

Islamic Education in Pakistan and Terrorism in Kashmir:
Is there a Connection?

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Although there are many definitions of terrorism, in this paper it will be defined as the deliberate targeting of non-combatants for political reasons. The word itself was used for the first time during the French Revolution as a reference to the “Reign of Terror,” which resulted in the death of 18,000 to 40,000 people. Later, in the late nineteenth century, terrorism was widely used by anarchists in the United States, Russia, and Western Europe. U.S. President William McKinley and Russian czar Alexander II were just a few of terrorists’ victims. In the early and mid-twentieth century terrorism was employed by various nationalist groups. The Irish Republic Army, the Algerian National Liberation Front, and the Basque separatist movement were among the groups that used terrorism to advance the cause of national independence. In other countries, Marxism was the inspiration for political action, and the Red Army Fraction in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy sought the creation of a revolutionary state through violence. In the last several years, terrorism has undergone a deep transformation once again. Today, most terrorists are neither anarchists nor Marxists. Although some of the nationalist groups still operate in the world, the new face of terrorism is increasingly religious, especially Islamic.

Scholars have shown interest in terrorism for many decades. However, never before has the problem of terrorism received so much media and academic attention as after the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001. Analysts produced numerous policy recommendations, examining the roots of terrorism and suggesting possible solutions. The most popular theories suggested that terrorism, similar to other forms of political violence, is caused by grievances and discontent. Among the numerous sources of

discontent identified by scholars are poverty, blocked political participation, lack of prospects for social mobility, ineffective government, and many more. President Bush, speaking at the United Nations Financing and Development Conference in 2002, suggested that poverty eradication is one way of prevention of terrorism: “We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror.”¹

Although the link between poverty and resort to terrorist violence seems to be quite logical, empirical evidence does not always support such a connection. Bangladesh, for example, is among the world’s least developed and poorest nations; yet almost no terrorists come from this country. Moreover, many terrorists, including the most wanted of them, Bin Laden, come from middle- and upper-class families. Thus, although eradication of poverty is a critical development task, it is not necessarily the only answer to the problem of terrorism.

The general idea behind terrorism appears to be the existence of grievances that seem incapable of being solved through other means. Democratic countries usually have political channels to deal with grievances and thus tend to have less terrorism. Most Islamic countries are not democratic, or have only nominal democracy. In addition, Islamic countries, with the exception of a very few, do not recognize separation of religion and state, and Islam plays an important role in politics. Modernization is viewed as a Western attempt of domination, and is often considered incompatible with Islamic way of life. Among the institutions that resisted modernization are madrassahs, which were suggested as a possible cause of terrorism by scholars such as P. W. Singer, Jessica

¹ George W. Bush, “A New Compact for Development in the Battle against World Poverty” (accessed 3 February 2006); available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0402/ijge/gj01.htm>; Internet.

Stern, Saeed Shafqat, Hassan Abbas, and Robert Looney.² The terrorist attack that struck London public transportation system in July 2005 further increased public concern about these Islamic schools. So, what are madrassahs?

The literal meaning of the word “madrassah” is “the place for giving lessons.”³ The earliest madrassahs date back to the times of Mohammed, who used to give instructions and explained his revelations at the mosque. The first known madrassah was founded in 1005 CE by the Fatimid caliphs in Egypt, and was a well-established institution educating its students not only in religious subjects, but also in secular ones.

As Islam spread to various parts of the world, so did madrassahs. Islamic schools were introduced to South Asia by the Sufis, an Islamic mystical sect. Madrassahs in this region differed from religious schools in the rest of the Islamic world in several ways. First of all, in the nineteenth century madrassahs in South Asia, unlike schools in the Arab world, abandoned secular subjects. With the establishment of the Deoband Madrassah in 1867, Islamic education experienced an incredible surge in the region. An increased role of madrassahs was a response to the introduction of secular British education and to a perceived threat to the Islamic identity associated with it. In the nineteenth century madrassahs became an attempt to save orthodox traditions and became increasingly conservative, excluding secular subjects from the curriculum.

² P. W. Singer, “Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education not Jihad,” in *Brookings Institutions Analysis Papers* 41 (2001): 2.

Jessica Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” in *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 6 (2000): 115-126.

Saeed Shafqat, “From Official Islam to Islamism: The Rise of Dawat-ul-Irshad and Lashkar-e-Taiba,” in *Pakistan – Nationalism without a Nation?*, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (New Delhi: Monohra, 2002), 139-40.

Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror* (London: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), 114-15.

Robert Looney, “Reforming Pakistan’s Educational System: The Challenge of the Madrassas,” in *Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies* 28, no. 3 (2003): 259-61.

³ Eric Hilgendorf, “Islamic Education: History and Tendency,” in *Peabody Journal of Education* 78, no. 2 (2003): 66.

Second, like nowhere else in the Islamic world, madrassahs in the Indian sub-continent represent a close connection between religious education and politics. This link is particularly obvious in Pakistan. Although at the time of Pakistan's creation in 1947, there were only 137 madrassahs in the entire country,⁴ the number of schools began to grow in the 1970s and exploded with the beginning of the Soviet-Afghan war in 1979. Although Pakistan never admitted officially that its Inter Services Intelligence supported the Taliban forces and provided training to mujahideen in Pakistani madrassahs, the connection is cited by a Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid.⁵ Furthermore, the expert of Islamic education Uzma Anzar⁶ suggests that after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, mujahideen educated in radical madrassahs continued fighting for the Islamic cause, but only in Kashmir and other local conflicts. The number of madrassahs in Pakistan today is highly disputed, but most sources estimate that there are between 12,000 to 15,000 madrassahs with an enrollment of about 1.5 million to 2 million students.⁷

Interestingly, scholars studying madrassahs concentrate on the connection between low social and economic status of students and enrollment in madrassahs. Jessica Stern⁸ points out that for poor children, these schools are the only source education that the Pakistani government failed to provide, as well as of room, board, and even clothing. In addition, madrassahs provide rigorous Islamic education and a particularly narrow and violent version of it. Such education, Stern argues, creates young

⁴ Saleem H. Ali, *Islamic Education and Conflict: Understanding the Madrassahs of Pakistan* [report online] (Submitted for Consideration to Oxford University Press, 2005, 24; accessed 4 January 2006); available from <http://www.uvm.edu/~envprog/madrassah/resources.html>; Internet.

⁵ Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan and the Taliban," in *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban*, ed. William Maley (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 84-90.

⁶ Uzma Anzar, *Islamic Education: A Brief History of Madrassas with Comments on Curricula and Current Pedagogical Practices* [draft] (2003, 19; accessed 4 January 2006); available from <http://www.uvm.edu/~envprog/madrassah/resources.html>; Internet.

⁷ Ali, *Islamic Education and Conflict*, 24.

⁸ Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture:" 118.

people who are not equipped for a normal life in a secular society but who are ready to sacrifice their lives for a religious cause. Although this may or may not be true, such claims are rarely supported by evidence. Hence there is a need for a new approach to examining the role of madrassahs in terrorism. Neither poverty alone nor poor economic perspectives after graduation suffice to compel a person to join a radical group. Several factors greatly increase the likelihood of being drawn in a terrorist organization.

Social scientists have developed the concepts of “structural availability,” as well as “cognitive opening,” “religious seeking,” “frame alignment,” and “socialization” to predict the probability of recruitment to a social movement. Structural availability is defined as the degree of involvement in alternative demanding (in regard to time, energy, and emotional attachment) social relationships. In order to evaluate structural availability of madrassah students, I will use such indicators as age, type of occupation, and approximate number of social ties to the surrounding community. I will also examine factors that can produce cognitive opening in students and make them more receptive to radical views of terrorist organizations; analyze the role of Islam in the lives of students to determine how likely they are to turn to religion in the time of crisis. Finally, I will examine the ideology of several terrorist organizations and compare them to the worldview of madrassah students. The objective of this study is to determine, based on analysis of these factors, how likely madrassah students are to be recruited to terrorist organizations. I have chosen to focus my research on the conflict in Kashmir as a case study to examine what type of terrorist organizations (if any) madrassah students are most likely to be recruited into.

Chapter 2: Historical Background

The conflict in Kashmir has a long and complicated history. Although Kashmir as a princely state was nominally independent at the time of Britain's withdrawal from its colonies, it recognized the supremacy of British rule. Thus, when the last viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, decreed that the princely state must join either India or Pakistan after the partition, the Maharaja of Kashmir was obliged to comply with the decree. However, the Maharaja hesitated until a rebellion broke out in the western part of the state. The Pakistani military helped to organize the rebels and provided them with logistical support. The Maharaja then appealed to India for military support, which it agreed to grant under the condition of Kashmir's accession to India. After the Instrument of Accession was signed, Indian troops entered the territory. India soon referred the Kashmir issue to the United Nations, and the United Nations sponsored a ceasefire in the first Kashmir war in 1949. Since then Pakistan has controlled around one-third and India the remaining part of the state, divided by the "Cease-Fire line."

In 1965, India and Pakistan went to war over Kashmir again. The two countries came very close to war again in the late 1980s, but this time the situation was quite different. Earlier it had been a dispute between the two nation states; now the conflict shifted to the popular level. As noted in the publication of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Before 1989, India and Pakistan fought over Kashmir. Since late 1989, it is Kashmiris who have done much of the fighting."⁹

The local insurgency developed over the course of several years in the 1980s and began as the struggle for political domination. In 1982 Farooq Abdullah succeeded his

⁹ Sumantra Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2003), 3.

father Sheikh Abdullah as the Chief Minister of Kashmir and leader of the largest political party in Kashmir, the National Conference. At the same time, the Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, led the Congress Party and sought to undermine the regional governments headed by non-Congress parties. Thus, in 1983 the government of Farooq Abdullah was dismissed, which at first gained the Kashmir leader enormous popular support. However, during the regional elections of 1987, Farooq unexpectedly formed an alliance with the Gandhi's Congress Party. This decision proved to be very unpopular, and in order to "win" the elections, the Conference - Congress alliance rigged them. This blatant violation of the electoral process provoked mass demonstrations and strikes throughout Jammu and Kashmir.

The protests reached their peak in January 1990, when the daughter of India's Home Affairs Minister was kidnapped by several Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) guerrillas. The captors demanded that six jailed JKLF activists be freed. The release of the men sparked both massive demonstrations of Kashmiris, calling for the freedom of Kashmir, and brutal repressions by the government. Subsequent human rights abuses, including twenty-four-hour curfews, house-to-house searches, illegal detentions, torture, and random killings, alienated the Kashmiri population and contributed to increased support for the JKLF.

What role did Pakistan play in the uprising? The answer to this question is in dispute. Among the Indian establishment, the argument that Kashmiri separatism was the work of Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) was quite popular. Indeed, the JKLF received logistical and military assistance from the ISI in the late 1980s. According to the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front web-site, in the initial stages of the insurgency "the

plan was to bring patriotic and brave youth from Indian-held Kashmir to Azad Kashmir [the part of the province that is controlled by Pakistan], train them in guerrilla warfare (armed freedom struggle), arm and then send them back to start armed freedom struggle.”¹⁰ However, the ultimate goal of the organization, the creation of an “independent and truly democratic” Kashmir, as well as its secular outlook were incompatible with the views of Pakistan, which was officially an Islamic Republic and promoted religious ideology. Therefore, from 1991 the Inter-Service Intelligence cut off its aid to the JKLF and started to support pro-Pakistan militant groups with a decidedly Islamic outlook, such as the Hizbul Mujahideen. At the same time, through coercion and threats Pakistan encouraged the JKLF’s branches to break away, weakening the organization.

As a result of this strategy, by 1993 the JKLF was almost defunct and the only groups operating in the region today have a clearly pro-Pakistan Islamic outlook. While the precise socio-economic composition of these organizations is not available, it is often alleged that these Islamic groups recruit their members from Pakistani madrassahs. The conflict in Kashmir is thus an excellent case for exploring the role of madrassahs in propagating terrorism.

Chapter 3: Theoretical framework

Literature Review

The subject of “differential recruitment” has been of interest to scholars of social movements for a long time. Who participates in social movements and what are the

¹⁰ Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, *Our Martyrs, Freedom-Fighters*, [web-site] (accessed 7 December 2005); available from <http://shell.comsats.net.pk/~jklf/iii3.htm>; Internet.

factors that stimulate participation? One of the long-established theories, known as the relative deprivation theory, approaches these questions from the socio-psychological standpoint. It holds that grievances, whether perceived or actual, lead to participation in a movement. Grievances may be caused by various factors, including political oppression, limited social and economic mobility, discrimination, economic crisis, and many others. Relative deprivation theorists particularly emphasize the importance of grievance in social movement participation, which, they argue, is often fostered by the perception of being in a disadvantageous position.¹¹

These socio-psychological explanations have several serious flaws. First, they do not explain why only a small fraction of people with similar backgrounds and, presumably, the same set of grievances participate in radical movements. The scholar of terrorism Marc Sageman,¹² for example, describes most terrorists as young and middle-aged people, from middle- and upper-class families and relatively well-educated. Coming from the same country or region, these people would probably have similar grievances. However, this background is so common that by itself it cannot explain participation in a movement.

Second, concentration on particular qualities of an individual overlooks the issue of group organization and the role of social networks in recruitment. Socio-psychological theories fail to explain how people, even if they possess certain common characteristics, manage to organize themselves in a working movement. As the famous sociologist David Snow and his colleagues noted in one of their studies, “however reasonable the

¹¹ Joan N. Gurney and Kathleen Tierney, “Relative Deprivation and Participation in the Civil Rights Movement,” in *Sociological Quarterly* 23(1982): 33-47.

¹² Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 73-75.

underlying assumption that some people are more susceptible than others to movement participation, that view deflects attention from the fact that recruitment cannot occur without prior contact with a recruitment agent.”¹³

Dissatisfied with the socio-psychological explanations, scholars increasingly have turned instead to social movement theories. While a social movement theory developed by Craig Jenkins emphasizes the importance of selective incentives that movements use to attract new members, sociologists David Snow and Doug McAdam¹⁴ point to the role of social networks in recruitment. Still others argue that a necessary condition of movement participation is “frame alignment,” a condition in which beliefs and ideology of an individual and a social movement organization are congruent.¹⁵

While these theories are all useful in describing the factors that increase participation in any movement, they are not sufficient to explain participation in radical organizations. High risks associated with involvement distinguish radical Islamic organizations from other groups.¹⁶ Given this difference, the core of the process of persuasion is the socialization of potential members so that they join despite of high costs and risks. Socialization, however, is preceded by several processes (“cognitive opening,” “religious seeking,” and “frame alignment”). These key processes enhance the likelihood of participation and narrow down the pool of potential members.

¹³ Snow et al., “Social Networks and Social Movements: A Microstructural Approach to Differential Recruitment,” *American Sociology Review* 45, no. 5 (1980): 789.

¹⁴ J. Craig Jenkins, “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1983): 527-53.

Snow et al., “Social Networks and Social Movements:” 790-95.

Doug McAdam, “Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer,” *American Journal of Sociology* 92 (1986): 64-90.

¹⁵ Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” *American Sociological Review* 51 (1986): 464-81.

¹⁶ Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam* [report online] (2004; accessed 4 January 2005); available from <http://www.yale.edu/polisci/info/conferences/Islamic%20Radicalism/papers.htm>; Internet.

Because my research deals with recruitment to terrorist organizations, I will use the processes of persuasion as described by the scholar of Islamic movements, Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam.” In addition, I will use the concept of “structural availability,” developed by Snow et al.¹⁷ Structural availability is a significant predictor of participation in a movement. It is defined as the degree of involvement in alternative demanding (in regard to time, energy, and emotional attachment) social relationships. People who have fewer ties to the community tend to have time for involvement in a movement. Thus, they are more likely to respond to the “invitation” to participate.¹⁸

Among the countervailing relationships that can prevent participation in a movement is marriage or any other intense personal relationship that counteracts the pull of the movement. As the sociologist Rosabeth M. Kanter points out in her study of communities, “an intense, private two-person relationship, where neither person is tied into community in other strong ways, is the sort of unit that potentially withdraws from involvement with the group.”¹⁹ In addition, a demanding job can potentially prevent a person from fully participating in an organization. Thus, young people in a transitional role (such as students) tend to have “a greater amount of unscheduled time and generally lack the kinds of extraneous commitments that are likely to inhibit movement participation.”²⁰ Therefore, I will use such indicators as marital status, age, and type of occupation to measure structural availability.

¹⁷ Snow et al., “Social Networks and Social Movements:” 794

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Rosabeth M. Kanter, *Commitment and Community: Communes and Utopias in Sociological Perspective* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972), 86.

²⁰ Snow et al., “Social Networks and Social Movements,” 793.

While structural availability creates the precondition for joining a movement, actual recruitment in a *radical* organization cannot take place without prior socialization. Wiktorowicz describes the key processes that precede socialization and are necessary conditions of it: cognitive opening, religious seeking, and frame alignment.

Cognitive Opening

Compared with other organizations, it is particularly difficult for a radical movement to spread its message, because the vast majority of people will reject its extreme views. Cognitive opening, or a condition under which a potential member becomes open to alternative views, is crucial for successful recruitment. Among the factors that can produce cognitive opening can be religious and racial discrimination, loss of a job, death in the family, etc. In addition, movement members can actively foster cognitive opening through the use of pictures, posters, and demonstrations. Sociologists James M. Jasper and Jane D. Poulsen describe this as a “moral shock,” when these images or speeches created such a sense of outrage in people that they become more willing to learn about and participate in the movement.²¹ Cognitive opening then produces some discontent in people. If a religion plays an important role in a person’s life prior to cognitive opening, it is safe to assume that he will try to resolve the discontent by turning to religion for the answers. Individuals will then “shop around” for a movement that suits them best.

Frame Alignment and Socialization

Frame alignment plays an important role in making a choice among various movements. Frame alignment, as mentioned above, is a state of congruence between the

²¹ James M. Jasper and Jane D. Poulsen, “Recruiting Strangers and Friends: Moral Shocks and Social Networks in Animal Rights and Anti-Nuclear Protests,” in *Social Problems* 42 (1995): 498.

frames (schemata of interpretation) of an individual and a movement. Individuals are likely to stop their “religious seeking” and make a choice in favor of a particular movement, if their frames resonate with those of the movement. Frame alignment is followed by socialization, the last stage of the process of persuasion. Socialization can include one-on-one interaction with the group members, participation in small tasks, protests, and social events. At this point, individuals accept the movement’s ideology and identity as their own, and joining becomes a natural progression.

I will use the concept of structural availability and the processes of persuasion in the following chapters to examine whether madrassah students are likely to be drawn into terrorist organizations.

Chapter 4: Structural Availability

Research on structural availability of madrassah students is hampered by a paucity of reliable information. However, as can be seen from the information that is available, it can be concluded that most students are young people with few, if any, ties to the surrounding communities. Thus, they are structurally available for recruitment.

Most madrassahs offer religious education of various degrees, from primary to post-graduate level. Thus students of different ages can be present at a madrassah at the same time. Some madrassahs, such as Jamia Ashrafia based in Lahore, restrict admission to the primary level course to teenagers under twelve years old.²² Other madrassahs have a restriction on the minimum age of a student. In Darul Uloom Deoband, for example, young children who are not yet able to take care of themselves and stay on their own in a

²² Jamia Ashrafia, “Condition of Registration for Admission in Jamia;” available from <http://www.ashrafia.org.pk/registration.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2006.

hostel are not admitted.²³ While Darul Uloom Deoband does not have any upper restrictions on age, students have to be less than 30 years to be admitted to the upper level courses. Thus, on the average, madrassah students are teenagers or people in their twenties.

Many religious schools are residential and provide full boarding to their students. In rural areas, the number of residential and non-residential schools is almost equal. Saleem Ali, for example, estimates in his study that 11,215 out of 26,030 madrassah students study in residential schools.²⁴ In urban regions of Pakistan the number of madrassahs, which provide full boarding to their students, is even higher; in Islamabad, for example, almost all students live in the boarding facilities of madrassahs.²⁵ It is important to note that sometimes students come to madrassahs from faraway areas, beyond commutable distance. As a result, they are disconnected from their original communities. At the same time, because of the highly structured life in madrassahs, they are not able to develop ties to the surrounding community. Instead, due to compact living, students form very strong bonds with each other. The historian Barbara Metcalf, describing the environment in the boarding school of the Darul Uloom Deoband madrassah, mentions that these close bonds “often transcended those of kin and locality.”²⁶ In the process of recruitment these fellow students are likely to be a stimulating rather than countervailing force, and may be prone to recruitment themselves. As sociologists John Lofland and Rodney Stark mention in their study of the process of

²³ Darul Uloom Deoband – India, “About Darul Uloom;” available from <http://darululoom-deoband.com/english/index.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2006.

²⁴ Ali, *Islamic Education and Conflict*, 51.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 64.

²⁶ Barbara D. Metcalf, *Islamic Contestations: Essays on Muslims in India and Pakistan* (New Dehli: Oxford University Press, 2004), 39.

religion conversion, “such an extra-cult person might be only slightly behind his friend in his own conversion process.”²⁷

After graduation, students generally seek employment in the religious, non-governmental sector. Many work as private tutors of reading and pronouncing the Quran or as teachers of the Arabic language; others become mosque clergy, such as prayer co-leaders.²⁸ Thus it is difficult to evaluate the potential for structural availability of madrassah graduates. On one hand, while working in a mosque they can get involved in a local community and develop strong social ties with members of a congregation. On the other hand, as the scholar of political Islam Jamal Malik observes in his book, after taking a job in a mosque madrassah graduates “frequently meet with rejection from the local population who prefer their own candidate instead of some ‘alim [an Islamic scholar] allocated to them from outside.”²⁹ In this case, a madrassah graduate will likely to become alienated, and his structural availability will be very high.

Thus it can be concluded that madrassah students (but not necessarily madrassah graduates) are structurally available for participation in a social movement. However, structural availability alone is not sufficient for successful recruitment into high-risk movements such as terrorist organizations. Most people will dismiss participation as not worth the risks of criminal or political persecution. However, the people who eventually do decide to get involved with a terrorist organization generally go through the following stages of the process of persuasion: cognitive opening, religious seeking, frame alignment, and socialization. In some cases, prior socialization rather than cognitive

²⁷ John Lofland and Rodney Stark, “Becoming a World-Saver: A Theory of Conversion to a Deviant Perspective,” *American Sociological Review* 30, no. 6 (1965): 872

²⁸ Ali, *Islamic Education and Conflict*, 90-91.

²⁹ Jamal Malik, *Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan* (New Dehli: Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 1996), 270.

opening may make potential members become more receptive to radical view of terrorist organizations.

Chapter 5: Prior socialization

Although most people will reject radical ideas outright, prior socialization may make people more receptive to the message of terrorist organizations. A study of madrassah curricula reveals that students are consistently exposed to materials promoting anti-Western attitudes, as well as religious and gender intolerance.

Most madrassahs use some form of the same curriculum called the Dars-i-Nizami. The original curriculum was compiled in the eighteenth century, and has been revised many times since then. The following syllabus of Darul Uloom madrassah³⁰ can serve as a representation of what is currently taught in Islamic schools on an intermediate level:

Table 1: Syllabus of the Darul Uloom Madrassah

Year	Subjects
Year 1	Biography of the Prophet, Grammar (Sarf), Grammar (Nahw), Arabic Literature, Logic, Chirography (Khush Navisi)
Year 2	Grammar (Sarf), Grammar (Nahw), Arabic Literature, Islamic Jurisprudence (Fiqh), Logic, Chirography (Khush Navisi), Recitation (Tajwid)
Year 3	Quranic Exegesis (Tafsir), Jurisprudence (Fiqh), Grammar (Nahw), Arabic Literature, Hadith (Sayings of the Prophet), Logic, Islamic Ethics (Islami Akhlaq), Recitation (Tajwid), External Study
Year 4	Quranic Exegesis (Tafsir), Jurisprudence (Fiqh), Principles of

³⁰ Darul Uloom Deoband – India, “The Curriculum of Darul Uloom.”

	Jurisprudence, Rhetorics, Hadith (Sayings of the Prophet), Logic, History, Recitation, Modern Sciences (Sciences of Culture, Geography of the Arab Peninsula and other Islamic countries)
Year 5	Quranic Exegesis, Jurisprudence, Principles of Jurisprudence, Rhetorics, Beliefs (Aga'id), Arabic Literature, Recitation, External Study
Year 6	Quranic Exegesis, Jurisprudence, Principles of Tafsir and Jurisprudence, Arabic Literature, Philosophy, Recitation, Study of Sirat (Biography)
Year 7	Hadith, Jurisprudence, Beliefs, Recitation, External Study
Year 8	Ten books of the Hadith

The curriculum consists of books rather than of subjects. Thus students go on to the next level after they have completed an assigned book in a particular subject and have passed an examination on it. Although some of the books are relatively modern, most madrassahs continue using canonical texts, which were a part of the original Dars-i-Nizami. Importantly, canonical texts are written in Arabic, and although Arabic literature and grammar are a part of the syllabus, the vast majority of students do not speak or understand the language. Thus students can either understand the texts from Urdu translations (which are often written in such a scholastic language that they are difficult to understand, or merely memorize them.³¹ Because of the large volume of information that has to be memorized rather than comprehended, “the spirit of questioning (even among the students themselves) [becomes] not only unnecessary but a hindrance to

³¹ Tariq Rahman, “Language-Teaching in Pakistani Madrassas,” in *Language, Education, and Culture* (Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 107.

successful memorization.”³² Besides diminishing students’ ability to think critically, Islamic education takes an absolutist stance on truth and is often criticized as very dogmatic. Indeed, Islam is presented as the only true religion, leaving no space for appreciation of religious diversity.

Interestingly, Islamic education produces not only religious but also sectarian bias, and refutation of other sects and sub-sects has always been an important part of madrassah education. There are two main sects within Islam, Sunni and Shia. Sunnis constitute a majority in the world (around eighty-five percent of the worldwide Muslim population) and in Pakistan, where they account for around eighty percent of the population. However, madrassahs in Pakistan are organized by sub-sects and not sects. Thus there are five types of Islamic schools in the country, one Shia and four Sunni (Deobandi, Ahl-i-Hadith, Barelwi, and Jamaat-i-Islami) madrassahs.

The Deobandis are a reformist school of thought that emerged in the eighteenth century in India. Similar to other Islamic reformist movements, the Deobandis thought that Muslim society had become corrupted with local, un-Islamic customs and sought to revive a correct and purified form of Islam. They recognized four sources of the religious law: the Quran, the Sunna (practice of the Prophet) as conveyed in the Hadith (sayings of the Prophet), analogical reasoning (qiyas), and consensus of the learned (ijma).³³

Another school of thought that originated in the eighteenth century was the Ahl-i-Hadith. This movement denied the validity of classic Islamic law schools, a standard source of legal guidance for the Sunni community, and advocated the direct use of the textual sources of faith, the Quran and the Hadith, which were to be interpreted literally

³² Hilgendorf, “Islamic Education: History and Tendency,” 65.

³³ Barbara D. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 141.

and narrowly.³⁴ The Ahl-i-Hadith was (and continues to be) more radical than the Deobandis in its opinions. For example, the movement denounced all of Sufism, while the Deobandis opposed only certain practices of it.

The Barelwi group emerged out of opposition to the Deobandis and the Ahl-i-Hadith. This school of thought aimed at preserving Islam at its present, evolved form, and of the three groups was the most tolerant of Sufi practices. They believed in a special role of the Prophet as the intermediary between people and God, that the Prophet was made of light, and had the knowledge of the unseen, and that he continues to exist even after his death.³⁵ The Barelwis demanded less individual responsibility of their followers than the Ahl-i-Hadith and the Deobandis did, because they offered a hierarchy of mediators, ranging from the Prophet to the saints and to the founder of the movement Ahmed Raza Khan himself, and thus were more popular among less educated people.³⁶

Jamaat-i-Islami is a political party founded by Sayyid Abul Ali Mawdudi, a prominent Islamic theologian of the twentieth century. He was a fervent critic of the Western ideas of nationalism and feminism, and of Western culture in general. However, he advocated a modern Islamic education, which would combine Islamic learning with knowledge of modern sciences. Thus, although canonical Islamic texts are taught in Jamaat-i-Islami madrassahs, some modern subjects, such as political science, economics, and history are also included in the curriculum.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 270.

³⁵ Usha Sanyal, *Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi and His Movement* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 255.

³⁶ Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India*, 297.

Because Shias are a minority in Pakistan, the number of Shia madrassahs is relatively small (for the numbers of madrassahs by sects see Table 2).³⁷

Table 2. Madrassahs in Pakistan

	Deobandi	Barelwi	Ahl-i-Hadith	Jamaat-i-Islami	Shia	Total
1988	1,779	717	161	97	47	2,801
2002	7,000	1,585	376	500	419	9,880

Although the differences between the sects may seem minor, they have caused bitter polemics among the sects. Since the emergence of the Barelwi school of thought, their scholars (ulama) regularly accused both the Deobandis and the Ahl-i-Hadith of being kafir (infidels).³⁸ On a broader level, all Sunnis were advised to avoid prayers with Shias.³⁹ Recently these disputes have led to sectarian violence, accounting for hundreds of deaths.⁴⁰ Although books refuting other sects are usually not a part of the official syllabus, those texts are available in madrassah libraries. As Tariq Rahman notes in his study of madrassahs,

The Report on the Religious Seminaries lists several books of Deobandi madrassas to refute Shia beliefs [...]. There are also several books on the debates between the Barelvis and the Deobandis and even a book refuting Maudoodi's views [Maudoodi was the founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami].[In Shia madrassahs]

³⁷ Tariq Rahman, *Denizens of Alien Worlds: A Study of Education, Inequality and Polarization in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004), 79 .

³⁸ Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India*, 232, 268

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 152.

⁴⁰ S.V.R.Nasr, "The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics," *Modern Asian Studies* 34, no. 1 (2000): 139-140.

polemical pamphlets claiming that there are conspiracies against the Shias are available.⁴¹

In addition to books refuting beliefs of other sects/sub-sects, curricula often contain material disproving Western philosophy. For example, in madrassahs of the Jamaat-i-Islami, which is particularly hostile to Western ideas, “besides Maudoodi’s own books on all subjects relating to the modern world, a book on the conflict between Islam and Western ideas is widely available.” Books refuting capitalism and socialism are also available in Deobandi madrassahs.⁴² Even government textbooks used in madrassah during Urdu and Persian lessons are penetrated with ideas of intolerance. Some sentences are openly anti-British (“The English were always the enemies of Islam”) and anti-Hindu (“The Muslim population of the Muslim minority provinces faced atrocities of the Hindu majority”), while others denigrate women and promote very conservative Islamic behavior (“These girls have been ordered to put on the veils and they have been stopped from going to the bazaar,” “You women are really ungrateful to your husbands”).⁴³

In sum, it is clear that religious education in Pakistan produces religious, sectarian and anti-Western bias in madrassahs. While such socialization is important in making the students potentially more receptive to the ideas of terrorist organizations, other factors (such as cognitive opening) may also make them open to radical view.

⁴¹ Rahman, *Denizens of Alien Worlds*, 86-87.

⁴² Rahman, *Denizens of Alien Worlds*, 88-89.

⁴³ Examples, illustrating anti-British and sexist sentiments, are drawn from Rahman, “Language-Teaching in Pakistani Madrassas,” 113-114. Anti-Hindu sentences were cited from A.H. Nayyar and Ahmed Salim, *The Subtle Subversion: The State of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistan* [draft copy] (Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute; accessed 1 March 2006), 22’ available from <http://www.uvm.edu/~envprog/madrassah/resources.html>; Internet.

Chapter 6: Cognitive Opening.

Because of the extreme views of terrorist organizations, average people must experience some sort of crisis, which will shake their previous beliefs, to become open to the movements' message. Some of the types of crises are economic, social (such as racism), political (political discrimination), and personal (such as a death in the family).⁴⁴

While these events are beyond control of terrorist organizations, movements can use moral shocks to produce cognitive opening in potential members. Moral shocks can be used in recruitment of strangers, who are not connected to a movement through social networks. Moral shocks are often public events, or protests or demonstrations, that can create such a sense of outrage in potential members, that they will become more open to the message of the movement. Movements can then translate these events in symbols and use them to attract more people.

One of the public events frequently invoked by the terrorist organizations as a powerful symbol is the demolition of the Babri Mosque in 1992. The mosque was built in the sixteenth century at the site that many Hindus believe to be the temple of Rama, and was torn down by the most violent supporters of the Bharatiya Janata Party, a Hindu nationalist party. The demolition resulted in nationwide riots, in which more than two thousand people were killed.

The demolition was particularly shocking because India had long prided itself on being a secular and tolerant country, able to accommodate the needs of people of all religions. Kashmir itself was a symbol of secular nationalism, a proof that a Muslim-majority province can peacefully exist within a Hindu-majority state. The rise of Hindu nationalist parties in the late 1980s, as well as a surge of communal violence, undermined

⁴⁴ Wiktorowicz, "Joining the Cause," 8.

decades of Indian secularism, which the Bharatiya Janata Party depicted as the years of “forced negation of Hindu history.”⁴⁵

Destruction of the Babri Mosque enabled terrorist organizations to accuse India of religious discrimination. As Mohammad Hafiz Said, a former chief of the terrorist organization Lashkar-i-Toiba says in his interview,

Right from the time of Partition till today, whatever India has done -- be it the demolition of the Babri mosque and the massacre of Muslims in its aftermath, or the holocaust in Gujarat against Muslims -- proves that the policy of Hindus is the genocide of Muslims so that India could become a Hindu-only state.

He also urges all Muslims to fight against non-believers, or else “[t]he evil would spread. Muslims would be wiped out. Their places of worship would be demolished, just like the Babri mosque in India.”⁴⁶

In his article “Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir” Praveen Swami describes the very effect that the demolition had on many Muslims. Jalees Ansari graduated from a medical college and observed “pervasive religious intolerance” both at school and at work. The events of 1992 completely changed the course of his life:

Although Ansari claimed to have been a ‘secular-minded person,’ the massacre of Muslims during the Bhiwandi riots of 1985 transformed him completely. The demolition of the Babri Masjid and the riots that followed made him [...] snap.

⁴⁵ Bharatiya Janata Party, *Hindutva: The Great Nationalist Ideology*, [web-site] (accessed 14 January 2006); available from www.bjp.org/philo.htm; Internet.

⁴⁶ *Frontline*, “In Defence of Jihad: Interview with the former chief of the Lashkar-e-Toiba;” available from <http://www.flonnet.com/fl2009/stories/20030509002704200.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2006.

Led by Ghauri and Karim, Ansari helped set off a series of forty-three explosions in Mumbai and Hyderabad.⁴⁷

While moral shocks are usually used during spontaneous demonstrations, terrorist organizations often use annual congregations to spread their message. According to Saeed Shafqat, an annual congregation of Lashkar-i-Toiba (arguably the largest Pakistan-based terrorist organization operating in Kashmir) is attended by as many as one million people, while around 500,000 people participate in Jamaat-i-Islami's congregation.⁴⁸ These meetings play an important role in recruitment. Not only do they provide an opportunity of social networking, but they are also used by movement leaders to propagate their ideas and to glorify martyrs fallen for an Islamic cause. The journalist Anthony Davis describes a 1999 Lashkar-i-Toiba's congregation:

The first afternoon brings news instantly broadcast across the encampment: a dramatic operation is under way in Kashmir. Two Lashkar fighters have infiltrated the high-security Srinagar headquarters of the Indian Army, and killed seven enemy soldiers. [...] "Our mujahideen [holy warriors] struck at this time so our voice could be heard all over the world," says professor Hafez Sa'eed, the bespectacled Markaz chief. Jihad is intensifying in Kashmir, he adds, as Indian troops are stretched thin. Domestically, says Sa'eed, the giant rally aims to spark popular pressure to counter foreign demands on Pakistan to curb support for the insurgency.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Praveen Swami, "Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir in Theory and Practice," in *The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect*, ed. Sumit Ganguly (London: Frank Cass and Company, 2003), 80.

⁴⁸ Shafqat, "From Official Islam to Islamism," 131.

⁴⁹ *Asiaweek*, "Inside Jihad International: A Three-Day Assembly Celebrates Militant Islam;" available from <http://www.pathfinder.com/asiaweek/magazine/99/1119/nat.pakistan.jihad.html>; Internet; accessed 23 February 2006.

Importantly, glorification of martyrs is common not only among terrorist groups, but also on the official level of Pakistani government and most prominent political parties. A website maintained by Cyber Wing of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting of the Government of Pakistan describes a visit that a Hurriyat Conference (an alliance of pro-secessionist parties) leader paid to express sympathy to the relatives of martyred mujahideen: “Addressing a public gathering on the occasion, Hurriyat leaders paying tributes to the two martyrs said that they and other martyrs have sacrificed their lives to get freedom from India's subjugation and for the glorification of Islam [*sic*]. No bargaining of martyrs' blood will be permitted, they stressed.”⁵⁰ Such a glorification of military actions against Indian oppression encourages at least a condoning and at most a very favorable view of the terrorist operations among average Pakistanis, and consequently eases recruitment efforts of terrorist organizations.

Thus, while it is nearly impossible to trace various personal types of crises that can potentially cause cognitive opening, it is clear that terrorist organizations make concerted efforts to foster cognitive opening through the use of moral shocks. In addition, views on terrorist activities among average Pakistanis are influenced by the “jihadi” culture forming in Pakistan. However, specific information is needed to judge the effect of this culture on madrassah students.

Chapter 7: Religious Seeking

Individuals who have experienced cognitive opening seek to respond to this crisis by looking for an alternative paradigm. It is only natural to assume that religious people

⁵⁰ *Kashmir News*, “Martyrs’ Mission will be Realized – APHC Complete Strike in Budgam,” available from http://www.infopak.gov.pk/news/kashnews/kashnews2004/kash_aug25_2004.htm; Internet; accessed 23 February 2006.

may try to resolve such a crisis through religious seeking. While one cannot assert that all people of Pakistan are deeply religious, the process of Islamization, which was implemented in the country for several decades, increased the role of religion in the society and particularly affected the lower and middle classes. Thus madrassah students, who come primarily from these strata, were affected by Islamization and religion is likely to play a central role in their lives.

Although the party of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-1977) was considered more socialist than Islamic, it was Bhutto's government that started the process of Islamization in Pakistan. Indeed, he ran on the platform of socialism in the 1970 general elections, but was immediately attacked by the conservative religious parties as anti-Islamic and anti-Pakistan. Bhutto could not ignore these forces in a country where religion still played a major role, and in attempt to appease the Ulema (religious scholars) he added several significant Islamic elements to the socialist program during his time in office.

Declaration of Islam as the state religion of Pakistan was one of the significant changes that Bhutto brought about. In 1973, for the first time since the creation of the country in 1947, Pakistan was named an Islamic Republic. The new Constitution emphasized the importance of Islam and outlined the steps that the State would take to ensure an Islamic way of life for every citizen:

- (1) Steps shall be taken to enable the Muslims of Pakistan, individually and collectively, to order their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam and to provide facilities whereby they may be enabled to understand the meaning of life according to the Quran and the Sunna[h].

- (2) The State shall endeavor, as respects the Muslims of Pakistan, -
- a. To make the teachings of the Quran and Islamiat compulsory, to encourage and facilitate the learnings of Arabic language and to serve correct and exact printing and publishing of the Quran;
 - b. To promote unity and the observance of the Islamic moral standards; and
 - c. To secure the proper organization of Zakat Auqaf and mosques.⁵¹

Furthermore, Article 227 of the Constitution established that “all existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam,”⁵² ensuring that there would be no law contrary to the Quran and the Sunnah. In addition, in accordance with the Islamic laws, the Bhutto government banned the consumption of liquor, horse racing, and gambling.

The government of Zia ul Haq (1977-1988) went even further in its Islamization efforts, as indicated by a number of martial law regulations that he issued after coming to power. One regulation established a Quranic penalty of hand amputation for theft or banditry. Islam left the confines of the private sphere with introduction of regulations on observing the noonday prayer in government offices, restrictions on eating in public places during the month of fasting, and, later, appointment of an organizer of prayer in every village and urban precinct.

Other provisions were aimed at bringing almost all aspects of life in accordance with the Islamic laws. In legal matters, in addition to the penalties for theft, Quranic

⁵¹ S. S. Bindra, *Politics of Islamisation with Special Reference to Pakistan* (New Dehli: Deep and Deep Publications, 1990), 151.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 152.

penalties were introduced for the crimes of adultery (stoning to death in a public place if the accused is married, one hundred stripes otherwise), for a false accusation of adultery (eighty stripes), and for consumption of intoxicants (eighty stripes). In addition, Shariat Courts were established both on the federal and provincial levels, which included not only judges from the judiciary, but also members of the ulama (Islamic scholars).

Islamization also affected the economic sphere, when a zakat (alms tax used to remove poverty) ordinance came into effect in 1980, levying a compulsory two and a half percent tax on savings and similar accounts, times deposit receipts and certificates, government securities and shares, life insurance policies, and provident funds. Importantly, zakat funds were used to support madrassahs, the number of which greatly increased during the Zia government. The amount of monetary help was considerable, and money from the Zakat funds constituted from one-fifth to one-third of madrassahs' budgets.⁵³ In addition to providing support to madrassahs, the government began to establish religious schools of its own. In addition, although curricula used in madrassahs did not include modern subjects and could not match the ones of secular schools, degrees from madrassahs were recognized as equivalent to degrees from traditional universities.

Thus, Islam under the governments of Bhutto and General Zia went beyond the confines of mosques and private houses and entered the public sphere. The politics of Islamization had a big impact on the lives of many Pakistanis. As S.S. Bindra notes in the book, *Politics of Islamization*, after a decade of Zia's rule, "in the eyes of the poor and the middle class people particularly living in the rural areas, the religion is headmost [very important]. President Zia was liked by them."⁵⁴ Given that most madrassah students

⁵³ Malik, *Colonialization of Islam*, 152.

⁵⁴ Bindra, *Politics of Islamisation*, 265.

come from poor and middle-class families, it is reasonable to assume that Islamization efforts had a considerable effect on them.⁵⁵

Family background can serve as another indicator of the importance of religion in one's life. As shown in one of the studies on madrassahs, a little more than one-third (757 out of 2,077) of fathers of students in Deobandi madrassahs had religious titles, among which mawlana/mullah (a religious teacher), haji (pilgrim to Mecca), shah and sayyid (descendent of the Prophet), and hafiz (a person who knows the Quran by heart) were the most common.⁵⁶ It would be reasonable to assume that the role of Islam in the identity of these students will be significant, and that they may try to resolve the crisis produced by cognitive opening through religious seeking.

Religious seeking takes the form of "shopping" on a market of religious ideas when an individual looks for a suitable religious paradigm. In his study of recruitment to a terrorist organization in Great Britain, Quintan Wiktorowicz notes that potential members are relative novices in religions, and thus do not possess sufficient knowledge to judge theoretical merits of competing religious perspectives. While madrassah students are certainly not novices, their lack of analytical skills, resulting from the nature of Islamic education, may prevent them from objectively judging a particular religious organization.⁵⁷ An ultimate choice then will be based not on the actual merits of a movement, but rather on its ability to achieve frame alignment with a potential member.

⁵⁵ Rahman, *Denizens of Alien Worlds*, 155 - 56.

⁵⁶ Malik, *Colonialization of Islam*, 241-42.

⁵⁷ Some features of Islamic education were discussed in Chapter "Islamic Education."

Chapter 8: Frame Alignment and Socialization

Traditionally, scholars distinguish three framing tasks: to identify the problem (diagnostic framing), to propose a solution to the problem (prognostic framing), and to urge others to participate in the proposed solution (motivational framing). Frame alignment occurs when a movement and potential members have a common understanding of the problem and agree on the solution to it. Terrorist organizations operating in Kashmir are often similar in what their perception of the problem, but differ considerably in their prognostic dimension. Therefore, more information is needed to determine with which movement madrassah students are most likely to identify.

Diagnostic Framing

Diagnostic framing often involves injustice frames, which identify the source of injustice, as well as its victims. Terrorist groups in Kashmir, like many other radical Islamic organizations in the world, are vehemently anti-Western. The conflict between the West and Islam is perceived to be religious, rather than economic or political, in nature. The West is said to be afraid of Muslims and Islam, because it is “the only potential rival to the West.”⁵⁸ According to these groups, successes of Islamic civilization are embedded “in the unshakable faith of Muslims in and a strong affiliation with the personality of Muhammad.”⁵⁹ Therefore, Western strategies are said to be aimed directly at the Prophet and his teachings. To subdue Islamic civilization, the West employs many tactics, including economic and cultural domination, false accusations in terrorism and discrimination against Muslims. The United States is perceived to be at the head of the

⁵⁸ Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, “Prophethood: the Root Cause of Islam – West Conflict,” available from <http://www.jamaat.org/Isharat/archive/792.html>; Internet; accessed 3/21/2006.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

anti-Islamic coalition. However, as stated at the web-site of Harkat Ul Mujahideen, “If the US government abandons their Anti-Islam attitude and policies, then the US would not be a target of the Islamic Movements.”⁶⁰ Another enemy of Islam, and a close ally of the U.S., is Israel. In the words of the founder of Lashkar-i-Toiba, “the Jews can never be our friends. This is stated by Allah.”

Terrorist organizations represent the conflict in Kashmir as a part of the global struggle between Islam and unbelievers (kafir). Although pro-Pakistan terrorist groups in Kashmir have mainly Pakistani cadre, the insurgency is portrayed as indigenous. As the leader of one terrorist group said in an interview, “there are no militants in Kashmir. Every Kashmiri is a mujahid.”⁶¹ Thus India is a “colonial imperialist,” guilty of torture and suppression. Kashmiri Muslims, as Harkat Ul Mujahideen argues, cannot live in a country, where

On average ten or more women are burnt alive every day, because of the lack of dowry money. Where a proportion of the female population has declined to such a level that just the mention of it causes shame. From India, obscenity is exported to the rest of the world. Where people sacrifice their lives for a few pieces of silver. Where the streets and market places stink with the odour of alcohol. Where dignity and humanity is auctioned openly.⁶²

⁶⁰ Harkat Ul Mujahideen, “Perturbation of the USA,” available from <http://www.harkatulmujahideen.org/>; Internet; accessed 3/20/2006.

⁶¹ *Rediff India Abroad*, “If the Loc is opened, more harm will be caused to Pakistan,” available from <http://us.rediff.com/news/2005/oct/24inter1.htm>; Internet; accessed 2/7/2006.

⁶² Harkat Ul Mujahideen, “Anti-Islamic Policies of India,” available from <http://www.harkatulmujahideen.org/>; Internet; accessed 3/20/2006.

Again, it is “Jewish Lobby-controlled countries”⁶³ that help India “to undo what life and strength the Kashmir issue has attained through Jihad.”⁶⁴

Not only India is said to be spreading un-Islamic values. The Pakistani government is also guilty of adopting corrupting Western values: “They [the government] wanted the women to abandon hijab; run with men nude in bikinis; and learn dance and music. They were not afraid of Allah but Bush. At his behest, they wanted to purge our schoolbooks from verses on jihad; befriend India and recognize Israel.”⁶⁵

Thus anybody who does not follow the true path of Islam is considered an enemy. Such injustice frames are likely to resonate with the worldview of madrassah students, who tend to have anti-Western and anti-Indian views.

As was noted above, madrassah students have anti-Western views. Anti-Western bias can be partially attributed to the curricula of religious schools. A syllabus of Jamaat-i-Islami madrassahs, for example, contains books that are intended to “make the students aware of Western domination, the exploitative potential of Western political and economic ideas, and the disruptive influence of Western liberty and individualism on Muslim society.”⁶⁶

Furthermore, students do not have access to any alternative source of information, which could potentially disprove the intolerant views propagated in most religious schools. Unlike their counterparts from elitist English-medium schools, madrassah

⁶³ Harkat Ul Mujahideen, “Introduction,” available from <http://www.harkatulmujahideen.org/>; Internet; accessed 3/20/2006.

⁶⁴ Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, “Kashmir,” available from <http://www.jamaat.org/qa/kashmir.html>; Internet; accessed 1/24/2006.

⁶⁵ *Rediff India Abroad*, “If the Loc is opened, more harm will be caused to Pakistan.”

⁶⁶ Rahman, *Denizens of Alien Worlds*, 88.

students are not exposed to cable TV, or textbooks printed abroad. In a country where less than one percent of the population uses the Internet, online sources will most likely be unavailable either.⁶⁷ Therefore books biased against the West and India are the only source of information that shape the worldview of madrassah students.

It is highly probable that students of religious schools will share anti-government sentiments. Students studying in religious schools generally come from lower class families. Tariq Rahman observed in his survey that 76.6 percent of madrassah students belong to poor sections of society.⁶⁸ In the survey conducted by Fayyaz Hussain, 48.95 percent of students responded that they joined a madrassah for economic reasons.⁶⁹ Another study showed that about 50 percent of the boarding students of madrassahs attended the primary stage of government schools, but dropped out due to poverty. The same study indicated that very few students want to attend a religious school because of family tradition or because they wish to become a religious scholar, and face bleak employment opportunities after graduation.⁷⁰ Thus, some students may blame the government for its failure to provide affordable formal education and students' subsequent marginalization.

Prognostic Framing

The function of prognostic framing is to convince potential members of appropriate tactics and strategies that will solve the problem. Perhaps, the most famous frame used by Islamic movements around the world is the one that proclaims, "Islam is

⁶⁷ CIA Factbook, "Pakistan," available from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pk.html#Comm>; Internet; accessed 3/21/2006.

⁶⁸ Rahman, *Denizens of Alien Worlds*, 91.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 92.

⁷⁰ Malik, *Colonialization of Islam*, 253, 270.

the solution.” Indeed, a refrain often used by terrorist organizations in Pakistan is that the rulers, as well as many common people, have forgotten how to be good Muslims. The leader of Lashkar-i-Toiba Hafiz Saeed, for example, claimed in an interview that the earthquake in Kashmir in 2005 was the result of “the rulers’ sinful policies,” who “blatantly ridiculed the commandments of Allah” and “wanted all the Pakistani to adopt the ‘get-up’ of Bush.”⁷¹ The website of another terrorist organization, Harkat ul Mujahideen, contains criticizes the Muslims who do nothing while “the Kuffar [unbelievers] lay their hands on their daughters.”⁷²

However, terrorist groups have a specific interpretation of the meaning of the return. They see jihad as the religious duty of every Muslim. Although jihad is not included as one of the five pillars of Islam, it appears as such in the official ideology of Lashkar-i-Toiba, which claims that “there is so much emphasis on this subject that some commentators and scholars of the Quran have remarked that the topic of the Quran is jihad.”⁷³ Moreover, it was when Muslims forgot this obligation that they “began to degenerate.”⁷⁴

All terrorist organizations operating in Kashmir consider jihad to be an appropriate tactic to free the province from Indian oppression. However, opinions differ on whether Kashmir is just one stage of jihad or it is an end in itself. One point of view is represented by Sayyed Ali Shah Gilani, the spokesperson of the Jaamat-i-Islami in Jammu and Kashmiri (JIJK), whose writing may influence the position of the military

⁷¹ *Rediff India Abroad*, “If the Loc is opened, more harm will be caused to Pakistan.”

⁷² Harkat Ul Mujahideen, “Jihad: The Forgotten Obligation,” available from <http://www.harkatulmujahideen.org/>; Internet; accessed 3/20/2006.

⁷³ Yoginder Sikand, “The Changing Course of the Kashmiri Struggle: From National Liberation to Islamist Jihad?” *Muslim World* 91, no. 1/2 (2001): 229-57.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

wing of JIJK, the Hizb-ul Mujahideen. In his opinion, the only goal of jihad is freeing Kashmir from Indian control and merging it with Pakistan. Gilani argues that Muslims are not fanatics, and that violence should be directed only against the Indian state, and not against Hindus.⁷⁵

On the other hand, for Lashkar-i-Toiba jihad in Kashmir is only one stage of the global war against the unbelievers. The purpose of this global jihad is to conquer the entire world (“We will uphold the flag of freedom and Islam through jihad not only in Kashmir but in the world”), and to extinguish all oppression against Muslims (“If we want to live with honor and dignity, then we have to return back to jihad.”), as well as “[to solve] financial and political problems.”⁷⁶

The frame, “Islam is the solution,” particularly in its radical interpretation, is likely to resonate with the worldviews of madrassah students. A study of Tariq Rahman showed that many students have very militant views. Almost sixty percent of students responded “yes” to the question, “Should it be Pakistan’s priority to take Kashmir away from India by an open war?” Fifty-three percent of the students agreed that it should be a priority for Pakistan to take Kashmir away by supporting Jihadi groups, and only thirty-four percent supported peaceful means only proposition.⁷⁷ While it is impossible to predict with certainty which of the two views on jihad madrassah students will choose, sect affiliation may play a part in such choice. Thus, the opinion of Gilani will appeal more to the students of Jamaat-i-Islami, while the followers of the Ahl-i-Hadith sub-sect will probably choose Lashkar-i-Toiba.

⁷⁵ Yoginder S. Sikand, “For Islam and Kashmir: The Prison Diaries of Sayyed Ali Gilani of the Jama’at-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir,” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 18, no. 2 (1998): 241-50.

⁷⁶ Sikand, “The Changing Course of the Kashmiri Struggle,” 229-57.

⁷⁷ Rahman, “Denizens of Alien Worlds,” 93.

Motivational Framing

The core task of motivational framing is to encourage potential members to take part in the proposed action. Terrorist organizations often appeal to religious feelings of potential members. Jihad is often referred to as a religious duty of every Muslim. Thus, Imam Saraksi, whose writings appear on the website of Hurkat ul Mujahideen, states that “jihad is obligatory and commanded by Allah. Any person who denies jihad is a Kafir (disbeliever) and people who doubt the obligation of jihad have gone astray.”⁷⁸ In a similar fashion ideologists of Lashkar-i-Toiba assert that the faith of a Muslim who has “never intended to fight against the disbelievers” is “not without traces of hypocrisy.”⁷⁹ In addition, those who take part in jihad are promised that “Allah will save [them] from the pyre of hell,” and “huge palaces in paradise” await those who are killed in fighting.⁸⁰

While appealing to the religious feelings of pious people can be effective, it is hard to predict whether these frames will resonate with the worldview of madrassah students. Thus, while it is likely that terrorist organizations will be able to achieve alignment of diagnostic and prognostic frames with madrassah students, more information is needed to estimate the possibility of motivational frame alignment.

Socialization

Socialization is the last stage of the process of persuasion. This stage may include one-on-one interaction with the group’s members, lessons, social events, and involvement in some activities of the movement. After a potential member has accepted

⁷⁸ Harkat Ul Mujahideen, “The True Meaning of Jihad in Islam,” available from <http://www.harkatulmujahideen.org/>; Internet; accessed 3/20/2006.

⁷⁹ Sikand, “The Changing Course of the Kashmiri Struggle,” 229-57.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

the worldview of a terrorist organization, formal joining becomes natural and almost inevitable. Information on this last stage is not available, and this study will not analyze socialization of madrassah students.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

Madrassahs have received much attention since the attack on the World Trade Center in September 2001. They have been described as everything from “weapons of mass instruction”⁸¹ to peaceful institutions that “have never preached any hatred.”⁸² The objective of this study was to determine whether madrassahs are indeed a breeding ground of terrorism. I used sociological concepts of structural availability, cognitive opening, religious seeking, and frame alignment to estimate the probability of recruitment of madrassah students to terrorist organizations. I also used the conflict in Kashmir as a case study to determine what terrorist organization madrassah students are most likely to be recruited into. Although the evidence presented in this paper suggests some connection between religious education and participation in terrorist organizations, more information is needed to reach a definitive conclusion.

An important precondition for recruitment is structural availability. I found that madrassah students possess unscheduled time to devote to potential membership and have few ties to the surrounding community. Thus they are structurally available for participation in an organization. At the same time, it is impossible to determine whether

⁸¹ Andrew Coulson, “Education and Indoctrination in the Muslim World: Is there a Problem?,” in *Policy Analysis* (accessed 10 October 2005); available from <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa511.pdf>; Internet.

⁸² *The News International*, “Al-Qaeda is not a Product of Madrassas,” (accessed 10 October 2005); available from <http://www.jang-group.com/thenews/aug2005-weekly/nos-07-08-2005/spr.htm>; Internet.

graduates of religious institutions are also structurally available, because their ability to participate in movements is influenced by individual circumstances.

In addition to structural availability, which helps to estimate the likelihood of participating in any social movement, four key processes (cognitive opening, religious seeking, frame alignment, and socialization) increase the probability of recruitment to *terrorist* organizations.

The process of cognitive opening makes potential members more open to radical ideas of terrorist organizations, which most people dismiss outright. Due to the character of religious education and to sectarian and anti-Western bias it produces in students, madrassah students are initially more receptive to the ideas of terrorist organizations than people with secular education. Besides this prior socialization, terrorist groups can actively foster cognitive opening in madrassah students through the use of moral shocks. In addition, glorification of martyrs by both the government and terrorist organizations encourages a favorable view of terrorist activities among madrassah students.

Because Islam plays a central role in the lives of madrassah students, they are likely to try to resolve the crisis produced by cognitive opening through religion, and thus are likely to join terrorist organizations with an Islamic platform. The choice of a particular organization will depend on the ability of this organization to achieve frame alignment with potential members. My analysis of frames commonly used by terrorist organizations operating in Kashmir showed that these frames are very likely to resonate with the worldview of madrassah students.

Thus, madrassah students are likely to undergo three of the four key processes that lead to successful recruitment. There are conditions that can ease the recruitment

efforts of terrorist organizations among madrassah students. However, the analysis of the likelihood of joining cannot be complete without the study of the fourth process of recruitment. During the socialization process, a potential member becomes a student of the movement and participates in some of its activities. Information on such activities is not available, and thus the analysis of this stage, however important, was omitted.

Thus, evidence suggesting the link between religious education and participation in terrorist organizations is rather tentative. It is certain that there are conditions that favor madrassah students' participation in terrorist groups. However, many important factors, which can decide ultimate joining, are individual for each potential member. Such factors obviously could not be addressed in this paper. Therefore, more detailed information and research are needed to reach a more decisive conclusion.

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