egypt, and in the literature this thesis will be referencing, this is not the case. "الشباب" *Al-Shabaab* or "youth," as will be discussed

²³ Abdel-Fattah, N. (2013, January 10). Youth Activism and the Arab Future. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, p. 9.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Lim, M. (2012). Clicks, Cabs, and Coffee Houses: Social Media and Oppositional Movements in Egypt, 2004-2011. *Journal of Communication*, 231-244. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01628.x

²⁶ Ibid. Page 239.

throughout this research, will not be defined by a set age-number, but rather will be used within the cultural context that it would be throughout Egypt. In Egypt, "youth" can reference any person who is considered an active, energetic and enthusiastic member of society and does not necessarily fall into a neat, set, range of numbers. There are no limitations on the definition based on marital status or employment status: Married, single, one kid, ten kids, unemployed, or happily working, it does not matter. Any Egyptian with an active personality can be considered a member of the "youth."

However, although the culture surrounding the term is the main consideration of this thesis, in order to properly analyze and discuss the data it is necessary to designate an upper limit for the definition of what constitutes a "youth." Otherwise, every active participant in the revolution could easily be counted as a member of the "youth," which would thus void all data. In contrast to Merlyna Lims's (discussed later on in this section) parameters and in order to keep with the context of culture, this thesis will not designate 30, precisely, as the upper age limit but, rather, will provide a 5 year "cushion" of flexibility. Those in the lower thirties will be counted as part of the youth just as they would be in Egypt. As well, children under the age of 15 will also be considered part of the youth, whereas they were not under Merlyna Lim's definition. Therefore, in order to analyze the data and keep with the Egyptian culture surrounding the term, the age range of 0-35 will be what is considered the "youth."

By designating an upper age limit, however, this author was forced to essentially place the youth within a demographic, just like in traditional literature written by Lim and others mentioned below. There is a gap to be addressed here between *what* this thesis is trying to confirm, and *how* the author was forced to do so. Throughout this thesis, the youth will be discussed as a social movement, yet, in order to properly analyze collected data, it was necessary

to create a set age range, a demographic. Because collected surveys failed to ask the respondents about their involvement within the 6 April Movement or the “We Are Khaled Said” Facebook page (discussed in detail later on in this Chapter) or any other social movement, ultimately the analysis looks at the youth as a demographic. Hypothesis #2 (H2) that the youth deserve to be considered their own social movement can still be addressed in this way, but for future study it would be beneficial to researchers to use other forms of data other than age to analyze collected information.


In conclusion, the criteria discussed above will be used throughout this research to define the “youth” and to analyze their role in the revolution.

Beyond the literature available on the youth’s importance in the Egyptian Revolution, the sheer population of young people in Egypt suggests that they played a large role in the revolution as well. Currently, young people (ages 0-24) make up approximately 50.3% of the Egyptian population.²⁷ More specifically, “[Y]oung people aged 15-29 make up one-third of the country's total population, about 23 million.”²⁸ Pictured below is an age pyramid of the Egyptian population for 2013 as according to the CIA World Factbook.²⁹ As can be seen in Figure 1.1

²⁷ US Government - CIA, (2013). *The World Factbook*. Retrieved from U.S Government - CIA website: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html>

²⁸ Lim, M. (2012). Clicks, Cabs, and Coffee Houses: Social Media and Oppositional Movements in Egypt, 2004-2011. *Journal of Communication*, 231-244. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01628.x


²⁹ US Government - CIA, (2013). *The World Factbook*: Population of Egypt as of 2013. Retrieved from U.S Government - CIA website: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html>

Figure 1.1

Egypt's population is heavily concentrated at the 25-34 age range and in the birth to 9 years age range. Those ranges alone make up around 17.5 million people of Egypt's 80 million total population. The 25-34 age range (around 7.6 million) encompasses a larger age group than any other two older generations combined. The age groups with the largest population are concentrated on the very bottom in the 0-19 age region, thus making Egypt a very young country. By comparison, examine the age pyramid of the United States below. Notice how the ages with the greatest population concentration is in the 50-60 age range. This means that the United States has an older population, relatively speaking, than Egypt does. It is important to acknowledge these differences in age and especially the youth bubble in the Egyptian population for it could be used as an explanation for why so many young Egyptians were involved in the revolution. By looking at the figures, it would logically follow that youth were the majority of active participants in the revolution because, quite simply, there were more of them. The approximately 7.3 million people who make up the oldest eleven age ranges, including everyone

in Egypt 50 and older, still do not match the population of the approximately 7.6 million members of those youth in the 25-34 age range alone.

Figure 1.2



For this thesis, the large size of the youth population has no effect on the analysis of collected data because analysis will use *per capita* involvement rather than the total number of participants in each age group. Even though young people (ages 0-24) make up approximately 50.3% of the Egyptian population, their overwhelming numbers will not affect the results. What is considered and analyzed is the percentage of youth that were active vs. non-active. For example, 46% of survey takers in the youth age range (0-35) were active participants. Although there were 37 respondents in that age range, 17 being active, only the *percentage* is considered for analysis because in the age range of 46 and older, of the four respondents, three considered themselves active. If only numbers of active/non-active participants were considered then the active youth would outnumber the active oldest respondents 17 to 3. It would be unfair and inaccurate to say the older generations were less involved purely based on number of activists

because the younger generations would have a great advantage. Thus, the population of each age group does not matter for the purpose of this thesis; it focuses instead on how active or non-active each group was per capita.

2.3 The Youth Movement:

With "youth" now defined, this thesis must also explain the theory behind H2 and H3 which both regard social movement theory. Social movement theory is an interdisciplinary study within the social sciences that generally seeks to explain why social mobilization occurs, the forms under which it manifests, as well as potential social, cultural, and political consequences.³⁰ With that said, the notion of considering "youth" as a social movement of people of passion rather than as a set age, contradicts the norm of many current scholars writing on social movement theory such as Giuseppe Caruso, who fails to mention youth as a social movement in his book *"Cosmopolitan Futures: Global Activism for a Just World."*³¹ In this book, many social movements are listed for discussion, including religious groups, peasant movements, trade union groups, women's movements, leftist parties, NGOs, etc. However, youth are not acknowledged as a separate group. This is due to the current norm that "youth" are not considered to be a separate social movement. Instead, the youth are typically minimized to merely a demographic within other various groups. For example, historian Joel Beinin made no mention of the role of the youth at all, only considering them as a demographic within part of a separate movement, such as workers or laborers.³²

³⁰ Tilly, C. (2004). *Social Movements, 1768–2004*. Boulder, Colorado, USA: Paradigm Publishers. p. 53.

³¹ Caruso, G. (2012). *Cosmopolitan Futures: Global Activism for a Just World*. Into Publishing.

³² Beinin, J. (2012). Egyptian Workers and January 25th: A Social Movement in Historical Context. *Social Research*, 79(2), 323-343.

Other writers emphasize the youth's role in various movements such as in Arizona State Professor and Princeton University Visiting Research Scholar, Merlyna Lim's, article *Clicks, Cabs, and Coffee Houses: Social Media and Oppositional Movements in Egypt, 2004-2011*. However, Lim places very strict parameters on the ages considered (15-29)³³ which create a demographic within the Youth movement itself. I agree with Lim that the Youth movement's role needs to be emphasized; however, a strict age range of only 14 years fails to adequately reflect many active participants' contributions (including those under age 15 and slightly above 30) and should thus be eliminated.

While traditional literature confines youth to a demographic, this thesis urges the following: that youth, rather than making up some portion of each of these movements, deserve to be a part of and should be considered, their own social movement known as the Youth movement. According to the sociologist, political scientist, and historian who specialized in the relationship between politics and society, Charles Tilly, social movements are a series of contentious performances, displays, and campaigns by which ordinary people make collective claims on others.³⁴ Tilly further explains that there are three major elements which comprise a social movement: Campaigns, Repertoire, and displays of WUNC (worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitments). To determine whether or not the Youth movement constitutes a social movement according to this definition, each of these elements will be broken down individually and compared to the youth movement of Egypt during the 2011 Revolution.

The first element to be considered is "campaigns." According to Charles Tilly, campaigns are a sustained, organized public effort making collective claims of target authorities. More precisely "Tilly states that a campaign always links at least three parties: a group of claimants,

³³ Lim, M. (2012). Clicks, Cabs, and Coffee Houses: Social Media and Oppositional Movements in Egypt, 2004-2011. *Journal of Communication*, 231-244. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01628.x

³⁴ Tilly, C. (2004). *Social Movements, 1768-2004*. Boulder, Colorado, USA: Paradigm Publishers. p. 53.

some object(s) [or target(s)] of claims, and a public of some kind"³⁵ The key term in this definition is "sustained." This term, and its effect on the Youth movement, will be revisited later on in this section. Insofar as "an organized public effort" is concerned, however, there is very little doubt that the youth created, organized, and held numerous demonstrations throughout Cairo, Alexandria, Ismailia and other cities during the Egyptian Revolution. These demonstrations consisted of tens of thousands, sometimes even millions, of youth gathering in protest. The youth - the claimants - organized these highly public efforts in order to demand the removal of President Mubarak. During the 18 days of protest, the youth united under a single cause - the cause which called for the end of Mubarak and the NDP's 30 year rule over Egypt. Mubarak would thereby be considered the object or target of the youth's claims. As it will also be discussed later on in this section, the lack of unified goals or demands other than this would cause fractionalization within the Youth movement, but when focusing solely on the timeframe of the revolution, the youth certainly met the campaigns definition.

The second element of consideration is "repertoire." Also according to Charles Tilly, repertoire is the employment of combinations of the various forms of political action: creation of special purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, pamphleteering, etc. As it will be discussed in the *Involvement and the Tier System* or section 4.2 of this thesis, the youth used numerous means to encourage their fellow Egyptians to take part in the revolution. The youth held rallies, demonstrations, and protests in the streets. Online and in their homes they hosted debates and discussions with family and friends. The youth certainly maintained the repertoire necessary to form a social movement.

³⁵ Kriesi, H. *Swiss Political Science Review*. 2009, Vol. 15 Issue 2, p341-349. 9p. Political Science Complete. <http://0eds.a.ebscohost.com.umiiss.lib.olemiss.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=66b4c799-062c-4193-8c81-71a5bb2f94f7%40sessionmgr4003&vid=14&hid=4208>

Finally, Tilly describes WUNC displays as participants' concerted public representation of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitments on the part of themselves and/or their constituencies. As previously mentioned, the youth undeniably had the numbers to qualify as a social movement. News sources estimate that approximately 2 million activists (of all ages) were in Tahrir Square during the 18 days of Revolution. Finding sources to estimate solely the number of youth present were extremely difficult to find, yet with youth making up such a large portion of the population and of the active population (according to collected data), it can be stated that their numbers are vast enough to qualify. The worthiness to be labeled as a social movement and the commitment to their cause go hand-in-hand with the youth movement's willingness and determination to achieve its goal given the violence of the revolution. Hundreds of young men and women were killed in the clashes against riot police during protests. Their level of commitment goes as far as the last full measure of devotion - self-sacrifice - and requires no further inquiry. However, the unity portion of WUNC does require further analysis.


What initially unified the protestors on January 25th, 2011, was the demand for an end to police brutality. Their demand was the result of months of escalation in altercations with policemen, culminating with the death of Khaled Said in June of 2010. January 25th, Police Appreciation Day, was chosen as the day for protests due to its irony and to display their displeasure with the police. However, as protests grew and activists refused to go home, the demand shifted. On January 28th, 2011, protestors officially began demanding the "fall of the regime" or, in other terms, Mubarak's resignation. The young activists shared this one goal but as will be explained further in the following section, the members of the Youth movement were so varied in ideology, religion, and other social strata that once this demand was met, the unity of the Youth movement was instantly under pressure. During the 18 days of demonstrations that

took place across Egypt, however, the unification of the young activists was strong enough to bring together all sorts of people from all types of background and beliefs.

In conclusion, the youth movement met the vast majority of criterion for a social movement put forth by Charles Tilly, however, two aspects of these criteria require further investigation: sustainment and unity (common goals). To best explain the role of sustainment and unity in the Youth movement, this thesis will introduce the concept of *Horizontal* and *Vertical* movements.

2.3.1 *Horizontal and Vertical Movements*: As discussed previously, the youth's role in the revolution was not confined by age restrictions as a demographic within a broader movement but was prominent enough to form its own social movement. This movement included young people from all sorts of group identities (gender, class, religion, etc) in order to best inform and promote their cause, the resignation of Mubarak, throughout the country. Yet, due to the nature of a movement with such varying people and ideologies, the unity created for the sole purpose of Mubarak's resignation would eventually run its course. The course for the Youth movement, lasted 18 days. As seen in Figure 2.1, the Youth movement represented a *Horizontal* type of movement, in that it included all different types of people and beliefs under the same umbrella for a single cause. Mubarak's resignation united Egyptians of various political affiliation, religion, etc briefly as a movement of their own.

Figure 2.1



The question of sustainability, however, remains. How long does a social movement need to remain unified to be considered "sustained"? In his definition of social movements, Tilly does not provide a time frame. "Sustained" is left as a relative term. For the youth to be considered a social movement of their own did they need to last one day? one week? one month? one year? Or does "sustained" simply mean "as long as necessary" to complete to object or target of the claimants? To aid in answering these questions, the concept of *Horizontal* and *Vertical* movements was developed by this author.

This thesis will begin by describing what the Youth movement was **not**. The Youth movement was not united by an ideology or religious beliefs or based off some political platform. These types of staunch, clear-cut groups are known as *Vertical* movements. *Vertical* movements in Egypt during the time of the revolution consisted of parties and organizations such as the National Democratic Party (Mubarak's party), the liberal *Wafd* party, and the extreme Islamist group *Jama'at Islamiya*. Each of these groups has a solid platform or principles, they host meetings or some type of gathering with its members, and they each have a firm

organizational structure. Many of these types of groups also incorporate membership identifications such as cards or numbers for their members so each participant is aware of their membership. Each of these groups is defined by particular interests, goals, ideology, or other identities. These movements are unified in their respective platforms, but most importantly, they have stood the test of time. The Muslim Brotherhood, another *Vertical* movement, has been in Egypt since 1928. The *Wafd* party has been in existence since 1919, *Jama'at Islamiya* since the 1970s, and the NDP since the 1980s. These social movements have been sustaining themselves for decades.

How does the Youth movement compare to these *Vertical* social movements? To answer this question, this thesis will examine the organization and leadership of the Youth movement to determine its unity and to explore its sustainability as a movement.

2.3.2 Organizing the Youth Movement: Throughout research on who it was that organized the first day of protests, the Day of Revolt on January 25th, 2011 against police brutality, it was discovered that there was very little evidence to support any one particular group or person. As *The Guardian* reported near midnight on January 24th, 2011: "An unlikely alliance of youth activists, political Islamists, industrial workers and hardcore football fans have pledged to join a nationwide "day of revolution" on a national holiday to celebrate the achievements of the police force."³⁶ Along similar lines *Muftah* reported in a *Historical Appraisal of Egypt's January 25th "Day of Wrath"* on January 27th that:

"[t]he protests were initiated and carried out without the guidance of any specific political party...As such, in many ways, the demonstrations have served more as an expression of a middle class awakening and less as a vehicle for any specific party agenda."³⁷

³⁶ Shenker, J. (2011, January 24). Egypt Braced for 'Day of Revolution' Protests. *The Guardian*.

³⁷ Elshami, N. (2011, January 27). A Historical Appraisal of Egypt's January 25 'Day of Wrath': Incentives, Characteristics, & Implications. *Muftah*. Retrieved March 10, 2014, from <http://muftah.org/a-historical-appraisal-of-egypts-january-25-day-of-wrath-incentives-characteristics-implications-by-nancy-elshami/#.U1IMVy9hOXug>

With that being said, however, throughout the research it was also clear that The April 6 Movement and the Facebook group "We Are Khaled Said" both deserved at least a portion of responsibility and credit for organizing the initial protests of January 25th, 2011. According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; "The April 6 Youth Movement, together with the 'We are All Khaled Said' Facebook Page, played a major role in organizing the January 25 demonstrations that sparked the uprising in Egypt."³⁸

2.3.3 The April 6 Movement: The April 6 Youth Movement was founded in March of 2008 when youth activists from Al-Ghad and the Labor Party called for a general strike in solidarity with a strike organized by textile workers in Mahalla scheduled for 6 April 2008.³⁹ The New York Times described the April 6th Movement on January 22, 2009 as:

[A] group of 70,000 mostly young and educated Egyptians, most of whom had never been involved with politics before joining the group. The movement... formed more or less spontaneously on Facebook last spring around an effort to stage a general nationwide strike. Members coalesce around a few issues — free speech, economic stagnation and government nepotism — and they share their ideas for improving Egypt.⁴⁰

The April 6 Movement was founded by Ahmed Maher, Mohammed Adel, Waleed Rashed and Asmaa Mahfouz. According to their website, the 6 April Movement defines itself as: A group of Egyptian youth of all ages, classes, geographic regions and intellectual and political affiliations.⁴¹ The April 6 Movement claims focus on a love of Egypt and a desire to change the current situation for the better. At the time of the movement's founding they decided to see to their "idea of light" to establish a political movement designed to resist the corrupt regime, to

³⁸ April 6 Youth Movement. (2010, September 22). *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Retrieved March 11, 2014, from <http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/09/22/april-6-youth-movement/h3h7?reloadFlag=1>

³⁹ Korany, B., & Mahdi, R. E. (2012). Chapter 6: Youth Movements and the 25 January Revolution. *Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and Beyond*. New York and Cairo: Oxford University Press and The American University in Cairo Press.

⁴⁰ Shapiro, S. M. (2009, January 22). Revolution, Facebook-Style. *The New York Times*.

⁴¹ Adel, M. (2014, January 1). Who Are We?. *The 6 April Youth Movement*. Retrieved March 10, 2014, from <http://6april.org/us.php>

contribute to veto activity, and to rely on the work of peaceful protestors.⁴² The website goes on to praise the notion of peaceful resistance stating that change is not legitimate unless it is done through peaceful means.

2.3.4 *We Are All Khaled Said:* Following the tragic death of Khaled Said, Egyptian-born Google executive, computer engineer, and internet activist, Wael Ghonim founded a Facebook page titled "We Are All Khaled Said." The page initially published posts about Said's case but the page quickly spiraled into an all-out campaign against police brutality and rights abuses in Egypt - becoming a clearinghouse for information, posting often-graphic photo and video, and publishing the names of allegedly abusive cops.⁴³ Sherif Mansour, a senior program officer for Freedom House, credits the page with turning police brutality into a popular debate.⁴⁴ The Facebook page, later discovered to be administered Wael Ghonim, organized demonstrations in honor of Said, before the eighteen days of protest even began. As of January 22nd, 2011, its membership was approaching 380,000, which made it the country's largest and most active online human-rights activist group at that time.⁴⁵ As briefly mentioned in Chapter 1:

"After protestors in Tunisia ousted their country's autocratic president...'We Are All Khaled Said' shifted gears to an aggressive political tone. Within days the page began sounding the call for a large-scale demonstration in Cairo [on] Tuesday January 25th, with demands ranging from ending police brutality and a \$180 minimum wage, to dissolving parliament⁴⁶

2.3.5 *Social Media in the Youth Movement:* Both the April 6 Movement and "We Are All Khaled Said" relied heavily on social media to spread the word of the first protests on January 25th, especially as both movements exist almost entirely in the cyber-sphere. The importance of social media to these two groups can not be overstated. As Mike Giglio, a

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Giglio, M. (2011, January 22). 'We Are All Khaled Said': Will the Revolution Come to Egypt?. *The Daily Beast*.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Newsweek reporter and *The Daily Beast* contributor, writes: "Social media has been another tool—and a crucial one—both in coordinating among activists and in spreading the word, particularly because Egyptian media is so tightly controlled."⁴⁷ Giglio continues by quoting Wael Ghonim, founder of "We Are All Khaled Said," as saying: "I don't know how we could do without [social media] under the current circumstances. Before, it was so much more difficult to reach out."⁴⁸

Social media was relied on so heavily, in fact, that both movements worried there would be no physical presence at the demonstrations or protests they were trying to organize. To counter this concern, Ghonim used his Facebook page to urge people to organize by traditional means as well, even posting links to flyers to be downloaded and distributed.⁴⁹ These leaflets were distributed days before the January 25th protests.⁵⁰ The April 6 Movement also shared concerns over the possibility of a lack of physical involvement in protests. To encourage Egyptian youth to take part in the demonstrations on the street, the founders wrote, "[We] have to combine the use of modern media and various online social networking sites between the traditional means such as demonstrations, strikes, and sit ins"⁵¹ on their platform page.

2.3.6 Where There is No Vision, The People Perish⁵²: Despite the positive features of social media, the online tool also created a web of organizational and unification weaknesses for the Youth movement. As explained by Nancy Elshami: "Galvanized by social networking sites, which have played a critical role in both the planning and spread of the revolts, the majority of participants [in the Egyptian Revolution] reportedly have no history of political involvement or

⁴⁷ Giglio, M. (2011, January 22). 'We Are All Khaled Said': Will the Revolution Come to Egypt?. *The Daily Beast*.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Adel, M. (2014, January 1). Who Are We?. *The 6 April Youth Movement*. Retrieved March 10, 2014, from <http://6april.org/us.php>

⁵² Soloman. (2002). Chapter 29:18. *Holy Bible: The King James Version*. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan.

particular party affiliation."⁵³ The April 6 website contradicts Elshami's statement, describing the members of the April 6 Movement as a group of volunteers that have "[primarily] relied on experience and the development of tools and new ways of political resistance."⁵⁴ Yet, the April 6 Movement only had 3 years of experience using social media to organize mass protests at the time of the Egyptian Revolution. Their website also reveals an additional weakness: a decision not to affiliate with or establish any existing platforms.

As stated on their website:

The movement does not follow any specific ideas or ideologies and does not follow any party or person, our only goal is the common good of our country without any hidden agenda or personal interests in order to ensure democratization during the transitional period until the arrival of an elected civilian authority to run the country.⁵⁵

This decision enabled the April 6 Movement and the Facebook page "We Are All Khaled Said" to create what this author established as a *Horizontal* movement; however, with no party affiliation, no centralized leadership, and a refusal to join forces with any other ideological forces, the Youth movement limited their capabilities greatly for growth and for the formation of a political arm for the Youth movement at the conclusion of the revolution.

Furthermore, in the wake of the 6 April protests, the April 6 Movement drafted a founding declaration in which it stated that it sought to change Egypt through youth activism. In its declaration, the group maintained that there was no substitute for systemic change which would be brought about not by the intellectuals and politicians, who are disconnected from the

⁵³ Elshami, N. (2011, January 27). A Historical Appraisal of Egypt's January 25 'Day of Wrath': Incentives, Characteristics, & Implications. *Muftah*. Retrieved March 10, 2014, from <http://muftah.org/a-historical-appraisal-of-egypts-january-25-day-of-wrath-incentives-characteristics-implications-by-nancy-elshami/#.U1MVy9hOXug>


⁵⁴ Adel, M. (2014, January 1). Who Are We?. *The 6 April Youth Movement*. Retrieved March 10, 2014, from <http://6april.org/us.php>

⁵⁵ Ibid.

masses, but rather through the struggles of the simple people who have a real interest in change.⁵⁶

By choosing not to establish a set of ideals for an Egypt post-Mubarak and by choosing to alienate other generations including those with the clout to understand the political game that would follow the Egyptian Revolution, the Youth movement severely affected its chances of forming a formidable, organized, or unified, political arm following the revolution. The youth did not have the experience, the political mind, or the forward thinking to consider the consequences of these decisions.

In short, the youth were not organized, they were led by two distinctly different groups, they did not partake in physical meetings, and in fact, many in their group were concerned with the possibility of having no physical appearance in the street demonstrations. They were not unified outside of their desire for the end of Mubarak's 30 year rule. For these reasons, the Youth movement was also not sustainable in the long run. See Figure 2.2.



⁵⁶ Korany, B., & Mahdi, R. E. (2012). Chapter 6: Youth Movements and the 25 January Revolution. *Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and Beyond*. New York and Cairo: Oxford University Press and The American University in Cairo Press.

Even though it sustained long enough to accomplish its main goal of removing Mubarak, the other desires of the various and differing members of the Youth movement (discussed in *The Future Belongs to Those Who Believe in the Beauty of Their Dreams* - section 4.4) would eventually lead to its collapse and inability to challenge the existing *Vertical* movements in the elections following Mubarak's resignation. A movement with such qualities has been determined by this author to be a *Horizontal* movement.

The Youth movement, and *Horizontal* movements in general, are inclusive movements that cross barriers, absorb all types of interests, job types, and even various demographics such as race, religion and gender. As Yasmine El-Rashidi, a Cairene, frequent contributor to the *New York Review of Books*, and author of the collection on the Egyptian Revolution titled "*The Battle for Egypt*" observed:

"In an ominous turn, Egyptian activists have declared solidarity with Tunisian rioters...the cumulative discontent of the elections, the religious persecution, and the long-standing economic troubles that plague the majority of the nation's 80 million population, may very well unite disparate groups, bringing them together in a larger, more forceful movement for change"⁵⁷

The youth certainly united, but only momentarily. Youth from all across Egypt, connected through social media, uniting for a single cause. Yet for *Horizontal* movements, once that cause is met, the movements will crumble unless they establish some distinct set of guiding principles and/or they establish a clear, organized structure for its members.

⁵⁷ Al-Zubaidi, L., & Cassel, M. (2013). Introduction and Cairo, City in Waiting. *Diaries of an Unfinished Revolution: Voices From Tunis to Damascus*. New York: Penguin Group.

III. Methodology

3.1 Survey Format:

In order to explore the role of youth in the Egyptian Revolution, forty-four mixed method surveys were conducted. The survey questionnaires, both the English and Arabic versions, can be found in the Appendix. Section A of the surveys consists of quantitative questions concerning the participants, namely basic demographics concerning their age, gender and educational level. Section B includes numerous qualitative, open-ended response questions regarding the participants' feelings about the Mubarak regime and their self-described role in the revolution. Section B also asks why and how they decided to become involved and whether or not non-active participants would have changed their role given the chance. Section C is a mixed-methods portion with simple multiple choice questions as well as open-ended questions about the participants' use of technology and social media.

3.2 Distribution of Surveys:

The surveys were conducted in April-May of 2013 in Alexandria, Egypt. Identical surveys were offered to participants in both Arabic and English. Participants were allowed to choose the language with which they felt more comfortable. Seventeen surveys were filled out in English, while the other twenty-seven were completed in Arabic. The surveys were printed at the University of Alexandria and conducted through two means of non-probability convenience sampling. A large portion of the surveys were handed out by two professors to their family members, friends, and students. If the surveys were handed out to students, the professors were asked not to distribute them during class for the university did not grant permission to conduct

research with students during class-time. A smaller portion of surveys were distributed at a fitness center in the upscale neighborhood of Kafr Abdo, Alexandria, for two consecutive days during the center's peak hours.

3.3 Coding:

Coding, as mentioned in the following sections, proved difficult on a number of occasions. Many respondents, for example, gave multiple reasons for choosing whether or not to get involved and especially for how they used technology to get involved in the revolution. In order to reflect the variety of means of involvement and use of technology in the revolution I allowed each respondent an unlimited number of answers. For example, Respondent #8 wrote that he decided to get involved because "[he] too [sought] democracy and freedom. [He] wants them for his children" (#8). To code each survey, buzz words were used to group ideas together. In the case of Respondent #8, "democracy", "freedom" and "children" were three different buzz words used too represent three different codes and three different reasons for involvement. "Democracy" was representative of code #8, or a desire for democracy. "Freedom" was representative of code #7, which likewise represented a desire for freedom. The reference to children throughout survey responses reflected a desire for a better future or improvements in the future that would make the lives of their children better. Therefore "children" became a buzz word for code #1, desire for a better future. Overall, Respondent #8 reflected three reasons for involvement: a desire for a better future, a desire for freedom, and a desire for democracy.

Of course, some responses did not offer precise buzz words or were similar to any other response category in their explanations. These responses were coded separately as their own code number and after re-coding some were combined into broader ideas (such as a desire for a

better future or a desire for change) but some like code #13, Responsibility towards country, remained outside of the major code groups and were left as separate codes. For this reason and because respondents were allowed an unlimited number of possible answers, the codebook for survey responses reflects a high number of varying ideas. In the answer to the question: "If active, why did you decide to get involved?" for example, there were 15 different codes.

3.4 Shortcomings:

By using convenience sampling, there are certain biases with the surveys and the collection strategy to be addressed. First, the participants were all from the urban center of Alexandria and therefore can not accurately reflect the whole of Egypt, especially the sentiments of rural Egyptians. Also, the surveys reflect the views of a highly educated portion of the population. As described previously, UNESCO reports that 66.4% of adult Egyptians (15 and older) were literate in 2006, while 84.9% of youth (15-24) were literate.⁵⁸ The results from the survey respondents for this thesis indicate a portion of the population that vastly surpasses these averages. For example, greater than 93% of participants reported an educational level of tertiary schooling (undergraduate) or higher. Thus, 93% of survey respondents could not only read and write but they could do so at the university level, whereas only 84.9% of youth (66% of the adult population) could do basic reading and writing.

In addition to being highly educated, many respondents were also quite young. A great majority of survey-takers (84%) were under the age of 35, with only one participant over the age of 56. As stated in section 2.2, the median age of survey takers was in the 20-25 age range. The survey data collected from these respondents will thus represent a very particular portion of

¹² UNESCO. (2011). *UIS Statistics in Brief*. Retrieved from http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=121&IF_Language=en&BR_Country=2200

highly educated, urban, youth. By choosing to conduct surveys at a local gym in Kafr Abdo, my results will also be skewed in part towards a portion of the population that could afford a gym membership in a middle to upper-class region of Alexandria.

However, despite the afore-mentioned drawbacks, this data remains important and highly relevant for this research. These statistics accurately reflect the average participants in the revolution - which this thesis contends to be and literature on the Egyptian Revolution (see section 2.2) support: young, educated, and urban Egyptians.

This thesis will explore the role of Egyptian youth in detail in order to determine if, why, and how these highly educated youth - while facing economic instability and the growing danger of police brutality - were so active in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. Even though the data cannot accurately reflect all of Egypt, it will provide the perfect sampling for the focus of such a project. The data collected will enable this thesis to provide a more authentic representation of the youth in particular and of their role in the Egyptian Revolution.

Yet, the section on biases would not be complete without addressing the probability of hindsight affecting the results. It is important to discuss how hindsight may have affected the answers provided by the respondents. As previously mentioned, respondents were asked to describe how they felt about the Mubarak government *before the uprising*; however, some respondents discussed their anger with the current turn of events in the country.

At the time the surveys were being conducted, Egypt was being controlled by a democratically-elected Muslim Brotherhood regime under President Mohammed Morsi. This regime was plagued with frequent strikes, demonstrations, and protests in a show of displeasure against the result of the revolution up until that time. Events like the Port Said Stadium Riot on February 1st, 2012, increased tensions amongst Egyptians and raised questions on the reliability

of the new government. Certain actions by the president and members of his regime, such as the arrest of public figure and comedian Bassem Youssef, and the attempt to declare the presidency above the decrees of the Supreme Court,⁵⁹ led many to question whether Egypt merely traded one dictator for another.

If such surveys had been conducted in the days immediately following Mubarak's resignation in February of 2011, it is the opinion of this author that the data would have reflected a much more optimistic population and one much more favorable towards a new regime and conversely, a population much more unfavorable towards the Mubarak regime. Those previously mentioned events, such as the arrest of Bassem Youssef, undoubtedly could have created a sense of longing for the stable, more predictable days of Mubarak or at least led respondents to reconsider the revolution (see section 4.5). Those who might have initially supported the revolution in Egypt or even participated in it may have regretted their decision to be involved or questioned the power of the revolution upon witnessing the events that were to follow. These people may have gone so far as to claim that they were not involved in the revolution because they did not want to be seen as partially to blame for the undesired events which were taking place at the time that the surveys were being conducted.

Once surveys were collected and returned, data analysis began. As each survey was received, it was labeled with a randomly assigned number of one through forty-four. These numbers were used throughout the coding process as the only identifiable feature of the respondents and for reference to each survey.

⁵⁹ Kirkpatrick, D. D., & Sheikh, M. E. (2012, November 22). Citing Deadlock, Egypt's Leader Seizes New Power and Plans Mubarak Retrial. *The New York Times*.

IV. Data Analysis

4.1 General Overview:

To reiterate, before research began, in H1 I hypothesized that: The youth were the most active generation in the revolution (on average, not by population) and thus played a vital role in the revolution. Conversely in H4, I also predicted that a majority of respondents in the older generations would have approved of or viewed the government of Mubarak neutrally and thus decided not to take an active role in the revolution. I also hypothesized in H5 that women played a small but important, behind the scene role in the revolution through actions within the two least physically demanding groups of active participants (namely Tier 2 and Tier 3 which will be explained further in the following section). Within those tiers I predicted as well that in H7 social media was especially vital and that without it the revolution would not have been as successful as it was. Also addressed in section 4.2, H6 addressed my prediction that the two most popular means of involvement for active participants in the revolution would be street demonstrations and the organization of demonstrations. Finally, in H8 I proposed that active participants in the revolution chose to get involved because of the three ideals of "Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice."

After collecting and analyzing the data, many of these hypotheses were denied or found inaccurate. According to collected survey data, for example, the average of young active participants was not as large as originally hypothesized. Egyptian youth *did* play a major role in the Egyptian Revolution; however, they were much more split in their involvement than expected. Conversely, according to the data, older generations were indeed active and involved in the revolution and also, according to collected data, every survey respondent age 36 and older

described the Mubarak regime with negative sentiments. Most contradictory to my hypothesis, the data also suggests that women played a major role in the revolution, even outnumbering male activists in certain age groups. Their role was either equal to or surpassing that of men in two-thirds of the youth age groups. Counter to the hypotheses made prior to conducting research, a majority of these women were involved in street demonstrations and thus members of the first tier of activists. Due to their large role, women will be discussed frequently throughout Chapter 4. Finally, overall, rather than the poor economic situation or a desire for democracy, active participants claimed a desire for a better future as their main reason for choosing to get involved in the revolution.

To clarify, the definitions of “active” and “involved” were left to the discretion of respondents. The terms were not identified within the surveys. This was done so as not to limit the means by which a person could be considered “active.” Therefore, the extent to which a respondent was “active” or “involved” will not be evaluated. What this thesis is examining are the various methods by which respondents chose to and were able to get involved. The methods of involvement, the how, is what is being considered, not the individual respondents. To analyze these methods, qualitative responses were coded using buzz words, as described previously, to determine the main method(s) of involvement for each respondent which were then analyzed using a tier system. These tiers are based on physical involvement and of the risk associated with the method of involvement. Please note, these tiers were created to reflect the various types of ways a participant could have been involved and are not meant to label or judge the extent to which respondents were involved. Please see section 4.2 for more details.

4.2 Involvement and the Tier System:

Before beginning analysis of who and why respondents chose to get involved, it is important to clarify what it means to be "involved" or to be an "active" participant. To develop these definitions, this thesis would like to consider *how* respondents chose to get involved in the revolution. This thesis has devised a tier structure in order to best understand the means by which respondents were involved. Additionally, this thesis will also explore the role of social media within the tier structure and its importance within the Egyptian Revolution. Coding these tiers proved difficult because many respondents cited multiple means of involvement. For example, if respondents went to the streets or took part in demonstrations, they typically also discussed the ideals of the revolution with family or friends or helped to organize future protests. Despite the challenge, these tiers were designed to provide insight into the various ways participants could have been involved and does not aim to label which respondents belonged to each tier.

Tier 1 methods of involvement required physical involvement in the revolution and a high risk of personal injury. Tier 1 thus includes methods of involvement such as demonstrations, protests, or otherwise being in the streets during the 18 days of revolution. Taking part in demonstrations was by far the most popular means of involvement cited by respondents. Ninety-two percent of male respondents chose to participate in the revolution through demonstrations and protests. Seventy-one percent of female survey respondents, as well, claimed they were involved in street demonstrations. Overall, 85% of survey respondents who considered themselves "active" participants in the revolution took part in street protests and demonstrations.

The qualitative responses from members of Tier 1 offered varying views of what demonstrating in the streets entailed. In the descriptions of how they were involved in the

revolution, some Tier 1 respondents wrote short, simple remarks such as "[I] participated in [the] street" (#7), "With people on the street" (#16), or "Through demonstrations" (#32). Others offered more detailed accounts of their involvement, such as Respondents #5 and #6. Respondent #5 went to squares and spoke about the corruption of Mubarak with his friends (#5) while Respondent #6 "[w]ent to the streets [to] protest peacefully against the regime of Mubarak" (#6). The addition of "peaceful" in Respondent #6's response is important to point out because, as mentioned on the April 6 Movement's website the demonstrators truly valued the principle of non-violence to achieve Mubarak's resignation from office (see section 2.3.3). To explain further, Respondent #42 described how he went to the street and participated with demonstrators in "shouting and cheering" (#42). There was no mention in any of the collected survey responses of violent tactics or the desire for the use of violent tactics in demonstrations against Mubarak.

Data collection also revealed that Tier 1 methods such as protests did not occur solely in Tahrir Square or even in Cairo. As quoted below, Respondent #8 went to demonstrations in Alexandria, and Respondent #35 "[w]ent to Tahrir Square, Qaid Ibrahim, and Sidi Gaber" (#35). Qaid Ibrahim and Sidi Gaber are both located in Alexandria, about three hours north of Cairo. Yet, despite this fact, the main focus of news media, especially in the United States, was to show images only of Tahrir Square during the Egyptian Revolution.

Beyond the descriptions of demonstrations and their locations, the survey responses from Tier 1 members also exposed a difference of opinion in the definition of what it means to be "active." Some Tier 1 "activists" such as Respondents #41 and #38 protested multiple times. As Respondent #41 described, "[I participated] starting from the 28th of January, especially after I knew those who participated on the 25th" (#41). Respondent #38 similarly wrote: "[I] went to the street with all my friends and colleagues...we were in demonstrations from the first day, Tuesday

January 25th, until now" (#38). Yet, the collected data also revealed that some Tier 1 respondents claimed to be active participants even if they only took part in one day of protest. For example, Respondent #8 claimed he was "[I]nvolved in the Angry Friday demonstrations on the 28th in Alexandria" (#8) and Respondent #34 wrote: "I participated in [the revolution] on Friday January 28th and that was the real day of the revolution" (#34). Respondent #12 also only took part in one day of protest on the 25th of January, which was the very first day of protest for the Egyptian Revolution (#12). Since no definition of "active" was given, those who took part only once in street demonstrations considered themselves on the same level of "active-ness" as those who took part multiple times. Both groups are included in Tier 1 but it is important to understand that even within each tier, there can be a wide array of variation.

Other than taking part in the demonstrations and protests, survey respondents in Tier 1 were involved in the streets by other means. For example, some got involved in their region or jurisdiction by acting as security guards while others took to the streets in order to care for the wounded and injured. An example of regional participation can be seen in the movie *الميدان* *Al-Midan* or "The Square."⁶⁰ In the documentary film about the 18 days of protest in Tahrir Square, young people can be seen acting as security guards at checkpoints throughout downtown Cairo. These young men and women questioned and patted down passers-by to ensure the safety of their neighborhoods and of the Square. Respondent #44 fails to specify in her response whether or not she was involved in the security of her region or how she was involved in her jurisdiction, yet this was one of the main means young people aided their neighbors during the revolution. Respondent #44, however, does reveal that, in addition to working within her region, she cared for the wounded and injured protestors during those 18 days. In her qualitative response she

⁶⁰ Noujaim, J. (Director). (2013). *Al Midan*: Noujaim Films, Worldview Entertainment, Roast Beef Productions.

wrote: " [I was involved in the revolution by]... juristic [(regional)] participation and healing the wounded/ injured ones" (#44). Respondent #44 provides an example of the type of high-risk, supporting roles necessary to enable the revolution in the street. Also mentioned in the movie *Al-Midan*, Egyptians provided water, food, shelter, first aid, and even music for those protestors in Tahrir Square. These people, such as Respondent #44, risked their lives to take care of others. Even though the collected data only revealed one such unsung hero it is important that their role not be diminished.

Tier 2 activists, like those that took part in street demonstrations, were also varied and inconsistent with their definition of active, yet unlike those in Tier 1, their methods were less risky and did not require a physical presence. Tier 2 methods of involvement include; organizing protests or demonstrations, raising awareness of the revolution through the distribution of literature or oral communication, and convincing others of the positive aspects of the revolution. Activists in this tier enabled others to get physically involved or encouraged others to get involved. This tier is centered around mobilization and making protests happen. It is within Tier 2 that the use of social media had its greatest impact on the Egyptian Revolution. Technology and networking in the hands of Tier 2 activists enabled the organization of and planning for each protest. Members of this tier, along with social media, would not allow the revolution to fizzle out. Even though it required members of the first tier to execute these plans, the revolution could not have happened without Tier 2 activists working behind the scenes.

Even though Respondent #40 was also involved in street demonstrations, she provides a prime example of an important Tier 2 method of involvement: the organization of demonstrations. In her response, Respondent #40 wrote that she "[w]ent to the street, organized demonstrations and participated in them" (#40). The planning of protests was no easy task, and

certainly not one with a lack of risk, especially if using social media. By creating an event on Facebook, for example, the event creator's name would be listed as the admin for the page, very obviously declaring who was responsible for the protests. Despite this risk and the commitment required to plan and organize such an event, Egyptian youth, such as Respondent #40, continued to take part in these methods.

Less risky, yet still physically involved were the methods of raising awareness and convincing others to get involved in the revolution. Like Respondent #1 writes: "[I] participated in [the revolution] by convincing people to believe in the principles of the revolution...my parents prevented me to participate by action [in demonstrations] [so I participated by using] my persuasion" (#1). Respondent #36 likewise worked to get people involved. In addition to going to demonstrations, Respondent #36 sent electronic and personal invitations in order to try and raise awareness about the revolution (#36). As mentioned previously, social media was an important tool used by Tier 2 activists to encourage others to participate in the revolution. This is especially the case for survey-takers such as Respondent #25. Respondent #25 described that he first "[p]articipated by talking and convincing [his] family - both extended and immediate - as well as [his] neighbors about [his] opinions and beliefs towards the revolution then [he] started participating using Facebook" (#25) The key word in his response is "convinced." By "convincing" his family and neighbors to take part in the revolution, Respondent #25 is considered a Tier 2 activist, however, if he had just "spread the word" or "talked" with his family about the revolution that would change his role to that of a Tier 3 activist. In the last line of his response, Respondent #25 fails to specify precisely *how* he participated in the revolution using Facebook, which leads to the question: How was social media used during the revolution?

Yet, before beginning analysis on social media, it is important to discuss the other methods used within Tier 3 by active participants in the revolution. Tier 3 methods are the most passive, least risky, and least physical means of involvement. Tier 3 activists participated in the Egyptian Revolution by spreading the word of the revolution, by following the news, or by being a member (not an admin) of revolutionary social media pages. This tier includes means of involvement not previously expressed and can come in a variety of forms, especially with the medium of technology available. This includes but is not limited to debates, talking with family members, blogging, or other intellectual involvement. Out of the 21 survey takers that claimed to be "active participants" only one was solely categorized as a member of Tier 3. Two others mentioned Tier 3 methods, yet they described involvement in demonstrations as well, thus making them members of Tier 1. These two respondents, Respondent #25 (mentioned previously) and #37, cite social media, Facebook in particular, as their means of participation beyond demonstrations. As Respondent #37 writes: "[I was involved through] demonstrations, [and by] awareness and activity through Facebook; interactions through Facebook" (#37). The only active respondent with a truly Tier 3 involvement describes her participation as follows: "I didn't really participate by going to the square (Tahrir Square) but I was following up on the news and participating though the internet, Facebook and Twitter. Both of them had a vital role in sparking this revolution" (#30).

It is interesting to note, that out of the 23 non-active participants, four claimed that they used technology to get involved in the revolution. Three of those respondents cited Tier 3 means of involvement with one unknown (Respondent #29's qualitative response was left blank). Respondent #15 wrote that he used technology in the revolution by "Connecting all of [his] friends and family" (#15). Respondent #4 and #28 similarly wrote that they used technology to

"Connect with other friends and discuss the current events and issues" (#4) and "To get information and to speak with relatives" (#28). All four of the non-active respondents cited Facebook as one of the means they got involved in the revolution, three of which cited it as their only form of technology. With so many respondents specifically naming Facebook, Twitter and other social media accounts as their means of involvement, it is important to discuss the role of social media in the Egyptian Revolution and what it means to "participate" by using social media.


4.2.1 Social Media and Technology: Based on collected data, respondents used social media and technology in thirteen major ways to get involved in the revolution. Technology includes any method of involvement that required some sort of machinery such as a mobile phone, the internet, and social media. The top five methods of involvement using technology and especially social media will be discussed in detail here but it is also important to note the less popular methods of involvement as well because those also help to display the wide array of options respondents had for getting involved. Therefore, after addressing the top five means by which technology was used in the revolution, this thesis will explore the other various methods as well.

It was hypothesized that social media was especially vital to respondents who were active in Tier 2 and Tier 3 and without it, as this thesis will explore, the revolution would not have been as successful as it was. Three respondents, as discussed above, mentioned social media such as Facebook and Twitter directly in their responses to how they were involved in the revolution. Respondent #37, a woman 20-25 years old, quoted above, described her awareness, activity, and interactions through Facebook (in addition to her role in demonstrations) as her means of involvement in the revolution (#37). Of the twenty-three respondents who agreed that they used

technology to get involved during the revolution, a full one-hundred percent stated that they used Facebook to do so. Twitter lagged behind with only 7 respondents, or 30%, claiming to have used it to get involved in the revolution. Facebook dominated even over cell phone use which only 10, or 43%, of the respondents cited to have used. The explanation for the low use of cell phones during this time, could be due in part to the shut down of the cellular satellites on January 28th.⁶¹ Yet, even though Facebook was the most popular tool of technology used by survey respondents overall in the revolution, the type of technology used varied between each method of involvement. A perfect example of this can be seen in the organization of protests and meetings, which was the number one method where technology was used to get involved in the revolution.

As it can be seen in Figure 4.1, making up nearly a third of responses, organizing meetings and protests was the top means by which survey takers were able to use technology to get involved in the revolution. As mentioned above, the organization of protests and demonstrations is a Tier 2 method of involvement and one which was vital to the process of the revolution. Without activists to pull together and plan events, the numbers involved in each protest would not have been large enough or organized enough to inflict change. It took people like Respondents #7, #5 and #6 to notify the population of protest places and times to ensure large numbers of protestors. It was apparent throughout survey responses that as well as social media, text messaging and cell phones played an important role in organizing protests. Even though only 43% of respondents claimed to have used cell phones to get involved in the revolution, the data revealed that a great majority of those that planned and organized meetings or protests used mobile phones. Respondent #7 said he sent emails or text messages to let people

⁶¹ Al Jazeera Staff. (2011, January 28). Live blog 28/1 - Egypt protests - Al Jazeera Blogs. *Al Jazeera Blogs*. Retrieved February 7, 2014, from <http://blogs.aljazeera.com/blog/middle-east/live-blog-281-egypt-protests>



know the place to meet (#7) and Respondent #5 incorporated a secret code into his text messages to tell people where to meet and protest (#5). Yet, as important as cell phones were, as described above, social media was also a very popular tool for planning demonstrations. According to the qualitative responses, it seems that cell phone use and social media were just as important to the organization of protests. Respondent #44 provides a good example of this split as he explains: "[I used] Facebook to participate with my friends in choosing/ allocating the places to meet and [a] cell phone to reach participating friends and brothers" (#44). The two forms of technology were both used to accomplish the same task.

The second highest means by which technology was used in the revolution was through the connection of friends and family. This is a perfect example of a Tier 3 method of involvement in which members took part in a very passive means of participation. Not surprisingly, every respondent that cited this as how they got involved in the revolution declared themselves as non-active participants. Also unsurprisingly, this tier heavily relied on social media to get involved as Respondent #4 described: "[I used Facebook] to connect with other

friends and discuss the current events and issues" (#4). Social media was such an important part of Tier 3 because it enabled young people and old alike to keep up with relatives, inform them of events and let them know they were still okay. Respondent #28 also only used Facebook to get involved by writing: "[I used Facebook] to get information and to speak with relatives" (#28). Only Respondent #15 cited the use of any technology other than social media. Respondent #15 used a mobile phone, email and Facebook to connect [with] all of his friends (#15).

The final three methods are all considered Tier 3 as well. These three methods: expressing opinions, sharing events and learning about events of the revolution, like connecting with family and friends, dominantly used social media as their main form of technology. For Respondent #1, Facebook enabled her to share the various events of the revolution and to express her opinion on such events. For Respondent #30, it was Twitter that provided the perfect tool. In her response, she described the importance of Twitter and social media in her role in the revolution:

"Twitter had a great part of [my role in the revolution] because of the interactive following up and sharing the news from the heart of the event. My role was to spread this information and to show my humble point of view and to make use of [the information] for the revolutionaries and leaders who were leading Egyptians to freedom" (#30).

Respondent #26 also cited Facebook and Twitter (as well as emails) as her means of "[S]haring the important events that took place at the library [of Alexandria] and the demonstrations that were held in front of it" (#26). Three respondents out of the three categories, however, acknowledged their use of cell phones in addition to social media during the revolution. One of those was Respondent #25 who wrote: "First I used Facebook to know about the current uprisings then to support them. As for the mobile phone, to convince others of my belief as well


as our rights and duties toward our country" (#25). Another was Respondent #12 who used social media and his cell phone to "Share events" (#12).

Overall, six methods were named which would fall under Tiers 1 and 2. Those methods included: Organizing protests, doing something positive for the country, participating in events, supporting the uprisings and the revolutionaries, convincing others of their rights and duties towards Egypt, and gathering friends and family to go to demonstrations. The other seven methods were listed as Tier 3 methods: Expressing opinions, informing others, discussing the current events and issues, connecting with friends and family, sharing events, learning about the events, and getting information. As is evident by the numbers and variety of these methods, there were many ways Egyptians could have chosen to get involved in the revolution other than demonstrations. There was a great deal of "behind the scenes" activism that was enabled by technology and social media. As the data reveals, social media and technology played a very important role in the revolution and without it, a great deal of "behind the scenes" planning, sharing and activism would not have existed. The data collected was not enough to support whether or not the revolution still could have successfully removed Mubarak without social media, but it was enough to show that social media certainly aided the process.

4.3 Young People and Women, Recipe for a Revolution?:

Now that the terms "active" and "involved" have been defined, this thesis will explore who it was that took part in the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. As can be seen in Figure 4.2 the youth, as previously defined, were not as involved as anticipated. The only age group under 35 in which active participants outnumber the non-active participants was in the 26-30 age group. Out of the six respondents in this group, four or 67% of respondents considered themselves active


participants. When the overall numbers are added, 17 respondents under the age of 35 considered themselves active while 20 considered themselves non-active.



Therefore, the overarching trend shows that those under age 35 were much more split in their involvement than hypothesized. This is especially evident in the 20-25 age group where the respondents were perfectly split in their involvement and overall with 46% of respondents under the age of 35 considering themselves active participants in the revolution. Based on the percentages and numbers involved, it is apparent that the youth definitely had a major role in the revolution; however, it was not as overwhelming as previously suspected. The small sampling size of this research, of course, certainly may have affected the validity of these results. With more surveys of respondents under age 35, it is hypothesized that the number of active participants in the 20-25 age range would outnumber the non-active of the same age, yet this should be a point for future study. Conversely, after data collection and analysis, what was surprising to find was the large portion of the older (non-youth) generation that claimed active

participation in the revolution. Of respondents 36 and older, 57% considered themselves active participants in the revolution. And as it can be seen in Figure 4.2, for those older than 46, three-quarters of respondents considered themselves active. This was directly in contrast to predictions established prior to conducting research, in which it was hypothesized that the older generations would comprise a small percentage of the overall active participants. Again, however, it is important to note that there were only seven respondents older than 36 years old. The older generations' role in the revolution should therefore also be a point for future study.

Beyond age, it is also interesting to examine the role women in particular played in the revolution. Out of the 17 active youth (under age 35), eight of those were women. This number



is much larger than was originally hypothesized. As Figure 4.3 above reveals, in the 20-25 age range women actually double the male active participants. In the 26-30 age range both genders were equally involved with two respondents each. As there was only one male active respondent in the 31-35 range it is impossible to know how the number of active women in that age range

would compare. Thus, only in the under 19 age group did male youth undeniably outnumber women in active participation. Given the violence and danger involved in the protests and due to cultural norms surrounding a woman's role in the country, the number of active women was expected to be much lower. According to the CIA World Fact-book, Egypt is 90% Muslim, 9% Coptic Christian and 1% other Christian.⁶² Because Egypt is a Muslim majority country, the Islamic culture is very prominent and embraced with a great deal of pride throughout the country. The numerous Islamic bumper stickers on cars and taxis, the call to prayer sounding five times a day, and the lack of business on Fridays are just a few examples of how the Muslim culture has been integrated into Egyptian daily-life. As it is believed in the Islamic faith, "A Muslim woman's main role is to care for her house and fulfill the responsibility placed on her shoulder by her Lord."⁶³ In the Islamic Hadith - sayings and teachings of Prophet Mohammed - it is stated plainly that women are to "Take care of [their] home for that is [their] *Jihad*."⁶⁴ Jihad in this situation refers to an internal struggle for Muslims to be the best Muslim they can be. Women, in the majority Islamic country of Egypt, are praised for traits such as "[T]ruthfulness, patience and perseverance, love and kindness, faith and self-confidence."⁶⁵ Therefore, for young women to deliberately take part in the "masculine" actions and dialogue of political discourse, exposure to violence, or the use of unkind words to describe the Mubarak regime and to leave their families and their homes while they protested, certainly went against these cultural expectations. As the results show, this particular group of female respondents momentarily chose

⁶² US Government - CIA, (2013). *The World Factbook*. Retrieved from U.S Government - CIA website: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html>

⁶³ Musnad. A. Muslim Woman's Role as a Mother. (2012, March 12). *On Islam*. Retrieved March 11, 2014, from <http://www.onislam.net/english/ask-the-scholar/family/children-a-parenthood/175504.html>

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

not to focus their efforts on the culturally-backed, religiously-based emphasis on family and domestic life, and instead centered it towards a broader goal for Egypt as a whole.

4.3.1 Women's Role in the Revolution: In 2011 journalist, politician, and human rights activist Tawakkol Karman accepted her Nobel Peace Prize with a speech that brought an entire international delegation to its feet in standing ovation. In her speech she wished to send the world a clear message:

Our peaceful popular youth revolution has succeeded in attracting to its ranks and marches hundreds of thousands of women who have fulfilled, and still fulfill, a major, noticeable and effective role in its activities, and in leading its demonstrations even to the smallest details. Not tens, but hundreds of these women have fallen as martyrs or been wounded for the sake of the victory of the revolution.⁶⁶

Although Karman was making reference to her native land of Yemen and the struggling revolution there, Karman uses her personal story to extend beyond Yemen to include women of every nation who took part in the events of the Arab Spring. Her message to the world was clear: Women were highly involved in the revolutions of the Arab Spring. The data collected by this thesis emphasizes that message.

For Egyptian women specifically, Yasmine El Rashidi, in her contribution to the book "*Diaries of an Unfinished Revolution*," highlights the importance of women's involvement in the Egyptian Revolution of 2011⁶⁷ in her first-hand account of the streets of Cairo during the Revolution. In her introduction to the non-fiction publication, award-winning Syrian writer and journalist Samar Yazbeck also emphasizes their importance, encouraging readers to "[pause] to consider the role [women] have played in events..."⁶⁸ The introduction also reiterates the

⁶⁶ Tawakkol, K. Nobel Lecture: In the name of God the Compassionate the Merciful." Nobelprize.org. 31 Mar 2013. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2011/karman-lecture_en.html

⁶⁷ Al-Zubaidi, L., & Cassel, M. (2013). Introduction and Cairo, City in Waiting. *Diaries of an Unfinished Revolution: Voices From Tunis to Damascus*. New York: Penguin Group.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

importance of women in the revolution by distinctly stating that half of the authors featured in "*Diaries of an Unfinished Revolution*" were women.⁶⁹ It is therefore imperative that the role they played in events and what the future holds for them be discussed here.

As previously mentioned, 48% of respondents who considered themselves active participants in the Egyptian Revolution were women. Why did these women choose to get involved? A desire for better education for women could certainly have been a factor. In Egypt, women have the same legal right to education as men, yet literacy levels are lower among adult females (59.7%) than adult males (83.3%) and among young women (79%) than young men (90%) for ages 15-24.⁷⁰ However, the gender gap in tertiary enrollment is often in favor of women.⁷¹ For example, in 2004/2005 women represented 49% of enrollments in higher education.⁷² In fact, during the 2003-2004 school year 79% of graduates from universities with degrees in economics and political science were women.⁷³ Additionally, 78% of university graduates with degrees in language were women as well.⁷⁴ In the collected survey data, of the eight women that expressed active participation in the revolution, one-hundred percent, every respondent, had an educational level of tertiary (university) or higher. Therefore, it was not the desire for higher education that drove these women to participate. However, if the lower proportion of men entering universities indicates that men found it easier to access jobs and

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Panzica, F., Popova, N., & Alquezar, J. Women and Work in Egypt: Case Study of Tourism and ICT Sectors. *European Training Foundation*, 8.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Women in Education. (2005, January 1). *State Information Service: Your Gateway to Egypt*. Retrieved March 12, 2014, from <http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?ArtID=2264#.U1NOEdhOVYc>

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

economic opportunities⁷⁵ than women, then did women choose to participate in the revolution out of a desire for better economic opportunities and jobs?

A desire for the ability to work and for high-income jobs could also have been a factor; especially because being financially independent is of extreme importance to women in Egypt due to *خلع* *Khola*^c. *Khola*^c is a woman's right to divorce *if* she can financially support herself. For lower-class women seeking a divorce without university education or formal training, they are left with little options. However, again, for these respondents, a desire for financial independence does not explain why they chose to get involved. As discussed previously, a vast majority of survey respondents were middle to upper-class and were highly educated. These women would presumably be financially stable enough to receive a divorce, and if they did not already have a job, with their higher degrees they would be more competitive in the job market.

The ability and likelihood of taking part in politics and government is a much more probable reason that this group of female respondents would have chosen to get involved, but even that is still not sufficient. Women have had the right to equally participate in the labor force and within the government as men for years due to the hard work of women's rights activists in the 1950s. In the Constitution of 1956, women gained full suffrage. More recently, the year 1971 highlighted total equality between men and women as Article 40 of the Constitution provided that all citizens were equal before the law and that they had the same rights and responsibilities.⁷⁶ Article 40 also emphasizes that no distinction shall be made between Egyptians on account of gender, origin, language, religion, or faith.⁷⁷ Thus, Article 40 grants women the same rights to education, voting and candidature to elections as men. Yet, despite their *ability* to be involved in

⁷⁵ Panzica, F., Popova, N., & Alquezar, J. Women and Work in Egypt: Case Study of Tourism and ICT Sectors. *European Training Foundation*, 8.

⁷⁶ Women in Politics. (2014, January 1). *State Information Service: Your Gateway to Egypt*. Retrieved March 12, 2014, from http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?ArtID=2258#.U1NQG_IdWSp

⁷⁷ Ibid.

Egyptian politics, the number of women that are *actually* involved is exceptionally low, even when compared to countries in the same region. The global average of women in the Lower House of Parliament is 18.5%. In the Arab world that number is 9.7%, but in Egypt, an average of only 5% of Parliament seats in the Lower House are occupied by women.⁷⁸

Table 1: Women's representation in Egyptian Parliament

Year	No. of women elected	No. of women appointed by president	Total % of women in parliament
1979 (11 Nov-21 April)	4	2	1.6%
1979 (23 June-20 March 1984)	33	2	9.7%
1984-1987	35	1	7.8%
1987-1990	14	4	3.9%
1990-1995	7	3	2.2%
1995-2000	9	4	2%
2000-2005	7	4	2.4%
2005-2010	4	5	2%
2010	65	1	13%
2011/2012	7	2	2.2%

Tadros, M. Bringing Gender Justice to the Egyptian Parliament. *IDS In Focus Policy Briefing*, 1.

By examining Table 1, provided by the Institute of Development Studies, it is evident that women have not held more than 3.9% of total parliament seats since 1987. The only exception occurred in 2010 when the Egyptian government attempted to encourage women to run for parliament by adopting a quota system that gave women 12 percent of the seats in parliament in 2010.⁷⁹ Sixty-four seats contested only by women were added to the 454 seats of the People's

⁷⁸ Mak, H. Politics and Media Lecture, Alexandria, Egypt. Spring 2013.

⁷⁹ Tahawy, R. E. (2013, September 29). Egypt Rights Groups Demand Quotas for Women in Parliament. *Features*. Retrieved March 11, 2014, from <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2013/09/29/Calls-rise-for-quota-of-Egyptian-women-parliament.html>

Assembly.⁸⁰ Overall, these statistics reveal that labor force participation and parliamentary involvement for women in Egypt during 2011 was exceptionally low yet research also indicates that the Mubarak regime attempted to encourage women to participate in politics by adopting the quota system in 2010. However, it should be noted that although the quota system may have been put into place to quell rising protests in 2010, it is unlikely that the system was solely developed for that purpose. The system had existed previously during the early years of Mubarak's regime in the 1980s (see 1984-1987 in the above chart) yet it was removed. In 2010 Constitutional Reforms were taking place to address those laws which had previously existed. Therefore, although it is logical to assume that the quota system was put in place by the government to help ease rising tension to some extent, it is impossible to deny that the system coincided with the Constitutional Reforms of 2007 and 2010 when a variety of other reforms were also being put into place.

Thus, if the survey respondents already had the higher education and the financial stability and were then being encouraged to become involved in Egyptian politics, why would they have put themselves at risk? Why get involved? Going a step further, why would any of the survey takers have chosen to get involved?

4.4 The Future Belongs to Those Who Believe in the Beauty of their Dreams⁸¹:

Overall, seventy-seven percent of survey respondents described negative sentiments regarding the government of Hosni Mubarak, yet only 48% of respondents considered themselves active participants in the revolution to overthrow him. What motivated the 48% to get involved? Why did the other 52% choose not to get involved? This section of the thesis will

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Quote by Eleanor Roosevelt

explore qualitative data from surveys to explain why Egyptians chose (or did not choose) to participate in the Egyptian Revolution of 2011.


In their open-ended responses, survey takers cited numerous reasons for their disapproval. In general, the responses reflected views such as "I grew up with thieves in the costumes of authorities" (#41) and "[I felt the Mubarak regime was] a totalitarian government" (#8) and "I hate him, he was a big thief and there was no democracy in our country" (#17). One respondent even wrote "I hated Hosni, he ruined everything" (#12). Broad statements such as "It wasn't good at all, it made a lot of people suffer" (#28) were also quite common in the responses.

More specifically, however, a vast majority of respondents described the Mubarak regime as a government plagued with corruption. As Respondent #29 described: "It was a corrupted government. We lived in injustice and oppression for 30 years" (#29). The accusations of corruption were emphasized again and again. Respondent #32 wrote: "I was feeling so much anger towards [the government of Hosni Mubarak] because of the corruption and the disrespect for dignity" (#32). Respondent #35 echoed with: "It was a very bad government and very corrupted [I know this] because I lived it myself" (#35). According to Respondents #36 and #37, the corruption of the regime was nothing new and had been occurring for years. In his statement on his feelings of the Mubarak regime before the revolution, Respondent #36 described this sentiment by writing: "[The] corruption, oppression and all the incidents through all the previous years are proof of [my unsatisfied feelings towards the regime]" (#36). Respondent #37, similarly observed that the Mubarak regime was a corrupted and betraying government, through her following of its performance (#37). As is evident by the sheer number of qualitative responses, this sentiment was shared by numerous survey-takers.

Beyond corruption, respondents also wrote of the Mubarak regime's favor for businessmen and the current state of the economy. Although similar, corruption and caring only for businessmen are two separate ideas. By caring for big businesses, Mubarak revealed that he did not care about the majority of the country (which is middle to lower class) and that rather than being concerned over education, social issues, or foreign policy - among other important things - Mubarak, the NDP, and the rest of his regime (were perceived to) only care about making money. With this perception, the people of Egypt could understandably feel disconnected from their presumed greedy and wealthy leaders. Respondent #21 provides a good example of this disconnect as she writes: "There was corruption in Mubarak's government and he didn't care for the simple citizen, he only cared for certain businessmen..." (#21). Respondent #9 mimicked these feelings in his survey as he stated: "[I felt] injustice [and] corruption because [the government of Hosni Mubarak] cared only for the rich and [the] businessmen" (#9). Interestingly, however, the economy and concern with favoritism towards big business were not cited as top reasons overall for choosing to participate in the Egyptian Revolution. Only when broken down to analyze why women chose to get involved did the economy become a reason for involvement (see Figure 4.6). Before discussing women specifically, this thesis will first analyze the top five overall reasons why survey takers chose to get involved in the revolution.

Figure 4.6 portrays the top five reasons why survey respondents decided to participate in the revolution. Throughout the Arab Spring, news sources within the United States and abroad emphasized with fervor the democratic and liberalist sentiments exploding throughout the region. Although these feelings were certainly present, they did not account for the top reason of why Egyptians chose to participate in the revolution. More than any other issue, survey respondents who were active in the Egyptian Revolution broadly claimed that they chose to participate in the

revolution in order to guarantee a better future: a better future for themselves, their children, and/or for Egypt in all aspects of the term. Respondents did not specify what part of the future they wanted to be “better.” The collected data, therefore, cannot offer detail about whether the “better” future meant: a booming economy, increased respect for human dignity, improved



education, security, etc. This thesis is thus left to assume a “better” future meant improvements in all aspects of the country, the government and the economy. These respondents worried about the course their country was following and took action in the hopes that these actions would guarantee a brighter future for their loved ones and their country. They just wanted it to be better – like every parent’s dream; they wanted their children to live a better life than they did. The specifics did not necessarily matter.

In her description of her feelings of the Mubarak regime before the revolution Respondent #22 expressed how Mubarak's regime "[Was] unfair and it didn't eliminate the spread of corruption. It also caused complete chaos and distrust in the future and a fear of the governing people..." (#22). Another respondent described his feelings of the Mubarak regime by saying: "I didn't like it at all: It didn't give hope in the future" (#5). Many respondents, like

Respondent #5, took to the streets in protest in the hopes that removing Mubarak and his regime would mean hope and a better future for their children. In his response to why he chose to participate in the revolution, Respondent #5 wrote: "I wanted to have hope in the future, [in having a] job and [a] wife" (#5). Respondent #6 echoed these feelings by writing " I wanted freedom and hope" (#6) and similarly with Respondent #12: "I wanted a better life for my children in the future" (#12). Other respondents like Respondent #40 specifically connected a better future to the removal of Mubarak's regime: "[I desired] a better future and to get rid of Mubarak regime" (#40). For some, like Respondent #41, they felt there was no bright future whatever they did; no matter what they might do, or whatever effort they might put in there was no way but the revolution. They felt their only choice, their only chance at a bright future, was through revolution (#41). Finally, for some, it was not necessarily about what the future would bring, but in just being a part of changing Egypt's future for the better (#44).

Change, itself was the second-largest reason respondents chose to get involved in the revolution. Many were tired and frustrated with Mubarak's 30 year rule, the broken social contract and the economic woes, and they hoped that by participating they would force a change in the status quo. As Respondent #37 wrote, "[I decided to get involved] because I was totally convinced of the importance of total change and I was supporting the opposition demands. It was a moment of dignity for us." Many respondents felt something needed to be done, and hoped that by joining the opposition they would force the government to pay attention to their demands. As Respondent #7 wrote: "I want[ed] change, [so] I participated in [the] street" (#7). Respondent #17 felt that revolution was the key to change as she wrote in her response: "I believe in revolution and [I] want to change the government" (#17). Egyptians, like Respondent #40, connected a better future with the removal of the government as she explains in her response: "[I

desired] a better future and to get rid of the Mubarak regime" (#40). For some, they knew the momentum of the revolution meant the time for change had finally arrived; the chance to rid Egypt of Mubarak and his National Democratic Party (NDP) was upon them, and thus they needed to get involved in order to ensure that change. Such was the case for Respondent #35. She decided to participate because she "lived it" and she knew that the time for change had arrived" (#35).

Similarly to forcing change, respondents also chose to participate in order to force an end to الفساد *Al-fasaad* or "corruption" within the Mubarak regime and the NDP. For Respondent #32, "[T]he chance to end the corrupted regime" (#32) was the only reason he decided to participate. For others, like Respondent #38, corruption was just one of many reasons, but it was still important enough to list as the first reason for her involvement. As discussed previously, many respondents described the government of Hosni Mubarak as "[A] corrupted and bad government" (#40). By removing it, jobs would be based on merit and not on connections within the government. Like Respondent #23 writes:

"[The Mubarak regime] was a corrupted government, unfair. It had a lot of weaknesses that we wanted to change so we started the Revolution of the 25th of January. Through [the revolution] we wanted to get rid of injustice, corruption, and humiliation that the Egyptian people see everyday. But none of this dream (no part of this dream) that we all wanted has been achieved [yet]" (#23)

If the government could not fix the rising inflation, if Mubarak could not prevent rising food prices, if the National Democratic Party could not cooperate on a way to create jobs - the one thing they could do was finally stop enabling and tolerating corruption within the regime.

According to survey respondents, corruption was the link to all the troubles facing the Egyptian people. This is especially the case for Respondent #1 who wrote:

For me, Mubarak and his government represent brutality and inhumanity. I wonder how we could dare to live without dignity and freedom. Indeed the

corruption of the ruling party have spread everywhere, so I hate this person called Mubarak. [Additionally] there were about 50% [of Egyptians] under the poor line in his reign. As a result, it was necessary to revolt (#1).


Respondent #2 also shared these sentiments in her response: "I felt upset and disappointed because there was corruption in all fields and injustice" (#2). For respondents, as well, the police brutality and political corruption had become too pronounced and too conspicuous for Egyptians to tolerate. For Respondent #38, for example, he admitted that he knew how "In reality Mubarak's regime was so bad..." and how "[t]here was a lot of corruption..." (#38). Respondent #38 went on to describe how, "[a]ll life and education were bad..." and "the police were so bad" as well (#38).

Similarly to corruption and police brutality, respondents named a desire to end injustice and a desire for freedom as their final top reasons for participating in the revolution. Injustice was separated from "corruption" because of specific terminology used by respondents: *الظلم* *Al-thulm* or "Injustice," was used to describe a perception of unfair or unequal treatment at the hands of the Mubarak government, the police, or the NDP. Respondent #25 describes this sentiment as he writes: "I felt I was a slave following [the Mubarak regime's] orders mainly because of their oppression and injustice, their restriction of our freedoms, as well as other types of corruption and political and governmental ignorance" (#25). Respondent #27 also shared these feelings of the Mubarak regime as she claimed that "The government was injustice. I used to hate it and I wished for it to change because of all the bad political and social conditions of the country" (#27). In her response to how she felt about the Mubarak regime before the uprising Respondent #26 wrote: "Really I used to hate the government [of Mubarak] because of the injustice towards the people and they stole our money and our freedom.." (#26). Respondent #26 goes on to say that she "...decided to participate in order to demand [her] legal rights that Allah

gave [her] and because of [the Mubarak government's] continuous injustice without any mercy" (#26).

The desire for freedom and of bringing an end to injustice motivated a combined 16% of respondents to get involved in the revolution. For some respondents, like Respondent #42, it was the only reason they got involved. In answering the question on why he chose to get involved, Respondent #42 wrote simply: "To get rid of injustice" (#42). Others, like Respondent #38, as mentioned previously, became involved for numerous reasons. As he cited in his answer, Respondent #38 became involved in the revolution "Because of the corruption, injustice and because [he] wanted a better future" (#38). With such feelings of injustice, oppression, and restraint of freedoms it is no wonder why so many respondents listed freedom as an equally important reason for getting involved. Respondent #8 stated he chose to participate "Because I too want democracy and freedom. I want them for my children" (#8). Respondent #6 adds to this sentiment by writing "I wanted freedom and hope" (#6).

For women specifically, the reasons for getting involved were much more varied and included elements not seen in the overall top five responses. As can be seen in Figure 4.7, more than a desire to shape the future, women were concerned with creating change within Egypt. The "change" these women desired was to change the government by removing Hosni Mubarak from power. As the 26-30 year old wrote: "I believe in revolution and want to change the government" (#17). Respondent #37 also emphasized these feelings in her response by writing: "[I chose to get involved] because I was totally convinced of the importance of total change and I was supporting the opposition demands...." Other than the desire for change, none of the reasons women chose to get involved were a great deal more preferred than the other: The



reasons for their involvement were perfectly spread across five justifications. Women cited a concern over the economic situation and the amount of poverty just as equally as they demanded an end to corruption, injustice and a desire for dignity. The concerns over corruption and injustice reflect similar views to men and the overall reasoning for involvement, as discussed previously. However, the focus on economic issues and the amount of poverty was something not seen in the top five overall results. Respondent #16 and Respondent #30 provide the perfect examples to aid in understanding sentiments regarding the economic situation. Respondent #16 wrote that she decided to participate in the revolution "Because of many things, like the low income [and because] there are not many services" (#16). More specifically, Respondent #30 describes how the middle class in Egypt was declining at that time:

"I decided to participate because I knew the truth, or a part of it, and because I knew how the people around me lived - because I am from the middle class that represents a majority of Egyptians - and despite the fact [that] it started to disappear [only] to be replaced by a limited income class [or lower class]" (#30).

As quoted for her views on the corruption of the Mubarak regime, Respondent #1 also brought to light a statistic that claims about 50% of the Egyptian population was under the poverty line

during the reign of the Mubarak regime (#1). Yet, why would she mind? Respondent #1 was only 17 years old and was currently obtaining or already had a university education. It would be interesting to explore in detail why these women were more concerned about the state of the economy than men at that time, especially the younger generation. This would be a good opportunity for future study.

The final reason women claimed for getting involved in the revolution was a desire for dignity. Respondent #1 wondered how Egyptians could dare to live without dignity (#1) while Respondent #37, as previously mentioned, highlights this idea by stating that the Egyptian Revolution "[w]as a moment of dignity for us" (#37). What is difficult to determine, however, is who "us" is. Is the 20-25 year old woman referring to her fellow Egyptians or specifically to Egyptian women? Did she intentionally leave this statement ambiguous so as not to attract attention to the effort by millions of women to establish themselves within the new regime (whatever that might become)? Were women so concerned with the economy and dignity because they wished to give hope and a voice to less fortunate women? Did women take part in the Egyptian Revolution to reinforce their role in society and to ensure that no new government, whatever it might be, would threaten that role? With the data collected and only Respondent #37's qualitative response as evidence, this is impossible to confirm or deny. However, what is not impossible to confirm is the large role that women did play in the revolution. Whatever their reasons for choosing to get involved, it is apparent through these women and the data they provide, that the Egyptian Revolution was only as successful as it was because of their involvement (see section 4.3.1).

4.5 Without Fear There Can Not Be Courage⁸²:

In the collected surveys, respondents also provided reasons for choosing *not* to be an active participant in the Egyptian Revolution. It is worth re-mentioning that although some survey takers labeled themselves as "non-active," some were still involved in the revolution, especially in their use of social media or more generally within Tier 3. Survey takers were greatly varied with their responses and coding proved difficult, yet the top five reasons for choosing not to be involved quickly developed into an observable pattern. Every reason for not being actively involved provides important information about the Egyptian Revolution and offers insight into the contradictory beliefs and tensions among Egyptians during this time. Overall, after analyzing the qualitative responses, the top reason for respondents choosing not to get involved was not a hatred for democracy or a desire for Islamic Law, but rather, was based on a very basic human emotion: fear.

As can be seen in Figure 4.8, twenty-six percent, greater than one-fourth of respondents, chose not to participate out of fear of injury, fear of what followed the revolution, fear of what would happen to their family if they participated, fear of what a future without Mubarak may mean... all different types of worries and concerns and all extremely valid. As El-Rashidi vividly described in her eye-witness account of the days of the revolution: "[The riot police] charges, hundreds of them, grabbing people by the scruff of their necks, kicking them beating them down hard. Many of them were dragged away, into narrow side-streets, disappearing."⁸³ El-Rashidi also described the death of a female protestor in the midst of the demonstrations: "There was the young woman, whose body was limp. They carried her out, her blood on their hands, screaming

⁸² Quote by Christopher Paolini

⁸³ Al-Zubaidi, L., & Cassel, M. (2013). Introduction and Cairo, City in Waiting. *Diaries of an Unfinished Revolution: Voices From Tunis to Damascus*. New York: Penguin Group.

for help...a young man dropped to his knees by her side, sobbing. She was his sister."⁸⁴ Finally, with gritty detail, El-Rashidi revealed the terror of learning that live ammunition was being used against protestors:

There were the sounds of bullets assaulting the chants of the crowds. Two men came sprinting from around the corner, their faces gripped with terror. 'It's real, it's real. Live ammunition, they're using live ammunition.' No one knew if it was true - we had heard this before. Minutes later, a procession with three bodies was carried into the square. One of a young child.⁸⁵


For many protestors, for the first time in their lives, they saw dead bodies lying on the streets.⁸⁶

Therefore, given the gruesome reality of the violence of the Egyptian Revolution, it is unsurprising that fear was the top reason given for not participating. One respondent simply admitted: "I was not brave enough to participate in the revolution" (#23). Others described their fears in more detail. For Respondent #24 and Respondent #14 the fear of injury was the reason they decided against involvement. As Respondent #24 explains: "I was afraid of being wounded or of dying in the demonstrations (#24). Similarly, Respondent #14 wrote: "I was worried because I'm half-Egyptian and I have kids, I was worried to get hurt and never be again with them" (#14). Other respondents were less concerned for their physical safety and instead focused on their fear of what the revolution could mean; they were "Afraid for the future" (#31) if Mubarak was to resign or be removed. Respondent #9 emphasizes this sentiment in his response: "[I decided not to get involved in the Egyptian Revolution] because I was afraid of what comes after the revolution, especially the Muslim Brotherhood and Muslim extremists" (#9). Fear is one of the factors that certainly could have been affected by hindsight (see section 4.5.1).

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.



The second-highest reason respondents did not actively participate was due to a family member (or their family in general) preventing their involvement. Seventeen percent of respondents were not allowed to participate in the revolution due to their family. Every participant that named this as a reason for not getting involved in the revolution was a woman. These female respondents were prevented from becoming active participants by their parents or by their fiancé. Respondent #2 provides a clear example of this predicament when family refuses to allow involvement as she explains: "[I did not get involved in the revolution] because my parents were afraid [since] they watched on TV [and saw that] a lot of young people [were] dead. My parents prevented me from participating in it" (#2). Respondent #4 adds to this sentiment in her response. In her answer to the question she wrote: "I did not decide that but my father refused as I am a girl and [it is] very dangerous to be in the street in this situation" (#4). Other than parents, fiancés also played a role in preventing young women from getting involved in the revolution. Such was the case for Respondent #10 who wrote in her response that she did not get involved "Because I was engaged and my fiancé didn't approve [that I] participate [since] he was against the revolution in the first place" (#10). Respondent #39 faced a similar situation stating

that she did not get involved because she was engaged and her fiancé was working in tourism at that time. As she explains further, the revolution affected his work and he didn't agree that she should participate in the revolution (#39).

With thirteen percent, the third highest group of respondents revealed they did not become active participants because they were not satisfied with the goals, aims, tactics or other aspects of the revolution at that time (see section 4.5.1). Respondent #43 puts this sentiment the most simply by stating that he did not get involved "Because I am not satisfied with this revolution" (#43). It is important to note that this respondent used the present tense in his answer to this question, even though it was asked in the past tense. This change in tenses occurred frequently throughout responses, as discussed in the Hindsight section. A similar situation exists for Respondent #33 who wrote that he initially participated in the revolution when he believed in its original aims and goals. However, since then, "[I]t all has gone and I regret what I've done" (#33) Respondent #20 was the only respondent in this category to remain in the past tense throughout his answer. Respondent #20 "[d]id not participate because [he] didn't agree with what the people did and claimed after President Mubarak's speech, including: 1. Changing the government and 2. The promise that [Mubarak] would not pass on the rule of Egypt to his son so the people *had* to respond" (#20). According to Respondent #20, revolutionaries "[n]eeded to have full awareness of the internal and external schemes" in order to properly address their issues with the Mubarak government (#20).

The final two groups did not get involved because they were either in school or because they did not think the "uprisings" would turn into a revolution. Those respondents that used "In school" as their reasoning for choosing to not get involved were all under 25 years of age, such as Respondent #27 who " ...couldn't participate because of being busy and being in

school..."(#27). At that time she was pursuing her high school diploma (#27). It is unknown which degree (high school or university) Respondent #29 was pursuing when the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 was taking place; however, she too cited school as a reason she was not able to get involved (#29). For Respondents #18 and #19, it was not a matter of school, but a matter of misinformation that determined their lack of participation. For these respondents, they did not believe that the uprisings would become the revolution they did. As Respondent #18 writes: "I did not expect [the revolution] to occur, I thought the problems of the revolution would slow it down" (#18). Likewise, Respondent #19 did not get involved because she "did not expect [the revolution] to occur" (#19). Given Mubarak's and the National Democratic Party's 30 years in power, it is understandable that a portion of Egyptians did not believe that the demonstrations in 2011 would have led to such a revolution.

4.5.1 The Effect of Post-Revolution Hindsight: This thesis contends that the portion of respondents which chose not to get involved in the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 would not have been nearly as prevalent had these surveys been conducted in the days immediately following Mubarak's resignation. Although this can not be confirmed, it needs to be addressed as an important bias from hindsight. As described in Methodology, these surveys were conducted in April and May of 2013; nearly two and a half years after the eighteen days of protest that led to Mubarak's resignation. Numerous events, a few of which were previously mentioned, took place during those two years that certainly could have affected survey responses.

As discussed in Chapter 4, fear was a major factor in deterring respondents from getting involved in the Egyptian Revolution. Of those who listed fear as a reason for their non-involvement, 75% of respondents were women. This thesis contends that events following the 18

days of protests specifically targeted women, and as a result, caused women to reconsider their decision to stay involved/get involved out of fear.

Women in particular stood a great chance of being affected by hindsight because they quickly became the targets of violence and sexual harassment. As Yasmine El Rashidi describes, in the summer of 2010, mere months before the revolution, Egypt witnessed "[A] regime's security apparatus run amok"⁸⁷ El Rashidi goes on to explain how the result of the elections "[A]side from injuries and deaths and kidnappings at the hands of State security agents and thugs, was a sweeping win by Mubarak's ruling National Democratic Party"⁸⁸ At the time, El Rashidi wrote a story for a local paper titled "Thugs for Hire." These thugs were not dismantled nor did they flee after Mubarak's resignation. Rather, they and Mubarak's police forces were (allegedly) instructed to target female protestors. El Rashidi emphasized this violence in her entry, writing how she had to "[R]un for cover, from rocks, from Molotov cocktails, from thugs"⁸⁹ In addition to thugs, women grew to fear the military and police forces following Mubarak's resignation. Revealed in numerous testimonials, Egyptian women were the victims of brutal beatings, sexual assault, and so called "Virginity Tests." The "tests" (allegedly) required women to strip naked against their will, and while waiting for the military doctor, to suffer humiliation by exposure to other officers, then to have their hymens "checked" by the doctor to confirm their virginity. Samira Ibrahim, 25, a victim of a forced virginity test after being detained in Tahrir Square, continues to the present day to battle in a case against the military doctor who performed the "test" on her. The incident took place on March 9th, 2011, yet a year later, in March of 2012, the doctor that performed the "test" was declared innocent. Ibrahim says

⁸⁷ Al-Zubaidi, L., & Cassel, M. (2013). Introduction and Cairo, City in Waiting. *Diaries of an Unfinished Revolution: Voices From Tunis to Damascus*. New York: Penguin Group.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

that despite the verdict, she's still determined to win justice for all of Egypt's women⁹⁰ Ibrahim explained that she believes that the military specifically targeted women who defied them and intended to break them emotionally. As she stated: "[For] when you break a woman, you break the entire society"⁹¹ A violent act against a woman, would send her male friends, her brother, and her father, home with her; away from the demonstrations. Thus, as women were supposed to be easier targets, harming a woman, or forcing a woman home, would dwindle the numbers and the perceived support for the revolution. Additionally, the art of fear, it was thought, and collected data contends to be true, would have a much greater affect on the female population than it would on the men. Therefore, towards the end of the revolution and well into the two years post-revolution, the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, Ismailia, Suez and other major urban centers became a place of horror for young women and certainly could have led women respondents to become affected by hindsight.

As discussed in Chapter 4, some respondents also revealed their dissatisfaction with the direction of the revolution as of the Spring of 2013. Rather than focusing on their *initial* reasoning for choosing not to get involved back in January/February 2011, they stated their unhappiness with the revolution up until and including that time. The best example of hindsight affecting responses can be found in Respondent #43. Respondent #43 wrote that he did not get involved in the revolution "Because I am not satisfied with this revolution" (#43). This change in tense is very important in the discussion of hindsight, and the use of the present tense makes it obvious that these were the sentiments respondents were having *at the time the surveys were conducted* instead of necessarily at the time of the revolution. It is impossible to say, without

⁹⁰ Adel, D. Samira Ibrahim, 'Virginity Test' Victim, Fights Egypt's Military Rule. 2012, March 19. *The Daily Beast*. Retrieved from <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/03/19/samira-ibrahim-virginity-test-victim-fights-egypt-s-military-rule.html>

⁹¹ Ibid

further interviews, whether these respondents felt the same at the time the surveys were conducted in late April/ early May 2013 as they did on February 11th, 2011. There are numerous examples of this change in tense within the survey responses. The most apparent case of hindsight was found in a response to how she felt about the Mubarak regime *at the time of the uprising* in which Respondent #2 did not try hard to hide a present tense verb she had crossed out. She wrote, in English, "I ~~feel~~ felt upset and disappointed because there was corruption in all fields and injustice" (#2).

Some respondents were much more directly affected by hindsight. Rather than mixing up their verb tenses, some respondents specifically cited how things were better "before," two years earlier, than they were at the time the surveys were being conducted. As Respondent #11 wrote: "As an ordinary citizen [I] didn't have any political view, I didn't have any problems with the government of Hosni Mubarak, and even more [so] after the revolution. Things were a lot better before" (#11). Respondent #3 adds to this by saying "I thought [the government of Mubarak] was good enough because I only felt the big problems in Egypt after the uprising" (#3). Additionally, Respondent #18 admits that "there was corruption" in Mubarak's government but he goes on to write how he "[f]elt more stability and security" when the NDP and Mubarak were in power compared to when these surveys were conducted (#18). This hindsight undoubtedly affected the percentage of those who approved or disapproved of Mubarak's regime *before the uprising*, making it seem like more people approved of Mubarak, when in reality, they just disapproved of the current situation and longed for the stability of his regime.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, hindsight also may have affected the specific answers given by respondents over what they wanted out of the revolution: why they decided to get involved. After the 28th of January, 2011, the Youth movement unified under the single cause of

Mubarak's removal, yet since that time activists have better articulated their individual desires. The increase in the intensity for these varying demands quickly led to the fractionalization of the Youth movement and its failure to present a strong opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood during Mohammed Morsi's candidacy. The Youth movement was not founded on a solid principle, only a desire to rid Egypt of its 30 year dictator, and once that was achieved suddenly the differing ideologies and ideals that once made the Youth movement a strong inclusive movement, also made it a disorganized *Horizontal* movement. Which meant it was only a matter of time before its sustainability began to deteriorate. Since the respondents offered such varying ideas for what they wanted out of the revolution so long after its conclusion, they provide the perfect evidence of this fractionalization in the Youth movement. It is the belief of this author that had these surveys been conducted during the 18 days of revolution, the responses would have reflected a much more united desire to rid Egypt of Mubarak.

This hindsight is an unfortunate effect of conducting surveys so long after an event takes place but it was to be expected. What was unexpected, however, was the number of non-participants who would not have changed their role if given the chance. Only seven of the 19 respondents, or 37%, would have changed their role if they could have. This statistic could also be due partially to hindsight, in that the participants would not bother to change their role because they already knew the events and situations that took place after Mubarak resigned.

VI. Conclusion

"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, concerned citizens can change the world. Indeed it is the only thing that ever has" -Margaret Mead

In conclusion, the role of youth during the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 *was* critical to the revolution. The youth also developed a social movement, the Youth movement, which highly influenced the direction of the revolution. However, it was not because of the youth's sheer number of activists or overwhelming enthusiasm of support which made their role in the revolution so critical; rather, it was *how* they took part in the revolution and *how* they influenced its outcome that made it so vital.

According to collected survey data, the youth (on average) were not as active in the revolution as in the original hypothesis, H1. The survey respondents revealed that the youth were much more split in their involvement than expected. However, with 46% of Egyptians under the age of 35 considering themselves active participants in the revolution, that remains a very large portion of the Egyptian populace, especially in a country where children (0-24) make up 50.3% of the population. With so many millions taking to the streets (among other methods) to get involved, the youth's role in numbers alone is still highly relevant to the revolution.

Conversely, according to the data, older generations were indeed active and involved in the revolution. Even more surprisingly, every survey respondent age 36 and older described the Mubarak regime with negative sentiments. Both of these conclusions were contrary to H4.

The data also suggested that women played a major role in the revolution, even outnumbering male activists within certain age groups. Their role was either equal to or surpassing that of men in two-thirds of the youth age groups. A majority of these women were

involved in street demonstrations and thus members of the first tier of activists. All of these findings disproved H5 on the role of women in the revolution.

After examining the qualitative responses, rather than listing "Bread, Freedom, or Social Justice" (and the ideals they represent) as their reasoning for getting involved, active participants cited a desire for a better future as their main reason for choosing to participate in the revolution which contradicted H8.

In H6, the two most popular means of involvement for active participants in the revolution were street demonstrations and the organization of demonstrations. The data reveals this as half-true. Demonstrations were by far the most popular method of involvement during the revolution yet the second-highest method was not as quantifiable. Survey respondents mentioned the rest of the methods of involvement as one, essentially combining coded methods such as raising awareness, convincing others, and taking care of the wounded as one possible way of getting involved. According to collected surveys, respondents either were involved in demonstrations or a whole separate tier full of options for varying means of involvement.

One hypothesis which was considered true was, H7 which predicted that social media was especially vital to respondents who were active in Tier 2 and Tier 3 and without it the revolution would not have been as successful in forcing Mubarak's resignation. There is no way to analyze the Egyptian Revolution without social media, but it was clear, from collected data, that social media was greatly a part of activist participation, especially in Tier 2 and Tier 3. Without social media Tier 3 would have essentially ceased to exist, thus leaving only Tier 1 and Tier 2. Without the medium of social media to help plan and organize the demonstrations or connect those taking part, there is no saying what might have happened.

Another hypothesis which was confirmed was H9 - regarding why Egyptian youth chose not to get involved in the revolution. It was predicted in H9 that non-active participants did not get involved due to fear or because family members would not allow it, and, as collected data revealed, this was found to be accurate.

Collected research also revealed that the Youth movement was originally organized by both the April 6 Movement and the “We Are All Khaled Said” Facebook page. Both of these groups relied heavily on social media to spread ideas and to disseminate word about upcoming protests or demonstrations. However, both groups were concerned over whether being a member of a Facebook group would necessarily translate into physical involvement in the street and came up with means of encouraging their members to participate in the revolution offline as well.

Finally, the lack of a strong set of beliefs or platforms lead both the April 6 Movement and the “We Are All Khaled Said” Facebook page to isolate their combined Youth movement from other intellectuals, party affiliations, politicians and most importantly, it also led to disunity following the resignation of President Mubarak. Initially thought to be a perfect way to avoid corruption and from becoming a revolution run by "personal interests" or "political gain" these decisions led the Youth movement to be void of strong organization or a political arm following the removal of President Mubarak. When he resigned, the Youth movement only had young founders and Facebook administrators with no political experience left to lead a crippled movement. By failing to establish strict membership principles from the beginning, the leadership of this movement isolated itself from any political ties or aid and thus the frontrunners of the revolution were suddenly left with no political candidates and no political organization to counteract the Muslim Brotherhood. The lack of unity and growing divisions following

Mubarak's resignation led to a drastic decrease in sustainability as well and according to Charles Tilly, both unity and sustainability are necessary for the survival of a social movement.

Therefore, it is my conclusion that the decisions by the Youth movement to form an inclusive yet disorganized *Horizontal* movement enabled the youth to successfully remove Hosni Mubarak from the presidency, yet it set them up for failure in the political battle for power that followed. In essence, they were able to unite against what they *did not* want but not for what they truly did want. Thus, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and Mohammed Morsi was due in large part to the failure of the Youth movement to create a competitive political arm or viable candidates to challenge the Islamists, confirming H3 and answering the research question which formed the basis of this thesis. It remains to be seen how their actions will affect future elections, especially in 2014 with the declaration that First Deputy Prime Minister and former Commander-in-chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, will be running for President. El-Sisi was in command when the military aided in the removal of President Mohammed Morsi in the summer of 2013.

Based on the sentiments expressed in the collected surveys, the youth are a force to be recognized. They forced Mubarak to resign. They compelled SCAF to give up power. They convinced Morsi to step down. The desire for a better future still remains in their hearts and will continue for years to come. Until their goals are met, they will continue to protest and demonstrate. They will not stop. Foreign policy makers ought to take notice and to aid them in their struggle for "Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice" before opposing forces brew within Egypt to counteract those desires.

Bibliography

- Abouzeid, R. (2011, March 16). Did Prison Breakout Reveal a Plan to Sow Chaos in Egypt?. *TIME*.
- Abdel-Fattah, N. (2013, January 10). Youth Activism and the Arab Future. *Al-Ahram*, p. 9.
- Abdelrahman, M. (2013). In Praise of Organization: Egypt Between Activism and Revolution. *Development & Change*, 44(3), 569-685. doi: 10.1111/dech.12028
- Adel, D. (2012). Samira Ibrahim, 'Virginity Test' Victim, Fights Egypt's Military Rule. *The Daily Beast*, Retrieved from <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/03/19/samira-ibrahim-virginity-test-victim-fights-egypt-s-military-rule.html>
- Adel, M. (2014, January 1). Who Are We?. *The 6 April Youth Movement*. Retrieved March 10, 2014, from <http://6april.org/us.php>
- Al Jazeera Staff. (2011, January 28). Live blog 28/1 - Egypt protests - Al Jazeera Blogs. *Al Jazeera Blogs*. Retrieved February 7, 2014, from <http://blogs.aljazeera.com/blog/middle-east/live-blog-281-egypt-protests>
- Al-Zubaidi, L., Cassel, M., & Yazbek, S. (2013). *Diaries of an Unfinished Revolution: Voices from Tunis to Damascus*. (pp. 6-65). New York, New York: Penguin Books. (pp. 6-65).
- April 6 Youth Movement. (2010, September 22). *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Retrieved March 11, 2014, from <http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/09/22/april-6-youth-movement/h3h7?reloadFlag=1>
- Ayasun, A. (2012). Women Take Key Leadership Role in Arab Spring. *Today's Zaman*,
- Beinin, J. (2012). Egyptian Workers and January 25th: A Social Movement in Historical Context. *Social Research*, 79(2), 323-343.

Campante, F. R., & Chor, D. (2012). Why Was the Arab World Poised for Revolution?

Schooling, Economic Opportunities, and the Arab Spring. *Journal of Economic*

Perspectives, 26(2), 167-188. doi: 10.1257/jep.26.2.167

Caruso, G. (2012). *Cosmopolitan Futures – Global Activism for a Just World*. Into Publishing.

Ebadi, S. (2012). A Warning for Women of the Arab Spring. *Wall Street Journal*,

Elshami, N. (2011, January 27). A Historical Appraisal of Egypt's January 25 'Day of Wrath':

Incentives, Characteristics, & Implications. *Muftah*. Retrieved March 10, 2014, from

<http://muftah.org/a-historical-appraisal-of-egypts-january-25-day-of-wrath-incentives-characteristics-implications-by-nancy-elshami/#.U1MVy9hOXug>

Engdahl, F. W. (2011). Egypt's Revolution-Creative Destruction for a 'Greater Middle East'?

Global Research.

Giglio, M. (2011, January 22). 'We Are All Khaled Said': Will the Revolution Come to Egypt?.

The Daily Beast.

Haas, M. L., & Lesch, D. W. (2013). *The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle*

East. (pp. 35-59). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Handoussa, H. United Nations Development Programme and the Institute of National Planning,

Egypt, Human Development Project. (2010). *Egypt Human Development Report 2010*.

Retrieved from website: [http://www.undp.org.eg/Portals/0/NHDR 2010 english.pdf](http://www.undp.org.eg/Portals/0/NHDR%202010%20english.pdf)

Jacob, J. (2011, February 01). What is Egypt's April 6 Movement?. *International Business*

Times, Retrieved from <http://www.ibtimes.com/what-egypts-april-6-movement-261839>

Kamel, C. (2012). Arab Women, Key to the Uprisings, Refuse to be Side-Lined. *Al Arabiya*

News.

- Kirkpatrick, D. D., & Sheikh, M. E. (2012, November 22). Citing Deadlock, Egypt's Leader Seizes New Power and Plans Mubarak Retrial. *The New York Times*.
- Korany, B., & Mahdi, R. E. (2012). Chapter 6: Youth Movements and the 25 January Revolution. *Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and Beyond*. New York and Cairo: Oxford University Press and The American University in Cairo Press.
- Krajeski, J. (2011). Beyond Tahrir Square: Can Egypt's Liberals Survive in the Post-Mubarak Era? *World Policy Journal*, 28(2), 89-99.
- Kriesi, H. *Swiss Political Science Review*. 2009, Vol. 15 Issue 2, p341-349. 9p. Political Science Complete. <http://0eds.a.ebscohost.com.umiss.lib.olemiss.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?siid=66b4c799-062c-4193-8c81-71a5bb2f94f7%40sessionmgr4003&vid=14&hid=4208>
- Lim, M. (2012). Clicks, Cabs, and Coffee Houses: Social Media and Oppositional Movements in Egypt, 2004-2011. *Journal of Communication*, 231-244. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01628.x
- Mak, H. Politics and Media Lecture, Alexandria, Egypt. Spring 2013.
- McRobie, H. (2012, August). Will the Tunisian Constitution Erode the Gains of Women in the Arab Spring? *New Statesman*.
- Musnad. A. Muslim Woman's Role as a Mother. (2012, March 12). *On Islam*. Retrieved March 11, 2014, from <http://www.onislam.net/english/ask-the-scholar/family/children-a-parenthood/175504.html>
- Noujaim, J. (Director). (2013). *Al Midan*: Noujaim Films, Worldview Entertainment, Roast Beef Productions.
- Osman, T. (2011). *Egypt on the Brink: From the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak*. (2nd ed., pp. 179-271). New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Panzica, F., Popova, N., & Alquezar, J. Women and Work in Egypt: Case Study of Tourism and ICT Sectors. *European Training Foundation*, 8.

Sedra, P., Springborg, R., Stacher, J., Sabra, A. & Colla, E. (2012, August 12). Roundtable on the Language of Revolution in Egypt. Jadaliyya, Retrieved from <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6552/roundtable-on-the-..1>

Shapiro, S. M. (2009, January 22). Revolution, Facebook-Style. *The New York Times*.

Shenker, J. (2011, January 24). Egypt Braced for 'Day of Revolution' Protests. *The Guardian*.

Sika, N. (2012). Youth Political Engagement in Egypt: From Abstention to Uprising. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 39(2), 181-199.

Skocpol, T. (1976). France, Russia, China: A Structural Analysis of Social Revolutions. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 18(2), 175-210.

Soloman. (2002). Chapter 29:18. *Holy Bible: The King James Version*. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan.

Tadros, M. Bringing Gender Justice to the Egyptian Parliament. *IDS In Focus Policy Briefing*, 1.

Tahawy, R. E. (2013, September 29). Egypt Rights Groups Demand Quotas for Women in Parliament. *Features*. Retrieved March 11, 2014, from <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2013/09/29/Calls-rise-for-quota-of-Egyptian-women-parliament.html>

Tawakkol, K. Nobel Lecture: In the name of God the Compassionate the Merciful."

Nobelprize.org. 31 Mar 2013. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2011/karman-lecture_en.html

The 'Spark' That Started it All. (2013, October 04). Retrieved from

<http://guides.library.cornell.edu/content.php?pid=259276&sid=2163144>

Tilly, C. (2004). *Social Movements, 1768–2004*. Boulder, Colorado, USA: Paradigm Publishers.
p. 53.

UNESCO. (2011). *UIS Statistics in Brief*. Retrieved from http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=121&IF_Language=en&BR_Country=2200

U.S Government - CIA, (2013). *The World Factbook*. Retrieved from U.S Government - CIA website: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html>

US Government - CIA, (2013). *The World Factbook*: Population of Egypt as of 2013. Retrieved from U.S Government - CIA website: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html>

Women in Education. (2005, January 1). *State Information Service: Your Gateway to Egypt*. Retrieved March 12, 2014, from <http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?ArtID=2264#.U1NOEdhOVYc>

Women in Politics. (2014, January 1). *State Information Service: Your Gateway to Egypt*. Retrieved March 12, 2014, from http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?ArtID=2258#.U1NQG_ldWSp

Appendix

What Was Your Role in The 2011 Egyptian Revolution?

A Survey by Undergraduate Student Elise Luers

(All Answers are Anonymous)

Section A

Age:

☐ < 14 ☐ 15 - 19 ☐ 20 - 25 ☐ 26 - 30 ☐ 31 - 35 ☐ 36- 40

☐ 41- 45 ☐ 46 - 50 ☐ 51 - 55 ☐ 56 - 60 ☐ 61 - 65 ☐ > 66

Gender: (circle one) Female Male

Education: (Please indicate level furthest completed or currently being pursued)

☐ Primary Education ☐ Secondary Education ☐ Tertiary Education (University) ☐ Post-Graduate

Section B

Regarding the 2011 Egyptian Revolution (Please write legibly):

Q: How did you feel about the government of Hosni Mubarak before the uprising? Why?

Q: How did you find out about the events of the Revolution?

Q: Do you consider yourself an active participant in the Revolution? Yes ☐ No ☐

Q: If Active, why did you decide to get involved?

Q: If Active, please describe how you were involved in the Revolution.

Q: If Non-Active, why did you decide to not get involved?

Q. If Non-Active, given the chance, would you have changed your role in the uprising? Why or Why not?

Section C

Technology and Social Media:

Q: Do you use technology (mobile phone, internet, social media, etc) in your daily life?

Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A (no access) ☐

-If yes, which type(s)? Circle all that apply:

Mobile Phone Email Facebook Twitter Blogs Other: _____

-If yes, for what purpose? Circle all that apply:

Work School Keep in contact with friends/ family Inform others of current events
Organize events Share feelings on current issues/ topics Networking Other: _____

-If yes, how often do you use technology? (please be as specific as possible):

Q: Did you use a method of technology (mobile phone, internet, social media, etc) to get involved in the uprisings? Yes ☐ No ☐

-If yes, which type(s)? Circle all that apply:

Mobile Phone Email Facebook Twitter Blogs Other: _____

-If yes, how did you use them to get involved?

Thank you for your help!
This survey will be used to collect data for a Senior Thesis at the University of Mississippi
All participants will remain anonymous
Alexandria, Egypt April/ May 2013

ما كان دورك في الثورة المصرية ٢٠١١؟

مسح للطالب الجامعية "إليس لورس"
(لا أسماء مذكورة)

عمر:

١٤ < ١٥-١٩ □ ٢٠-٢٥ □ ٢٦-٣٠ □ ٣١-٣٥ □ ٣٦-٤٠ □
٤١-٤٥ □ ٤٦-٥٠ □ ٥١-٥٥ □ ٥٦-٦٠ □ ٦١ > □

جنس: (دائرة واحدة) □ أنثى □ ذكر

تعليم: (يرجى الإشارة إلى أعلى مستوى من التعليم حتى لو يجري متابعته حالياً)

□ التعليم الابتدائي □ التعليم الثانوي □ التعليم العالي □ دراسات عليا

فيما لعام ٢٠١١ الثورة المصرية (يرجى كتابة مقروء):

س: كيف تشعر حيال حكومة حسني مبارك قبل الانتفاضة؟ لماذا؟

س: كيف عرفت بأحداث الثورة؟

س: هل تعتبر نفسك مشاركاً نشطاً في الثورة؟ نعم □ لا □
س: إذا بالموقع، لماذا قررت المشاركة؟

س: إذا كنت كذلك، يرجى وصف كيف اشتركت في هذه الثورة؟

س: إذا لم تكن كذلك، لماذا قررت أن لا تتورط؟

س: إذا لم تكن كذلك، إذا أتاحت لك الفرصة، هل من الممكن أن تغير دورك في الانتفاضة؟ لم أو لم لا؟

التكنولوجيا وسائل الاعلام الاجتماعية:

س: هل تستخدم التكنولوجيا (موبايل فون البريد، والإنترنت، ووسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية، الخ) في

حياتك اليومية؟ نعم □ لا □ لا توجد إمكانية

إذا كانت الإجابة بنعم، أي نوع (أنواع)؟ دائرة على كل ما ينطبق:

الهاتف المحمول البريد الإلكتروني الفيسبوك تويتر مدونة أخرى: _____

إذا كانت الإجابة بنعم، ما الغرض؟ الدائرة على كل ما ينطبق:

عمل مدرسة التواصل مع الأصدقاء / الأسرة تنظيم الأحداث الشبكات

إعلام الآخرين عن الأحداث الجارية المشاعر حول القضايا الراهنة / موضوعات أخرى: _____
إذا كانت الإجابة بنعم، كيف وغالبا ما كنت تستخدم التقنية؟ (يرجى أن تكون محددة قدر
الإمكان)

س: هل استخدام أسلوب التكنولوجيا (الهاتف المحمول، والإنترنت، ووسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية، الخ)
لتشارك في الانتفاضات؟ ☐ نعم ☐ لا
إذا كانت الإجابة بنعم، أي نوع (أنواع)؟ دائرة على كل ما ينطبق:

الفيس بوك البريد الإلكتروني الهاتف المحمول أخرى: _____
مدونة تويتر
إذا كانت الإجابة بنعم، لم كيف كنت استخدامها على المشاركة؟