

*Political Underrepresentation and Domestic Terrorism: The Deficiency of
Minority Descriptive Representation as a Causal Factor of Violent Radicalization
in Western European Democracies*

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Chapter 1: Introduction

On 7 January 2015, two Islamist gunmen forced their way into the Paris headquarters of *Charlie Hebdo* and opened fire, killing twelve. The shooters were later identified as French Muslims of Algerian descent. Over recent years, attacks similar to the ones committed at the offices of *Charlie Hebdo* have occurred throughout Western Europe. Democratic nations experiencing such violence has become a serious concern for policy makers in the European Union. The perpetrators of the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks were French citizens. They were born and educated in France. They didn't recently immigrate, and they didn't import terrorism from a foreign land where they were raised. They were radicalized at home, in France.¹ There are several causal factors as to why individuals commit these violent acts against their home countries including educational opportunities, unemployment, geographical region, personal grievances and alienation from one's society. Conventional wisdom suggests that the feeling of alienation creates an environment where it is more likely for an individual to turn towards violent extremism. However, how best to combat these feelings of isolation among European minority groups remains unclear.

In this thesis, I seek to explain the role of political representation in preventing or exacerbating minority violence. In an example of a large minority group in France, Muslims fill none of the 577 deputy posts in the National Assembly, and as a large minority group in Germany, only two people of Turkish descent are present among the 603 members of the German parliament.² Given these examples, it is fairly easy to

¹ M.G. Oprea, *How France Grew Its Own Terrorists*, (Austin: The Federalist, 2015).

² Mirjam Dittrich, *Muslims in Europe: addressing the challenges of radicalization*, EPC Working Paper 23 (Brussels: European Policy Center, 2006), p. 22.

assume that minority groups in these Western European states are extremely underrepresented.

Democracies are based upon the idea that the elected officials of a state should adequately represent the population that they govern. Despite this general notion, political scientists have continuously noted the fact that minority groups have been, and continue to be, vastly underrepresented in Western democracies. Are electoral systems the cause of the vast underrepresentation of minority groups in Western Europe, and therefore does this level of underrepresentation affect the level of domestic terrorism in those countries?

European Union integration policies of minority and immigrant groups are crucial in preventing radical extremism in Europe. The term integration is defined as “wanting to take part in the society in which you live. But it also means taking part.”³ One of the essential factors of successful EU integration is participation in a member state’s democratic process and political decision-making.⁴ Unfortunately, this participation and representation of minority groups is more difficult in some EU member states than others. For example, “ethnic groups are not recognized in French law, under which all are considered equal, so such a ‘positive discrimination’ policy would be difficult to implement; some policy makers in France and elsewhere in the EU also contend that such a policy could lead to further segregation of immigrants or ethnic minorities rather than less.”⁵

³ Paul Gallis, Kristin Archick, Francis Miko, Steven Woehrel, *Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries*, (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2005), p. 6.

⁴ Gallis et al., *Muslims in Europe*, p. 6.

⁵ Gallis et al., *Muslims in Europe*, p. 9.

If integration policies fail, there can be serious implications for national security. In many works of political science, isolation or alienation has been noted as a core, driving factor of radicalization. The process of radicalization frequently begins by individuals feeling frustrated with their lives, international events or politics. They are searching for an identity and a cause, and they often find a solution in violent extremism. This prospect of being part of a group and feeling important is a major contributing factor in the progression toward radicalization.⁶ If a minority group is underrepresented at the political level, it sends a message of exclusion to the group. As a consequence, it creates a situation of alienation that in turn can be a strong motivating factor for an extremist. If an individual feels as if they do not belong or are not welcomed in their society, they will search for other ways to feel included. Though alienation is not the sole, triggering factor of radicalization, it can play a large role. The solution to this issue lies in integration policies, especially political representation. If minority groups feel as if they have a voice in their society's political process, the feeling of alienation in society lessens.

Why do we continuously see minority groups underrepresented in democracies? There exist several, different types of democracies with different electoral laws and systems as well as diverse types and sizes of minority communities within their populations. As is evident in just the last decade, a great number of democracies have experienced some category of violence perpetrated by minority citizens of that country. Little research has been done on this topic to date, but I intend to explore the major types of political systems of democracies in an attempt to determine whether or not a particular form of democracy, whether its system be more inclusive or more exclusive to minority

⁶ Tomas Precht, *Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalization in Europe*, (Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Justice, 2007), p. 35-36.

groups, impacts the level of domestic terrorism in that country. Therefore, the question my thesis seeks to answer is whether the political characteristics of a democracy increase the likelihood that it will experience domestic terrorism.

While I intend to link the electoral systems to the level of terrorism in Western European democracies, I note that individuals rarely resort to terrorism initially, but also participate in other crime and become delinquents before they turn to terrorism. “About 60 to 70 percent of all inmates in the country's prison system are Muslim, according to Muslim leaders, sociologists and researchers, though Muslims make up only about 12 percent of the country's population... ‘The high percentage of Muslims in prisons is a direct consequence of the failure of the integration of minorities in France,” said Moussa Khedimellah, a sociologist who has spent several years conducting research on Muslims in the French penal system.”⁷ In Britain, 11% of prisoners are Muslim while Muslims make up approximately 3% of the total population, according to the Justice Ministry. Research by the Open Society Institute, an advocacy organization, shows that 20% of adult prisoners and 26% of all juvenile offenders are Muslim in the Netherlands, and Muslims comprise about 5.5% of the country’s population. In Belgium, Muslims from Morocco and Turkey make up at least 16% of the prison population, compared with 2% of the general populace, the research found.⁸ The causal factors leading to the high incarceration rates of Western European Muslims, including integration failures as suggested by Moussa Khedimellah, are similar if not the same factors that can eventually lead certain individuals to committing acts of terrorism. France, for example, is an

⁷ Molly Moor, *In France, Prisons Filled With Muslims*, (Washington D.C.: The Washington Post, 2008).

⁸ Moor, *In France, Prisons Filled With Muslims*.

assimilationist society, expecting immigrants to give up their original culture and language in order to more closely embody what it means to be “truly French”. In this type of society, it is virtually impossible for a minority group, such as French Muslims, to form a political party that is viewed as legitimate by the whole of French society and participate in French politics. The political integration of minority groups like Muslims in France has thus far been a failure, creating an environment of exclusion that often leads to violence on the part of minorities and, as this study suggests, terrorism. Although crime on the part of underrepresented minorities exists, this study focuses on the link between underrepresentation and terrorism. All countries experience crime, but the level and frequency of terrorism being experienced by Western Europe is a relatively new phenomenon with devastating consequences and therefore, a cause for great concern.

Minority representation in the political sphere is significant. In order to achieve this, two notions of representation have been developed, substantive representation and descriptive representation. Substantive representation describes the extent to which a governing actor advocates for the interests of a certain social group, without regard to shared characteristics.⁹ For instance, a white, male politician may be able to represent the interests of a minority group, but despite this argument, the inherent lack of diversity still conveys a message of exclusion.¹⁰

Descriptive representation, is defined as the idea that elected representatives in democracies should not only represent the preferences of their voters, but should also embody their descriptive characteristics that are politically relevant, one of these

⁹ Sophia J. Wallace, *Representing Latinos: Examining Descriptive and Substantive Representation in Congress*, (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2014), p. 918.

¹⁰ Bloemraad, *Accessing the Corridors of Power*, p. 655.

characteristics being ethnicity. According to this definition, an elected body should resemble a distinctive section of the voters they are representing by their external characteristics. There are four main arguments for the importance of minority descriptive representation. First, minority descriptive representation carries symbolic implications. The legitimacy of a nation's political parties, as well as its political system as whole, is at risk when its minority groups are underrepresented. This underrepresentation calls in the question of whether a state is truly, by definition, a democracy if its representatives do not reflect the diversity of its population.¹¹ Second, without a certain level of diversity present in legislatures, a message of exclusion is automatically conveyed to minority groups, which in turn, can elevate the political alienation of those groups.¹² Third, the election of a politician belonging to a minority group can be viewed as a type of acceptance of that minority by the majority population of the country. It can also gauge the level of the socio-cultural and economic integration of the minority group.¹³ Fourth, there can be serious consequences attached to the lack of statistical minority representation in government. When elected, those representative members are able to work for their group by advocating specific policies, influencing the allocation of public resources and serving a role as the spokesperson for the concerns of their minority group. Without this representation, minority groups are at an automatic disadvantage and may also feel excluded from the whole of society.

¹¹ Irene Bloemraad and Karen Schönwälder, *Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Representation in Europe: Conceptual Challenges and Theoretical Approaches*, (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 565.

¹² Irene Bloemraad, *Accessing the Corridors of Power: Puzzles and Pathways to Understanding Minority Representation*, (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 654.

¹³ Bloemraad, *Accessing the Corridors of Power*, p. 654.

When certain individuals feel as if they have no voice or say in the policy decisions of their government or feel they are being purposely excluded from the political process, they may reject the political system, completely. Unfortunately, this harsh rejection is sometimes expressed through violence, whether that results in violent protests, or the possibility of acts of terrorism against the seemingly oppressive and barring government system.

Didier Ruedin notes that only in nations where minority communities are properly included can conflict be avoided. He continues by saying that in areas where particular groups are being excluded, there will remain the potential for future conflict.¹⁴ In addition to this theory, Rafaela Dancygier contends that increases in minority descriptive representation have been shown to lead to a lower incidence of anti-state violence on the part of minorities.¹⁵

The feeling of alienation in a person's society is a factor that continuously surfaces in discussions on terrorist radicalization.¹⁶ Studies have been done linking minority group representation in government and the level of alienation felt by these groups. This is not to say that low or non-representation of minority groups at the political level creates radical extremists from these groups, but it could play a role as one of the causal factors of the sense of alienation from the rest of the population. This feeling of being alienated, in turn, can be an influential element leading to acts of violence in a country.

¹⁴ Didier Ruedin, *Ethnic Group Representation in a Cross-National Comparison*, (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 336.

¹⁵ Rafaela M. Dancygier, *Electoral Rules or Electoral Leverage? Explaining Muslim Representation in England*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 229.

¹⁶ See the following: Dittrich, *Muslims in Europe*, Pretcht, *Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalization in Europe* and Gallis et al., *Muslims in Europe*.

Government and electoral institutions play a key role in the inclusion of a country's minority populations. If problems of minority underrepresentation are not addressed, feelings of alienation among members of Western Europe's minority groups will increase, creating situations in which domestic radicalization will become more likely. As evidenced by domestic terror attacks such as *Charlie Hebdo* (2015) in France, domestic radicalization is a critical issue that needs to be addressed by many governments of Western Europe. In this thesis, I argue that electoral institutions impact the likelihood of domestic terrorist attacks in a state. I theorize that a country's level of descriptive representation are important for Europe's minority groups when thinking of the level of communication, circumstances of uncrystallized interests, social context and de facto legitimacy. Higher levels of minority descriptive representation in government should decrease the likelihood of domestic terrorism by creating a sense of unity between a country's minorities and majority group. When members of a minority groups feel included in the society as a whole, feelings of alienation are reduced and minorities are less likely to turn toward violent extremism for a sense of belonging. Electoral systems are vital in controlling the levels of minority descriptive representation in a government because each system contains characteristics that make it easier or more difficult for a member of a minority group to be elected to office. Because of this power, I focus on the role of electoral systems as a possible, causal factor of domestic terrorism by way of their effect on the level of a country's minority descriptive representation, and therefore, levels of minority inclusion.

In the following chapter of this thesis, I give a brief overview of the previous research on this topic and how it relates to this study. I draw upon research on the causal

factors of radical extremism as well as examinations on the importance of descriptive representation in government. Continuing, I present a theory on the correlation between a state's type of electoral system and its level of minority descriptive representation and outline the hypotheses. Next, I present methods of analysis in addition to an explanation of the variables I use to test the hypotheses. I then provide the results of the data analysis and offer a discussion on the findings, Finally, I present a case study comparing the two countries of France and Denmark in order to further explore the results of the analysis, and I conclude with a discussion of the findings of this research and their possible implications.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Previous research suggests that there exist a variety of factors that can lead to the radicalization of a member of a minority group to commit acts of terrorism. These factors include lack of integration or social exclusion, government policy and socio-economic hardship. It must be noted that none of these factors will inevitably lead an individual to

turn toward radicalization, but in combination with one another and in addition to personal experiences or grievances, these elements create an environment where the process of radicalization is more likely to occur.

The socio-economic status of minorities is present in most works analyzing the radicalization process. Many members of minority communities in Europe work as laborers, and the existence of minorities in the middle and upper classes is quite rare. For example, in Belgium, the rate of unemployment for “foreign born” individuals is twice as high as the rate for native Belgians. Political scientist, Mirjam Dittrich contends that a weak socio-economic situation makes it difficult for minorities to exercise influence in the public sphere.¹⁷ Syed Mansoob Murshed and Sara Pavan draw upon a collective action problem to describe how the socio-economic status of minority groups may lead to radicalization. In poor, culturally homogenous communities that suffer from high unemployment, group grievances transform into individual grievances. Individuals act upon these grievances. It is not the poverty of the one person that drives individual membership of a radical group, but the disadvantage faced by the group as a whole. These identity economics show the type of intragroup dynamics that lead to increasingly extensive, radicalized collective action.¹⁸ They continue in stating, “Individual utility functions associated with terrorism or radical acts are altruistic and based on the social positioning of the group and not the individual; these individuals are motivated by the plight of their impoverished and oppressed brethren. There is not only identification with

¹⁷ Dittrich, *Muslims in Europe* p. 22.

¹⁸ Syed Mansoob Murshed and Sara Pavan, *Identity and Islamic Radicalization in Western Europe*, Research Working Paper 16 (Brighton: MICROCON, 2009), p. 12-13.

a cause...but an imperative to participate in furthering that cause.”¹⁹ Though a strong motivator of radicalization, not all minority group members who live in poverty become terrorists. Other research suggests that the root cause for the high rates of minority group unemployment is the level of education. Minority groups, more than any others, have lower completion rates of secondary schools, which in turn lead to the significantly higher unemployment rates among individuals of minority groups.²⁰ The reasoning behind the low levels of minority education stem from a variety of issues including low income as well as the poor schooling in minority dominated areas. Previous research has been conducted on the specific issue of minority education, but this issue is not included in the scope of this thesis.

A second factor that has the potential to lead minorities to radicalization is the influence of the media and public discourse. One-third of Europeans admit to being racist, and a majority believes that minority groups abuse their countries’ social benefits systems. A majority is also convinced that the presence of minority groups increases unemployment.²¹ This notion results in many Europeans’ belief that the minority presence in their countries is a source of insecurity. For example, “The French media is filled with plaintive stories that the French ‘identity’ is being diluted by immigrants, and a strong consensus remains that the Republic’s central ideals must be preserved.”²² In Britain 69% of persons polled feel that the rest of society does not regard the British,

¹⁹ Murshed et al., *Identity and Islamic Radicalization*, p. 15.

²⁰ Dittrich, *Muslims in Europe*, p. 26.

²¹ Dittrich, *Muslims in Europe*, p. 17.

²² Gallis et al., *Muslims in Europe*, p. 31.

Muslim minority as an integral part of life in the country.²³ The availability of these opinions is widespread through media outlets, creating a general distaste for minority groups. This feeling of insecurity is exacerbated when a member of a minority group commits an act of violence. Reports in the media emphasizing the ethnicity of the perpetrator create a backlash from the majority population to that minority group as a whole. Increased media attention, and attention from police forces after a terrorist attack, fuel a growing sense of insecurity among minorities. When minorities feel insecure in their society or blamed for the actions of a single individual, they tend to cling to their communities and hold a negative view of the people placing blame upon their group, creating an atmosphere suitable for radicalization.

Thirdly, government policy of European countries has the potential to create grievances among minority groups that could later become grievances and part of the radicalization process of certain individuals. In recent years, the French government has refused to grant special privileges in public institutions, which has led to clashes with a small percentage of the Muslim population. That specific minority group has called for the allowance of a headscarf to be worn by Muslim girls in public schools and that only female doctors treat Muslim girls in public hospitals.²⁴ Mirjam Dittrich has found that “political statements by leading political figures have contributed to bringing xenophobic, racist and Islamophobic views into mainstream politics.”²⁵ Some may argue that it is reasonable for the host society to expect their non-native population to assimilate to the their way of life. Though some level of assimilation is reasonable and even necessary, at

²³ Dittrich, *Muslims in Europe*, p. 19.

²⁴ Gallis et al., *Muslims in Europe*, p. 23.

²⁵ Dittrich, *Muslims in Europe* p. 27.

some point or another, a line must be drawn to signify how much assimilation is required and how much is too much. France emphasizes their belief in *laïcité*, the separation of church in state, but has created laws that target the Muslim faith. Wearing any type of “religious symbol” is prohibited in public schools, but most view this law as a direct attack on the hijab, the head covering worn by Muslim women. Learning the language of the host country is a necessary, assimilationist policy, but countries like France have created overbearing assimilationist policies that have only generated more conflict and a larger gap between the native and the non-native population of the country.

Another form of exclusion that has been touched upon in combination with other alienation factors is the presence of minorities in government. In Western European democracies, minority groups are severely underrepresented. Mirjam Dittrich notes a few examples in the article, *Muslims in Europe: addressing the challenges of radicalization*. “Muslim politicians active in national political life are a rarity throughout the EU. According to a report by the German *Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung*, there are less than 30 elected members of national parliaments representing the 15 million Muslims living in Europe. The Netherlands has seven Muslim MPs (with a Muslim population of 800,000) and the UK has six Muslims in the House of Lords and four in the House of Commons. France prides itself as being a country of *égalité* (equality), but none of the 555 (now 577) deputies in the National Assembly are Muslim. Germany, with a population of 82 million, is home to 3.5 million Muslims, but there are only two people of Turkish descent among the 603 members of the German parliament.”²⁶ Dittrich notes the cause of this underrepresentation to be weak socio-economic situations, but does not

²⁶ Dittrich, *Muslims in Europe* p. 22.

go into further detail on the link between the two. Dittrich's article continues in saying, "According to some observers, this is partly because the established political groups are fearful of a backlash from voters if Muslims are appointed to political office and promoted to leadership positions, even in youth groups."²⁷ I intend to add to this observation by looking at different electoral systems in Western Europe to see if there are characteristics of certain systems that make it easier or more difficult for minorities to be elected. This level of integration is extremely important in combatting radical extremism as it has been noted that "Increases in minority descriptive representation have been shown to lead to more positive attitudes toward minority groups, to a lower incidence of antistate violence on the part of minorities, and to better substantive representation of minority interests."²⁸

The case for the importance of descriptive representation arises when the interests of a group cannot be sufficiently represented by individuals who are not a part of the group themselves. Political scientist Jane Mansbridge identifies at least two circumstances where the previous statement is true: 1) "when representatives who are members of a group tend to respond to group-relevant issues with greater concern than non-members, and 2) when representatives who themselves are members of a group can communicate better among themselves, with other representatives and with constituents from that group."²⁹ Descriptive representatives also play an influential role in symbolic terms by "making the statement to the entire citizenry, including its other representatives,

²⁷ Dittrich, *Muslims in Europe* p. 22.

²⁸ Dancygier, *Electoral Rules or Electoral Leverage?*, p. 229.

²⁹ Jane Mansbridge, *Quota Problems: Combating the Dangers of Essentialism*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 624.

that members of that group are capable of ruling.”³⁰ The personal experiences of representatives also play a crucial role. These experiences make them attentive to the needs of constituents who are similar to them and drive them to act on those needs. In Mansbridge’s article, *Quota Problems: Combatting the Dangers of Essentialism*, she explains that, “Descriptive representatives have, moreover, several advantages in communicating with other legislators. In listening, they can respond flexibly, drawing not just from what they have heard from their constituents, but also from what they know from their own lives.”³¹ She continues by saying, “Even when the descriptive legislator is silent, his or her mere physical presence reminds the other legislators of the perspectives and interests of the group of which he or she is a descriptive member.”³² Finally, descriptive representation aids in ameliorating the mistrust that potentially obstructs communication between the representatives and their constituents. “Descriptive representation thus has positive effects on outcomes important to a group through at least two mechanisms of investing more heavily through greater concern and communicating interests more thoroughly.”³³

In review of previous research on the subject of minority representation in government, it has been noted that in many Western European democracies, minorities are significantly underrepresented. When considering systems of proportional representation (PR), the political parties play the most crucial role. In systems of proportional representation, whether that is closed list, open list or semi-open list, competition among parties is normally, relatively strong. The party leadership itself

³⁰ Mansbridge, *Quota Problems*, p. 625.

³¹ Mansbridge, *Quota Problems*, p. 626.

³² Mansbridge, *Quota Problems*, p. 626.

³³ Mansbridge, *Quota Problems*, p. 627.

wields a significant amount of power over who is put on the list by controlling appointment procedures. In terms of candidate procedure, party leadership priorities are based upon the composition of party factions in parliament. Whether or not a minority group member will be placed on the list is determined by the mainstream parties' decisions to recruit minority representatives. These decisions are made based on different types of concerns. Allotting even a single seat to any specific group is a costly act for the party; it is also a significant indicator of the party's commitment to the group. From the viewpoint of maximizing the number of votes, including minority representatives on party lists makes sense when it holds the promise of vote gain.³⁴ In order for a member of a minority group to be elected, a party must make the decision to place them on a list. Karen Bird states that the geographic location and concentration of a minority group are also important. The chance of a traditional party choosing a minority candidate is greatest where the party considers that such a candidate can generate new voter support where the party has not performed well in passed elections. Even so, parties will display caution in order to avoid being identified solely with the interests of minority groups. In order to win an election, they need to acquire votes not just from the minority communities, but also from the rest of the population.³⁵ That being said, it is primarily up to a state's political parties whether or not a minority group member will even have the chance at being elected. The preferential characteristics of the proportional representation system are key in determining whether or not minority groups are adequately represented.

³⁴ Oleh Protsyk, *Recruitment and Representation of Ethnic Minorities under Proportional Representation: Evidence from Bulgaria*, (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012), p. 320.

³⁵ Karen Bird, *The Political Representation of Women and Ethnic Minorities in Established Democracies*, Working Paper (Aalborg East: Academy for Migration Studies in Denmark, 2004), p. 17-18.

Two additional types of electoral systems that can be employed within PR systems are single-member party districts (SMD) and multi-member party districts (MMD). These two systems are often compared when determining whether one form of electoral process or the other is more beneficial for minority groups. Rafaela Dancygier suggests that balancing of the ticket is not an option in the single-member system when only one seat is up for grabs in a particular election. In these circumstances, competition for a place on the ticket may be stronger, and strategic considerations about what type of candidate will most likely win, come to the forefront. In these situations, parties are more likely to run candidates belonging to dominant majority groups, not minorities.³⁶

Most theoretical accounts assume that multi-member elections should lead to higher shares of ethnic minority representatives. This assumption is based on the facts that multi-member elections allow party leaders to balance the slate and many parties do so thinking that a balanced ticket will be attractive to new voting blocs. Statistically speaking, the more seats there are in play, the more likely it is that someone from a minority group will be elected, therefore minorities are likely to enter multi-member district races. Many political scientists find the multi-member electoral system to be beneficial for the election of underrepresented groups.³⁷

The failure of integration, and the social exclusion from which it stems, is a fundamental factor in what leads individuals to terrorism. Integration failures and feelings of isolation originate from a variety of circumstances in a society. The turn toward radicalization may be reinforced by relative deprivation factors including alienation,

³⁶ Dancygier, *Electoral Rules or Electoral Leverage?*, p. 23.

³⁷ Dancygier, *Electoral Rules or Electoral Leverage?*, p. 231-240.

social dissatisfaction, experiencing discrimination and social exclusion.³⁸ Media plays a large role in exacerbating the feeling of social exclusion. The media blames immigrants and minority groups for national issues, such as unemployment rates. Many minorities have also experienced personal discrimination in their life, adding to the increased polarization between minority groups and the general population. As previously mentioned, an isolated area containing only one ethnic group can serve as an ideological sanctuary for breeding terrorists. Some political scientists argue, “the ethnic concentration in certain areas is enhancing social exclusion and creating parallel societies where minorities are not part of the major values in the society.”³⁹ After there are attacks in a country, this feeling of exclusion is exacerbated. Minorities feel that they are placed under a cloud of suspicion and “increased attention from the media and the police fuel a growing sense of insecurity among minorities.”⁴⁰

Chapter 3: Theory

The terrorist attacks in Madrid in March of 2004 followed by the London attacks in July of 2005, brought to light that terrorism was no longer an imported, overseas occurrence, but instead was a homegrown issue for Europe. On 7 January 2015, two Islamist gunmen forced their way into the Paris headquarters of *Charlie Hebdo* and opened fire, killing twelve people. In November of the same year, the city of Paris was

³⁸ Mansoob et al., *Identity and Islamic Radicalization*, p. 43.

³⁹ Mansoob et al., *Identity and Islamic Radicalization*, p. 45.

⁴⁰ Dittrich, *Muslims in Europe* p. 27.

targeted again by a series of terrorist attacks that killed 130 people and injured 368 more. Over recent years, attacks such as these, have occurred throughout Western Europe. Such violence being experienced by democratic nations has caused serious concern for EU policy makers. “The threat level and the intensity of the desire to perpetrate mass-casualty attacks within Europe is not diminishing...It is also clear that the radicalization processes are becoming more challenging to address as it is simply not just a linear progression, a complex combination of push-pull factors or that people move in and out of roles and functions.”⁴¹

The process of violent radicalization is one full of complexities with no single source or mechanism that can be transferred from one case of radicalization to another. Instead, “it is the complex interplay between these factors being played out simultaneously across the global and local levels and across different geographic contexts down to the individual level. This is the very core as to why finding decisive factors has proven so difficult, if not almost futile. It is instead the combination of different factors that facilitate the journey towards radicalization.”⁴² Some of these facilitating factors include educational opportunities, unemployment, polarizing public rhetoric and stigmatism, geographical region, personal grievances, identity crisis, political polarization and alienation from one’s society. Conventional wisdom suggests that the feeling of alienation creates an environment where it is more likely for an individual to turn towards violent extremism. However, how best to combat this feeling of isolation among European minority groups remains unclear. I hypothesize that there exists a correlation

⁴¹ Magnus Ranstorp, *Understanding Violent Radicalization: Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 2.

⁴² Ranstorp, *Understanding Violent Radicalization*, p. 2-3.

between the level of descriptive, minority representation in Western European democracies and terrorism, likely as a result of the minority group alienation brought upon by their descriptive underrepresentation at the national, political level. The failure of minority groups being represented at the political level may exacerbate the radicalization process by contributing to the factors that facilitate radicalization. The absence of a minority group can intensify feelings of alienation of that group from the rest of society. Without feeling as if they are a part of their society, individuals of minority groups could suffer from an identity crisis where they feel as if they do not belong in their own society. This lack of identity can lead individuals to search elsewhere for a feeling of belonging, sometimes leading them to radical extremist groups. Underrepresentation can also lead members of a minority group to hold personal grievances because they feel as if they have no voice in their societies. It is often that individuals are acting upon their personal grievances when they begin the radicalization process.

In the Federalist Papers No. 35, Alexander Hamilton wrote, “It is said to be necessary, that all classes of citizens should have some of their own number in the representative body, in order that their feelings and interests may be the better understood and attended to.” Instead of Western European democracies containing legislative bodies of increased descriptive representation, there has been a noticeable trend of representative exclusion of ethnic, minority groups. In an example of a large minority group in France, Muslims fill none of the 577 deputy posts in the National Assembly, and as a large minority group in Germany, only two people of Turkish descent are present among the

603 members of the German parliament.⁴³ Democracies are presumed to be based upon the idea that the elected officials of a state should adequately represent the population that they govern. Despite this general notion, political scientists have continuously noted the fact that minority groups have been, and continue to be, vastly underrepresented in Western democracies. The previously specified examples of minority underrepresentation in Europe support the words of essayist, Agnes Repplier, that state, “Democracy forever teases us with the contrast between its ideals and its realities, between its heroic possibilities and its sorry achievements.” High levels of minority underrepresentation call into question the legitimacy of a democracy. It is difficult, if not nearly impossible to firmly uphold the core values of a democratic society when 3.5-5 million people in a country are not politically represented, as in the case of Muslim citizens in France.⁴⁴

The Argument for Descriptive Representation

Increases in minority, descriptive representation have been shown to lead to more positive attitudes toward minority groups, to a lower incidence of anti-state violence on the part of minorities, and to better substantive representation of minority interests. I use the term *descriptive representation* to mean the state of political representation in which the representatives are “individuals who in their own backgrounds mirror some of the more frequent experiences and outward manifestations of belonging to the group.”⁴⁵ It is important to note that description does not solely come from visible characteristics such as skin color, but also shared experiences between the representative and constituent.

⁴³ Dittrich, *Muslims in Europe*, p. 22.

⁴⁴ Euro-Islam.info, *Islam in France*, (Euro-Islam: News and Analysis on Islam in Europe and North America, 2016).

⁴⁵ Jane Mansbridge, *Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent “Yes”*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), p. 628.

Despite any particular qualifications of a representative, there are situations in which the interests and perspectives of an ethnic, minority group cannot be sufficiently represented by anyone other than another member of that group. “In at least two circumstances, the interests and perspectives of members of a group cannot be adequately represented by others: 1) when representatives who are members of a group tend to respond to group-relevant concern than nonmembers, and 2) when representatives who themselves are members of a group can communicate better among themselves, with other representatives and with constituents from that group.”⁴⁶ Professor and political scientist, Jane Mansbridge offers four contexts in which disadvantaged groups gain advantages as a result of descriptive representation.

Communication

The communication between members of one group and members of another can be interfered with by means of historical circumstances between the two groups, especially if one group is historically dominant and the other, historically inferior. In these situations, shared experiences of a representative and their constituents enable vertical communication between the two. “Representatives and voters who share some version of a set of common experiences and the outward signs of having lived through those experiences can often read one another’s signals relatively easily and engage in relatively accurate forms of shorthand communication. Representatives and voters who share membership in a subordinate group can also forge bonds of trust based specifically on the shared experience of subordination.”⁴⁷ In listening, descriptive representatives “can respond flexibly, drawing not just from what they have heard from their

⁴⁶ Mansbridge, *Quota Problems*, p. 624.

⁴⁷ Mansbridge, *Should Blacks Represent Blacks*, p. 641.

constituents, but also from what they know from their own lives. In speaking, they can call up anecdotes from personal experience to describe how a piece of legislation may affect their group. They can speak vividly with facts and emotion drawn from their experience. They can speak with authenticity and be believed. They can also call on the relationships they have with other legislators for the empathy that the others might need to understand the descriptive representative's position. Even when the descriptive legislator is silent, his or her mere physical presence reminds the other legislators of the perspectives and interests of the group of which he or she is a descriptive member."⁴⁸

Depending upon the historical circumstances at play between two separate groups, more descriptive representation is required to bridge the gaps between groups.

Circumstances of Uncrystallized Interests

When issues arise that have not been present on the political agenda and candidates have not publicly expressed their platforms on them, they are considered to be uncrystallized. In these situations, descriptive representation is important when issues emerge in which different ethnic groups have differing interests on the developing issue. "Then, as issues arise unpredictably, a voter can expect the representative to react more or less the way the voter would have done, on the basis of descriptive similarity...Here, the important communication is not vertical, between representative and constituent, but horizontal, among deliberating legislators. In this horizontal communication, a descriptive representative can draw on elements of experiences shared with constituents to explore the uncharted ramifications of newly presented issues and also to speak on

⁴⁸ Mansbridge, *Quota Problems*, p. 626.

those issues with a voice carrying the authority of experience.”⁴⁹ Pamela Conover, Burton Craige Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, observed that,

The way we think about social groups depends enormously on whether we are part of that group. Try as we might, the political sympathy that we feel for other groups is never quite the same as that which these groups feel for themselves or that which we feel for ourselves.⁵⁰

This observation explains how groups that are at a disadvantage may require descriptive representation in order to get uncrystallized interests represented with adequate strength.

Social Context

In particular conditions, certain minority groups may suffer from a form of “second-class citizenship” in which historical circumstances have framed a certain group as incapable of governing. Sometimes the descriptive characteristics of a group carry with them a historical meaning that states, “persons with these characteristics do not rule,” possibly leading to “persons with these characteristics are not able to (fit to) rule.”⁵¹ These circumstances convey a message of exclusion and isolation to minority groups by creating a political setting in which a group’s characteristics, rather than their ability or qualifications, determine their ability to govern. This argument of descriptive representation is unlike the previous two in that it is not a case for a right, but for a social good. Simply stated, the argument is that if costs are not too high, every measure is beneficial that increases the degree to which the society by and large views almost all groups as equally qualified to rule.⁵²

De Facto Legitimacy

⁴⁹ Mansbridge, *Should Blacks Represent Blacks*, p. 644.

⁵⁰ Mansbridge, *Should Blacks Represent Blacks*, p. 648.

⁵¹ Mansbridge, *Should Blacks Represent Blacks*, p. 649.

⁵² Mansbridge, *Should Blacks Represent Blacks*, p. 650.

When members of a minority group see their fellow, group members implementing the responsibility of ruling with complete status in the legislative body, de facto legitimacy is enriched by making members of the historically underrepresented group feel as if they themselves were participants in the legislative discussions. The benefit of de facto legitimacy is somewhat stemmed from the previously discussed benefits. “Easier communication with one’s representative, awareness that one’s interests are being represented with sensitivity, and knowledge that certain features of one’s identity do not make one as less able to govern all contribute to making one feel more included in the polity. This feeling of inclusion in turn makes the polity democratically more legitimate in one’s eyes. Having had a voice in the making of a particular policy, even if that voice is through one’s representative and even when one’s views did not prevail, also makes that policy more legitimate in one’s eyes.”⁵³ As similarly stated in the social context discussion of descriptive representation, diversity in legislatures should always be promoted if the costs associated with that promotion are not too high.

When certain individuals feel purposely excluded from the political process, they may reject the political system, completely. Sometimes, this rejection is followed by acts of violence in the form of protests or even acts of terrorism against what is viewed by them as a repressive and discriminatory government. Previous research suggests that in areas where certain minority communities are being excluded, the potential for future conflict will persist.⁵⁴

Democracies are generally seen as the most inclusive type of government regime, but as evidenced in the national political institutions of many Western European

⁵³ Mansbridge, *Should Blacks Represent Blacks*, p. 651.

⁵⁴ Ruedin, *Ethnic Group Representation*, p. 336.

democracies, exclusion rather than inclusion seems to be the pattern. All of the Western European governments presented in this study practice some form of a proportional representation, electoral system. As Western Europe continues to become more diverse, the level of descriptive representation present in the Western European, political institutions is extremely relevant. An increase in ethnic diversity creates more views and opinions when uncrystallized interests come into play in political decision making. One example of an uncrystallized interest at the forefront of Western European politics is the issue of immigration. People who themselves are of an ethnic minority in a country and/or are the descendants of immigrants, are likely to hold differing views from those of a white, native European. Without the adequate descriptive representation of those minority groups, the groups' viewpoints and interests are generally absent when discussing the formation of political platforms on uncrystallized issues.

As previously explained, social context is another critical area of focus of the descriptive representation of Western European minority groups. How these groups are viewed by the majority of society matters in the argument for the groups' greater political representation. A European Union-wide survey in 1997 revealed that the issue of race is problematic for Europe. 33% of the individuals who were interviewed for this survey openly described themselves as "quite racist" or "very racist".⁵⁵ Only one in three of those interviewed said they felt they were "not at all racist". One in three declared themselves "a little racist" and one third openly expressed "quite" or "very racist" sentiments. A more in depth look at the country-by-country results shows that "nearly 9% of interviewees put themselves at the top of the racist scale saying they were "very

⁵⁵ Eurobarometer Opinion Poll no. 47.1, *Racism and Xenophobia in Europe*, (The Hague: European Year Against Racism Conference, 1997), p. 1.

racist”. Belgium led with a large 22%, openly stating they were “very racist”. France (16%) and Austria (14%) followed. The same three countries were at the forefront when the “quite racist” score is added to the “very racist”, giving a total of 55%, 48% and 42% respectively. The countries with the lowest number of declared “very racists” were Spain and Ireland (4% in each), Portugal (3%) and Luxembourg and Sweden (2% each).⁵⁶

Given the above statements, a question surfaces concerning the explanations of why we continuously see minority groups underrepresented in Western European democracies. There exist several, different forms of democracy comprised of different electoral laws and systems as well as diverse types and sizes of minority communities within their populations. As is evident in just the last decade, a great number of democracies have experienced some category of violence perpetrated by minority citizens of that country. Little research has been done on this topic to date, but I intend to explore the major types of political systems of democracies in an attempt to determine whether or not a particular form of democracy, whether its system be more inclusive or more exclusive to minority groups, impacts the level of minority violence in that country. Therefore, the question my thesis seeks to answer is whether the political characteristics of a democracy increase the likelihood that it will experience minority violence.

Numerous political scientists have argued that one of the many factors that can lead people to committing acts of violence, as well as radical extremism, is the feeling of alienation in a person’s society.⁵⁷ Studies have linked minority group representation in government and the level of alienation felt by these groups. These connections are not to

⁵⁶ Europabarometer, *Racism and Xenophobia*, p. 2.

⁵⁷ See the following: Dittrich, *Muslims in Europe*, Pretcht, *Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalization* and Gallis et al., *Muslims in Europe*.

say that low or non-representation of minority groups at the political level creates radical extremists from these groups, but it could play a role as one of the causal factors of the sense of alienation from the rest of the population. This feeling of isolation, in turn, can be an influential element leading to acts of violence and/or terrorism in a country.

Electoral Systems

I will compare types of democratic electoral systems to the level of home grown terrorism in the states that use each system. The different systems are listed as follows: a comparison of leftist parties and rightist parties in power in states with proportional representation, electoral systems, multi-member party districts and single-member party districts. I will provide a brief description of the characteristics of each system as well as use these characteristics to form hypotheses about each system's implication on homegrown terrorism.

Based on previous research on this subject matter and upon reasoning stated in the introductory portion of this thesis, we can assume that employing electoral systems that create difficulty for minority group members to be elected will experience more acts of homegrown terrorism. That being said, states that employ electoral systems that create a situation in which there is a greater chance of a member of a minority group being elected will experience fewer acts of homegrown terrorism.

Proportional Representation

The ability of ethnic minorities to win legislative seats is usually seen as a result of electoral systems and the size and geographic concentration of minority populations. The argument that proportional representation systems promote the representation of ethnic minorities has typically rested on the idea that PR systems support the emergence

of ethnic parties. Proportional representation systems do this by lowering the electoral threshold necessary to gain representation, thereby increasing the number of parties and making smaller ethnic parties more viable.⁵⁸ Political parties in proportional representation systems exercise a large amount of power in that they are the sole decision makers in determining who is placed on the party list. Therefore, it is primarily the decision of a country's political parties whether or not a minority group member will even have the chance of being elected. The preferential characteristics of the proportional representation system are key in determining whether or not minority groups are adequately represented, and the priorities and decisions of political parties vary from each party and each state. All of the countries included in this study employ some form of a PR electoral system, and because the political parties of this system are so influential, I will focus on the political party in power in each.

In many right-wing political parties, minorities suffer from what political scientist, Karen Bird, labels as "imputed prejudice". This situation is when the selectorate of a party argue that voters are not ready for the election of a minority. In addition, as long as minorities are absent from the selectorate, parties will continue to nominate primarily white males as political candidates. In some cases, like Britain, the Conservative Party has promised to establish ways for ethnic minorities to participate more in furthering their knowledge of Conservative politics. Though some action by right-wing parties seem as if they are attempting to reach out to minority groups, Bird argues that these attempts are merely symbolic and do not create concrete changes within

⁵⁸ Robert G. Moser, *Electoral Systems and the Representation of Ethnic Minorities: Evidence from Russia*, (New York: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York, 2008), p. 274.

the parties. Continuing, Bird finds that even when minorities are involved in right-wing parties, they still find it difficult to speak for the interests of their groups.⁵⁹

H1a: Having a right-leaning party in power will increase the likelihood of domestic terrorist attacks.

In contrast to right-wing parties, Bird suggest that when left-wing parties reach out to minority groups, there will be concrete changes to the traditional platforms in favor of minority interests. Left-wing parties have historically been more open and minority-friendly than those on the right of the political spectrum. As a result, minority groups frequently display a consistent allegiance to particular parties. For example, African Americans in the U.S. have overwhelmingly voted for the Democratic Party, and a similar situation exists among black voters in Britain with the Labour Party. Because of these historical ties, the cohesive support of minorities for generally left-wing parties will endure even when said party does not succeed to advance the interests of the minority group.⁶⁰

H1b: Having a left-leaning party in power will decrease the likelihood of domestic terrorist attacks.

Multi-Member Party Districts

Unlike single member districts, MMDs have more than one seat up for grabs in any given election, an attractive characteristic for minority groups because the more seats that have to be filled in a given election, the greater chance a minority has of being elected. Political party leaders in MMD electoral systems may also be more willing to absorb potential losses associated with a minority candidate if that candidate is not the

⁵⁹ Bird, *The Political Representation of Women and Ethnic Minorities*, p. 17-18.

⁶⁰ Bird, *The Political Representation of Women and Ethnic Minorities*, p. 17-18.

only one in the running, and by balancing the slate in this fashion, parties are able to draw in new voting blocs for support. By contrast, the winner-take-all nature of SMD elections hampers reaching out to minorities in this way. In these circumstances, calculated decisions about what type of candidate has a greater chance of winning take center stage.⁶¹ As previously stated, minority group members are more likely to be slated major parties and therefore have a greater chance of being elected, which leads me to *hypothesis 2: countries with a greater proportion of seats coming from multi-member districts are less likely to experience domestic terrorism*

Single-Member Party Districts

Unlike the multi-member system, there is a “winner take all” nature that exists within the single-member system that rules out the possibility of a balanced slate. Balancing of the ticket is not an option in the single-member system when only one seat is up for grabs in a particular election. In these contexts, competition for a place on the ticket may be stronger, and strategic considerations about what kind of candidate will most likely win, come to the forefront. In these situations, parties are more likely to run candidates belonging to dominant majority groups instead of a minority.⁶² Given the “winner takes all” description of single-member party systems, *hypothesis 3: countries with a greater proportion of seats coming from single-member districts are less more to experience domestic terrorism.*

⁶¹ Dancygier, *Electoral Rules or Electoral Leverage?*, p. 231-240.

⁶² Dancygier, *Electoral Rules or Electoral Leverage?*, p. 231-240.

Chapter 4: Data and Analysis

To test my hypotheses, I use a set of linear regression models on the occurrence of domestic terrorist attacks using a country-year database of 33 European countries that are considered to be democracies as determined by the ‘revised combined polity score’ defined in the Polity IV Annual Time Series, 1800-2014, in a time period of 1970 to

2006.⁶³ My unit of analysis is country year in order to model how the annual change in the independent variable corresponds with the change in the amount of terrorism/

Independent variables

The majority of Western European democracies use some form of a proportional representation electoral system. Therefore, the political parties in a proportional representation matter in determining the causes of domestic terrorism in these states. In order to test hypotheses 1a and 1b, (*having right-leaning parties in power will increase the likelihood of domestic terrorist attacks and having left-leaning parties in power will decrease the likelihood of domestic terrorist attacks*) I created two, dummy variables, ‘right’ and ‘left’, from a variable defining a country’s ‘chief executive party orientation’ as described in the Database of Political Institutions (DPI). DPI defines this variable as party orientation with respect to economic policy, coded based on the description of the party. The dummy variable indicating a left-wing party in power is coded as 0, and the dummy variable indicating a right-wing party in power is coded as 1. These variables are in reference to centrist parties, the omitted category.^{64 65} Because the unit of analysis is country year, I am able to observe when the party in power changes each year, over time.

To test my second and third hypotheses, (*countries with a greater proportion of seats coming from multi-member districts are less likely to experience domestic terrorism and countries with a greater proportion of seats coming from single-member districts are*

⁶³ Monty G. Marshall, and Keith Jagers, *Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013*, (Vienna: Center for Systemic Peace, 2014).

⁶⁴ Jan Teorell, Stefan Dahlberg, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Anna Khomenko and Richard Svensson, *The Quality of Government Standard Dataset*, (Gothenburg: The QoG Institute, 2016), p. 172.

⁶⁵ Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, *New tools of comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions*, (Bern: Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2001), p. 165-176.

more likely to experience domestic terrorism) I use the variable as it is defined in Joel Johnston and Jessica Wallack's database of electoral systems, for the measurement of multi member districts.⁶⁶ The variable is described as the proportion of seats from multi-member districts (lower/only house).⁶⁷ Because this variable measures the proportion of seats that come from multi-member districts, the proportion of seats that come from single-member districts is found by subtracting the numeric value of the variable measuring the proportion of seats from multi-member districts from the total number of districts present. Therefore, it is not necessary to include a separate variable that measures the proportion of seats that come from single-member districts. Higher values in this variable indicate a greater share of seats form multi-member districts, while lesser values indicate a greater share of seats from single-member districts.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable used in this study is a country-year count of domestic terrorist attacks adopted from a study by James A. Piazza.⁶⁸ Piazza uses a modified version of the Global Terrorism Database,⁶⁹ that restricts the terrorist events included to

⁶⁶ Joel W. Johnson, and Jessica S. Wallack, *Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote*, (Pueblo: Colorado State University, 2012).

⁶⁷ Teorell et al., *The Quality of Government Standard Dataset*, p. 398.

⁶⁸ James A. Piazza, *Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism*, (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2011).

⁶⁹ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2015). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>

only domestic terrorist attacks.⁷⁰⁷¹ The time frame of the variable is between the years 1970 and 2006, and the dataset is comprised of 5,783 incidents that are considered to be domestic. For these domestic incidents, the venue country matches the nationality of the identified victims, and there are no diplomatic or multilateral entities involved. Finally, these domestic terrorist incidents do not concern hostage events that included the interests from two or more countries.⁷²

Variables of minority economic discrimination

In order to measure levels of minority economic discrimination, I adopt two dummy variables constructed by Piazza in his previously mentioned study. To derive the dummy variables for his study, Piazza used the ‘ECDIS/Economic Discrimination Index’ variable published by the Minorities at Risk Project, housed at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland. The ECDIS variable measures the degree to which members of groups designated as ‘minorities at risk’ (MARs) – ethno-political communities in countries that collectively suffer or benefit from systematic discrimination in comparison to other groups in society – face economic discrimination as a result of formal or informal governmental neglect, lack of opportunities or social exclusion, and whether or not they are afforded affirmative remediation.⁷³ In his article, Piazza gives the description for ECDIS as it is coded in the Minorities at Risk database.⁷⁴ Piazza constructs the dummy variables by reshaping

⁷⁰ Walter Enders, Todd Sandler and Khusrav Gaibulloev, *Domestic versus transnational terrorism: Data, decomposition and dynamics*, (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2011).

⁷¹ Piazza describes the procedure Enders et al. engage in in more detail (p. 343-344).

⁷² Enders et al., *Domestic versus transnational terrorism*, p. 10.

⁷³ Piazza, *Poverty*, p. 344.

⁷⁴ Piazza, *Poverty*, p. 344.

ECDIS into a country-year indicator in which the highest measurement of discrimination across minority groups, if a country contains more than one, is recorded. The variable measuring the level of minority discrimination in a country is coded 1 for country-years containing at least one Minority at Risk group, but where ECDIS has a value of zero, indicating that minorities do not suffer from economic discrimination; ‘Remediation policy for minority economic discrimination’, and is also coded 1 for country-years containing at least one Minority at Risk group but where ECDIS has a value of 1, indicating that minorities either experience or have a legacy of economic discrimination, but where policies have been put into place to correct the effects discrimination. The second dummy variable I use from Piazza’s study measures the presence of minority groups at risk in a country. This variable is coded 1 for observations in countries where Minority at Risk groups are absent and coded 0 in countries where there is a presence of one or more of these groups.⁷⁵

Control variables

I also include several control variables that frequently appear in empirical studies of terrorism, in my linear regression models. I use the variable constructed by Kristian S. Gleditsch as a measure of real GDP per capita and two other control variables found in Piazza’s study.⁷⁶ To operationalize income inequality, Piazza uses the same measure used in several other empirical studies: national Gini coefficients. I apply this variable to my analysis as a control because Piazza notes that there has been some evidence found that countries with high, income inequality are more prone to terrorism. Piazza also references

⁷⁵ Piazza, *Poverty*, p. 345.

⁷⁶ Kristian S. Gleditsch, *Expanded Trade and GDP Data*, (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2002), p.712-724.

arguments that have been made in which at theory states, that nations with large populations are more likely to experience terrorism as a result of their higher, policing costs. Taking that argument into account, I use Piazza’s variable that measures the natural logs of national populations.⁷⁷

To begin the data analysis, I present a table containing the results of simple means tests I conducted to examine the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables measuring right and left parties at a basic level. I also include a means test for the effect of centrist parties on the dependent variable. This table merely offers a preliminary test of the hypotheses and acts as a way to display raw trends in the data as a precursor to the more in-depth analysis with the addition of the control variables that will be given thereafter.

Means Tests

Average Number of Domestic Terrorist Attacks per Year for Countries with a Leftist Party in Power	7.399
Average Number of Domestic Terrorist Attacks per Year for Countries with a Rightist Party in Power	8.028
Average Number of Domestic Terrorist Attacks per Year for Countries with a Centrist Party in Power	15.307

The results of the means tests offer some suggestive evidence that countries with right-leaning parties in power experience a similar number of domestic terrorist attacks per year as countries with left-leaning parties in power. The results also indicate that a country with a centrist party in power is likely to experience far more domestic terrorist attacks per year than those with either a right or a left party in power. I discuss possible explanations of this finding in the results section of this thesis.

⁷⁷ Piazza, *Poverty*, p. 345.

The following models express the results of a further, more in-depth analysis on the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable of domestic terrorist attacks while including several, previously described covariates in the models.

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V
Proportion of Seats from Multi-Member Districts	-20.111 1.3e-10****	-20.023 9.06e-11****	-5.418 0.124	-9.919 0.002***	-10.15 0.000****
Right Party in Power	-5.569 0.066*	-5.076 0.089*	-9.753 0.001****	3.696 0.181	1.887 0.368
Left Party in Power	-6.28 0.039**	-4.94 0.099*	-11.066 0.000****	-0.782 0.776	-0.635 0.762
GDP		0.424	1.538		
		0.868	0.527		
GINI Coefficient		0.971	0.757		
		0.000****	0.003***		
Population			6.819 1.18e-12****		
Level of Minority Discrimination				8.259 0.000****	
No Minorities at Risk Present					-7.61 3.14e-05****

Coefficients are presented with p-value below and statistical significance is expressed by the following codes: Significance codes: 0 '****' 0.001 '***' 0.01 '**' 0.05 '*' 0.1 '.' 1

For the analysis, I run five sets of tests, displayed in models I-V. As shown in models I, II, III and V, the variable measuring the proportion of seats from multi-member districts is statistically significant at either the level 0 or .001. In model IV, the variable is less statistically significant, at a .12 level; a narrow miss indicating about an 88% level of confidence. A one-unit increase in the variable measuring multi-member districts – that is the proportion of seats coming from multi-member districts – equates to approximately 5 to 20 fewer terrorist attacks per year when compared to single-member districts (Models I-V). When controlling for population, GDP, the GINI coefficient and the variable measuring whether or not there exists a minority group at risk in the country, the results are consistent with hypothesis 2: countries with a greater proportion of seats coming from multi-member districts will experience less domestic terrorism, and hypothesis 3: countries with a greater proportion of seats coming from single-member districts are more likely to experience domestic terrorism.

These results are possibly attributed to the fact that multi-member elections allow party leaders to balance the slate and many parties believe that a balanced ticket will be appealing to new voting blocs. Statistically speaking, the more seats there are in play, the more likely it is that someone from a minority group will be elected, therefore minorities are more likely to enter multi-member races. The outcomes of my analysis on multi-member districts supports previous research that MMD electoral systems tend to be beneficial for the election of underrepresented groups. The greater level of representation a minority group holds at the political level, the lower the level of alienation that is experienced by that group, possibly reducing the likelihood of the radicalization of a member of said group.

Hypothesis 1a states that having right-leaning parties in power will increase the likelihood of domestic terrorist attacks. The results indicate that countries with right parties in power are slightly more likely to experience domestic terrorism when compared to centrist parties than are countries with left parties in power. A one-unit increase in the variable measuring right parties – that is, a change in power from a centrist to a right leaning party – equates to approximately 5 to 10 fewer terrorist attacks per year (Models I-III). The average number of domestic terror attacks per country, per year in my study is 7.399. These results indicate a significant decrease in the number of domestic terror attacks per year.

However, when controlling for additional covariates measuring the existence of a minority group in the country and the level of minority discrimination, as in models IV and V, the effect loses statistical significance. A possible cause of this loss in statistical significance may be attributed to the size of the sample tested in models IV and V. Models I-III have samples sizes of 538, but when the two covariates are added the sample size of the test decreases significantly to 359 in model IV and 475 in model V. The results presented in these two tables should not suggest that the hypothesis is incorrect, only that when these two specific covariates are added, the results become less certain when compared to the statistical significance produced in model III.

Minorities in right-wing parties often suffer from “imputed prejudice”, where the selectorate of a party argue that voters are not prepared for the election of a minority. In addition, as long as minorities are absent from the selectorate, parties will continue to nominate primarily white males as political candidates. Often, minorities that are involved in right-wing parties still find it more difficult to speak for the interests of their

groups. Without a feeling of inclusion in politics, many minority groups feel as if they do not have a voice in their society, in turn, exacerbating feelings of exclusion from the collective whole of the population with a possible consequence of violent radicalization.

Despite this theory, my results show that that is not the case. Countries with right-leaning parties in power are in fact not more likely to experience domestic terrorist attacks when compared to the reference group, centrist parties. In fact, countries with centrist parties in power are much more likely to experience domestic terrorism than those with right parties in power. These results are presented in models I, II and II. These unexpected results may be attributed to characteristics of right-leaning governments. First, countries with right-leaning parties in power may be more likely to use government funds for the purpose of domestic surveillance, making it more difficult for radical extremists to plan and execute attacks within the country's borders. Secondly, terrorist organizations may view right-leaning governments as more resolved and less likely to offer concessions to terrorist groups. If a terrorist organization does not believe they will be offered concessions from their government as an attempt to stop terrorist attacks, they are unlikely to launch attacks in the first place. Further research should be conducted on this finding of why governments with centrist parties in power are more likely to experience domestic terrorist attacks than governments with right-leaning parties in power.

Hypothesis 1b states that having left-leaning parties in power will decrease the likelihood of domestic terrorist attacks. The results indicate that countries with left parties in power are slightly less likely to experience domestic terrorism when compared to centrist parties than are countries with right parties in power. As presented in models I-

III, a one-unit increase in the variable measuring left parties – that is a change in power from a centrist to a left leaning party – equates to approximately 4 to 11 fewer domestic terror attacks per year. As stated in the discussion of right parties in power, the average number of domestic terror attacks per country, per year in my study is 7.399. These results of a left party in power display a meaningful reduction in the number of terrorist attacks a Western European country experiences per year. Left-wing parties have historically been more open and minority-friendly than those on the right of the political spectrum. When left-wing parties reach out to minority groups and attempt to further their inclusion in the political process, it is more likely that there will be particular changes to the traditional platforms in favor of minority interests. As a result, minority groups often display a stable commitment to specific parties. Because of these historical ties, the cohesive support of minorities for generally left-wing parties will endure; even when the party does not necessarily succeed in advancing the interests of the minority group. When governments have left parties in power, the interests of minority groups will be more greatly represented than in governments with right parties in power. When minority groups feel as if their interests are being represented and are recognized as important at the political level, feelings of exclusion will decrease. As minority groups are seen as more accepted and respected by the government of a country, it is likely that they will be viewed more positively by the general society of the country as well. When minority groups feel as if they are included in society and the outcome of government policies, the occurrence radicalization within minority groups becomes less likely.

Chapter 5: Case Study

A Comparison of Terrorism and Minority Descriptive Representation in Denmark and France

To further explore hypothesis 2: countries with a greater proportion of seats from multi-member districts are less likely to experience domestic terrorism, and hypothesis 3: countries with a greater proportion of seats from single-member districts are more likely to experience domestic terrorism, I compare the two countries of France and Denmark.

I compare France and Denmark because both are rich, Western European democracies that employ some form of proportional representation in their electoral systems. With a nearly equal GDP per capita (France: \$35,700, Denmark: \$37,800), the two countries also rank almost exactly the same on the Human Development Index (France: .955, Denmark: .952), and both are members of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).⁷⁸ The cultures of the two countries are more comparable to one another than a culture of a European country is to that of a Middle Eastern, East Asian or Latin American country. Both countries hold the same, general values of democracy and have experienced significant waves of migration from other EU member-states, but more so from non-EU nations, creating a need for integration policies within each country. France and Denmark offer a suitable scope for comparison because both countries, though similar on many accounts, demonstrate significant variations in terms of their electoral systems.

⁷⁸ Aneki.com, *Denmark vs. France (2014)*.

Denmark: Proportional Representation with Multi-Member Districts

The electoral system for the Danish Parliament is based on proportional representation in 10 multi-member districts, which are divided into 92 nomination districts. The Danish Parliament consists of 175 members. The first 135 parliamentary seats are awarded to the 10 multi-member districts and the 40 remaining seats are distributed among the qualified parties according to a highly proportional electoral formula called the Hare quota. This system is employed in order to increase overall vote-to-seat proportionality. According to the Danish constitution, Denmark's electoral system of proportional representation with multi-member districts secures equal representation of different constituent opinions and backgrounds.⁷⁹

France: Proportional Representation with Single Member Districts (Two-Round Runoff Voting)

The majority voting system employed in France's legislative elections is referred to as the two-round system (TRS). This system requires candidates in single-member district elections to earn a majority of the votes to win legislative office and a runoff election between the two top candidates if no candidate wins a majority of the votes in a general election. The implementation of this form of electoral system is rare and the only two Western European countries to use it are France and Monaco. The system encourages a two-party system and single-party legislative majorities. Because of the system's winner-take-all nature, it has several consequences including the misrepresentation of

⁷⁹ Metapolls.net, *Danish Electoral System*, (2013).

parties, manufactured majorities, gerrymandering and the denial of fair representation to third parties, racial minorities and women.⁸⁰

Representation in France

Despite their similarities, France and Denmark differ significantly on the topic of minority descriptive representation. Although Muslims make up 10% of the French population, no Muslims fill any seats in the French National Assembly. There were no visible minorities among the 321 members of the French Senate until 2004. There were three visible minorities among the more than 4,500 *conseillers généraux* and only five among the more than 1,700 *conseillers régionaux* until elections in March of 2004. It is evident that members of minority groups are staggeringly absent in all levels of French elected office.⁸¹ More recently, in the elections of 2012, eight French citizens of foreign descent were elected to parliament. Although this is a record number of minorities present in the French government, the French council of black organizations (CRAN) says these eight new ethnically diverse faces are not sufficient. It points out that they represent less than 2% of the National Assembly, while 10% of French citizens are foreign-born.⁸² Karen Bird attributes these extremely low levels of minority descriptive representation to France's assimilationist model of citizenship. She explains,

France has traditionally viewed the retention of ethnic identity as an obstacle to both integration and national solidarity, and so immigrants and their descendants, as well as territorial minorities, are expected to give up their cultural identity, linguistic distinctiveness, and so on, in return for the full benefits of French citizenship. In the past, this has meant limited rights of association for ethnic minorities. France's long tradition of equating French citizenship with equal treatment has also meant that the state does not track ethnic origins in official statistics. It has been historically difficult to document and

⁸⁰ Mtholyoke.edu, *Plurality/Majority Systems*, (2016).

⁸¹ Karen Bird, *The Political Representation of Visible Minorities in Electoral Democracies: A Comparison of France, Denmark and Canada*, (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 433.

⁸² *Record number of women and minorities in new French parliament*, (French24, 2012).

punish hate crimes and acts of racial discrimination, given that race as a category has been assumed not to exist. Finally, this has meant that, until recently, there has been little attention in France to the problem of descriptive under-representation in political assemblies.⁸³

As presented in the theory section of this thesis, one of the implications of descriptive representation is social context. The way in which the majority of the population in a country views its minority groups is critical when it comes to whether a minority group will be included or alienated from the rest of society. A World Values survey in 2013 presents on a world map, the share of respondents who answered “people of another race” when asked to pick from groups of people they did not want as neighbors. Though one might expect the richer, more-educated Western European nations to be more tolerant, that is not exactly the case. France appeared to be one of the least racially tolerant countries on the continent, with 22.7% saying they did not want a neighbor of another race. Former Soviet states such as Belarus and Latvia scored as more tolerant than much of Europe. Many Balkan states, perhaps after years of ethnicity-tinged wars, expressed lower racial tolerance.⁸⁴ In the wake of the terrorist attacks of November 13, 2015 in Paris, the president of the National Front (FN), a national-conservative political party in France, Marine Le Pen stated in a speech, “France and the French are not safe...France must ban Islamist organizations, closed radical mosques and expel foreigners who preach hatred on our soil, as well as illegal immigrants who have nothing to do with France. As for binational participants of these Islamist movements, they must

⁸³ Bird, *The Political Representation of Visible Minorities in Electoral Democracies*, p. 434.

⁸⁴ Max Fisher, *A fascinating map of the world's most and least racially tolerant countries*, (Washington D.C.: The Washington Post, 2013), p. 1.

be stripped of their nationality and be inadmissible.”⁸⁵ Approximately 10% of France’s total population is comprised of Muslims, and statements from political leaders, like this one from Marine Le Pen, convey a harsh message of exclusion to France’s Muslim population. Despite the fact that blame for the November 2015 Paris attacks rests upon a few radicalized individuals, none of which were French citizens, Marine Le Pen declared that it was necessary to ban all Islamic organizations and begin closing mosques in France. These verbal attacks on France’s largest minority group exacerbate the notion of ‘us versus them’ among France’s people. Le Pen’s statements not only place blame on the perpetrators of the Paris attacks, but on French Muslims as a whole, deepening the divide between France’s Muslims and its other citizens. This divide intensifies feelings of alienation experienced among the Muslim minority in France and presents an idea to the rest of the population that not only are Muslims not French, but they are also a threat to the French people and the French way of life. As previously mentioned, this form of social alienation can cause France’s majority population to view minority groups, such as French Muslims, as ‘second-class citizens’ who, no matter their citizenship status, can never be truly French and will never be fully accepted as legitimate members of French society. Statements like those made by Marine Le Pen create a divide between France and its Muslims as well as generate feelings of exclusion of the Muslim population, both factors that have been shown to lead to the radicalization of certain group members.

Representation in Denmark

In contrast to France, the Danish electoral system has remained distinctively open and responsive to ethnic participation. In the large, Danish cities with significant

⁸⁵ *Marine Le Pen Statement On Paris Islamic State Attacks - English Translation*, (Traditional Britain Group, 2015).

immigrant populations, the electoral system tends to produce governing councils that are statistically representative of groups of non-EU immigrant origin.⁸⁶ One possible factor contributing to this striking difference in minority descriptive representation is the two states' implementation of proportional representation electoral systems. France is comprised entirely of single-member districts while Denmark is comprised solely of multi-member districts. "Under the proportional representation methods used in France, the order of candidates on each list is fixed. Seats are awarded beginning with the top candidate on each list, working down until each list has received its designated proportion of seats. The party selection process is paramount in determining which candidates are elected and, because visible minority candidates are usually placed well down on local lists, few ever win seats. In contrast, Danish rules allow voters to alter the order of candidates on the list. They may give their vote either to the whole list (a list vote), or to a single candidate (a personal vote). Candidates with more personal votes move up the list, while those with fewer personal votes move down. Within such a system, the electoral success of an individual candidate depends critically on the candidate's ability to mobilize eligible voters both to participate in the election and to cast their personal vote for them. For strategic reasons, visible minority competitors will usually focus their mobilization efforts on voters within immigrant communities."⁸⁷ The main reason behind the high levels of political, descriptive representation of minorities in Denmark is this method of proportional representation, using preferential voting within multi-member districts. The Danish electoral system creates incentives for the political parties to place

⁸⁶ Bird, *The Political Representation of Visible Minorities in Electoral Democracies*, p. 444-445.

⁸⁷ Bird, *The Political Representation of Visible Minorities in Electoral Democracies*, p. 444-445.

ethnic minority candidates on their party's list. This system is more open to the recruitment of minority candidates. It is possible that a candidate on a large party's list can gain the votes of only 0.1% of the registered voters and still win a seat in a local council. For many minority groups, it is rather easy to mobilize this amount of votes, which renders the Danish electoral system more open to minority groups than most other systems, especially that of France.⁸⁸

In Denmark's national elections in 2001, two immigrants were elected to parliament comprising 1.1% of the representatives. This percentage is in fact an underrepresentation of the Danish immigrant population, but not a very strong one.⁸⁹ "At the general election in February 2005, three immigrants were elected (1.7 percent of the representatives), but the immigrant electorate had now grown to 2.2 percent. In addition, two seats in the Danish Parliament are reserved for representatives from Greenland and two seats for representatives from the Faroe Islands. All in all we can conclude that the immigrants get almost their fair share of seats in the Danish Parliament."⁹⁰ Although Danish immigrants only constitute approximately 2.2% of the electorate as opposed to approximately 10% in France, the raw number of minorities is not significant. What is significant is the impact of each country's electoral systems on their minority populations. In addition to the remarkably high level of minority representation at the national level, the percentage of immigrant representatives in local councils in Denmark has also increased over time. In 1981, the first election where foreign citizens had the

⁸⁸ Lise Togeby, *The Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities: Denmark as a Deviant Case*, (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2008), p. 329, 340.

⁸⁹ Lise Togeby, *The electoral system and representation of ethnic minorities*, (Washington D.C.: APSA Annual Meeting, 2005), p. 7.

⁹⁰ Togeby, *The electoral system and representation of ethnic minorities*, p.7.

right to vote, three immigrants were elected to the local councils. In 1985, five immigrants were elected, in 1989, 12 immigrants, in 1993, 15 immigrants, in 1997, 24 immigrants and in 2001, 51 immigrants.”⁹¹ In the local elections of 2001, Danish ethnic minorities acquired almost their share of seats in local councils. In fact, on average, 9.7% of the Danish electorate and 8.8% of the representatives have an ethnic minority background. In several municipalities, there actually exists an over-representation of ethnic minority members in the local councils. Some of these municipalities are Denmark’s three largest cities of Copenhagen, Aarhus and Odense.⁹²

The Muslim population of France is one of the country’s largest minority groups with members of Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian descent, and Turkish Muslim immigrants are the largest Danish minority, being one of the first immigrant groups to arrive in the country around 1970. Turkish migrant workers were the first group of immigrants to be elected to the Danish local councils, and they continue to be the best-represented group today. For example, in the 2001 elections, approximately 50% of the Danish ethnic minority representatives had a Turkish background, and roughly 40% of the Turks who were nominated were elected.⁹³ In addition to the Turkish minority, “a considerable number of candidates from the traditional ‘refugee countries’ gained election for the first time in the 2001 elections. In 1997, one Palestinian refugee, Naser Khader, was elected to the city council in Copenhagen. By contrast, five people from Lebanon, three from Sri Lanka, and one each from Iran, Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq and

⁹¹ Togeby, *The electoral system and representation of ethnic minorities*, p. 9

⁹² Togeby, *The Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities*, p. 331.

⁹³ Togeby, *The Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities*, p. 336-337.

Afghanistan were elected in 2001. Moreover, Naser Khader and Kamal Qureshi, a Pakistani, were elected to parliament.”⁹⁴

The combination of the Danish political opportunity structure brought upon by their multi-member district, proportional representation electoral system, and the resulting political mobilization of ethnic minority groups explains the country’s high level of descriptive, minority representation from the local councils to the Danish Parliament. The electoral system provides incentives for the political parties and the Danish minority groups to cooperate with one another and facilitates communication between the two. It has been stated that the Danish electoral system is very open, but it is also transparent. This transparency makes the system easier to understand and also aids in an individuals educated guess regarding their chances for election.⁹⁵ Denmark’s open and transparent election system facilitates the election of minorities in relatively high numbers. These numbers suggest that the Danish society is fairly accepting of its minority populations and generally believes minority group members are just as qualified to govern as the members of the Danish majority. It seems as though the Danes view a minority group member’s ability or qualifications determine their ability to govern, rather than their minority characteristics. The Danish level of minority descriptive representation produces a national, social context in which the larger whole of society is reasonably inclusive to all members of the population, be they members of the majority population or members of ethnic minority groups. As Danish minority groups become greater represented in government, senses of alienation among the country’s minority groups are lessened by the inclusiveness that this descriptive representation generates. It

⁹⁴ Togeby, *The Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities*, p. 336.

⁹⁵ Togeby, *The Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities*, p. 340.

is reasonable to assume that Denmark's minority groups feel a greater sense of belonging to the Danish society and are less likely to turn towards violent extremism in order to attain feelings of acceptance and recognition. This is not to say that anti-immigrant sentiments are absent in Denmark. There do exist powerful political movements (e.g., the Danish People's Party) to counter the presence and visibility of Muslim communities in the country, but the size, strength and influence of such groups is much greater in France than in Denmark, and the level of minority representation is much lower as well.

Levels of Domestic Terrorism

In order for my theory to be supported, we should see more incidents of domestic terrorism in France than in Denmark. In an analysis of the average number of domestic terrorist attacks per year, France experiences approximately 18.324 domestic terrorist attacks per year while Denmark experiences .324 attacks, on average. Continuing, France experiences roughly 11.724% of Europe's domestic terrorist attacks while Denmark only accounts for .215% of attacks. The average number of terrorist attacks per year, as well as the percentage of Europe's domestic terrorist attacks, is significantly higher in France than in Denmark.⁹⁶

Using France's large minority population of Muslims as an example, we can see how the underrepresentation of the group in French government is connected to the radicalization of some of its members. In 2010, the French legislative body passed a law prohibiting the covering of one's face in public spaces. This controversial law essentially prohibits Muslim women from wearing the traditional Muslim head-coverings. An older

⁹⁶ In order to further compare the levels of terrorism in France and Denmark, I calculated the number of terrorist attacks per capita of each country. France experiences approximately .278 terrorist attacks per capita while Denmark experiences significantly less at approximately .057 terrorist attacks per capita.

law passed in 2004 forbids anyone from wearing any religious symbol in a public school. This can include crosses, rosaries, and any sort of head covering. Prohibiting the burka and niqab limits Muslims' right to practice their religion and results in feelings of oppression and discrimination. One 2013 source stated that 74% of French citizens view the Islamic faith as "intolerant" and "incompatible" with French values, while 70% said that there are too many foreigners in France. French citizens and Muslims, whether nationals or immigrants, share a mutual distrust towards one another. The sense of social injustice creates an attitude that views the Muslims as "victims of society" and harbors ideologies that condone and encourage retribution.⁹⁷⁹⁸ This discrimination causes many French Muslims to act out against the French government, sometimes in the form of violent extremism or terrorism, and breeds loyalty to something greater than the French state. Because Muslims have no representation in government, they sometimes resort to terrorist activities as a way to voice their grievances. In addition, radical groups such as ISIL continue to expand their influence in countries like France on the platform that they are at war with the West, a type of society that alienates and discriminates against its Muslim citizens. Without sufficient, political representation, the Muslim minority does not have the ability to take effective action against France's discriminatory laws. Radicalization appeals to young people who want to reject the Western culture and society they feel has rejected them.⁹⁹ Many Muslims may be unable to find a way to express their grievances peacefully, given their place in French society, and are attracted

⁹⁷ Soeren Kern, *The Islamization of France in 2013*, (New York: Gatestone Institute, 2014).

⁹⁸ Alex Wilner, *We must make sure that prison isn't terrorism school*, (Toronto: The Globe and Mail Inc., 2009).

⁹⁹ Oprea, *How France Grew Its Own Terrorists*.

to the violent nature of a “war” against the West, as it allows radicalized individuals to express their aggression toward the French government and society in a way that seems legitimize.¹⁰⁰

Given the many similarities of France and Denmark, the two differing electoral systems and subsequent levels of minority descriptive representation in their governments is a plausible explanation as to why we see such high levels of domestic terrorism in France in comparison to Denmark. Further studies should be conducted on the minority relationship vis-à-vis the majority in both countries, but as my theory states and the analysis presents, lower levels of minority, descriptive representation lead to higher levels of domestic terrorism. This is not to assume that the level of descriptive representation is the sole factor in determining the level of terrorism experienced in these two countries. Other factors such as France’s culture of unmediated citizenship as opposed to the more flexible, group-permitting cultures of other Western European countries, such as Denmark, may be factors as well, but the findings in this study indicate that the level of descriptive representation is a significant factor in determining the level of inclusion of a country’s minority group. Given this significance, electoral systems are vital in determining the level of inclusion of minority groups. These findings return to one of the central factors of violent radicalization; the feeling of exclusion or alienation from one’s society and subsequently, the search for a purpose, group or stable identity that can promise inclusion. Based on this case study, it may be assumed that as France continues to practice methods of political exclusion of its minority groups, the more alienated the Muslim minority will feel and the greater chance the country has of

¹⁰⁰ Arie W. Kruglanski, *Psychology Not Theology: Overcoming ISIS’ Secret Appeal*, (Bristol: E-International Relations, 2014).

continuing to experience domestic terrorist attacks. The opposite may be assumed for Denmark.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to understand the sources of domestic terrorism in Western European democracies. I argue that the underrepresentation of minority groups is significant in understanding the origins of radicalization. Underrepresentation exacerbates feelings of exclusion and isolation among minority groups. Feelings such as these that create a gap between the majority and minority populations have previously been shown to be features of the terrorist radicalization process. The level of political representation of any group is determined by the electoral system employed in each given country, and therefore, I argue that the inclusive or exclusive characteristics of a country's electoral system will have an effect on the level of domestic terrorism experienced by that country.

The results, derived from both quantitative analysis and a case study on France and Denmark, indicate that a country's electoral system does in fact influence the its level of domestic terrorism. The analysis revealed that countries with right-leaning or left-leaning parties in power experience significantly less domestic terrorist attacks than countries with a centrist party in power. Continuing, the data analysis and case study also showed that countries with a greater proportion of seats coming from multi-member districts experience significantly less domestic terrorist attacks than countries with a greater proportion of seats coming from single-member districts.

Western European, domestic terrorism has quickly become a critical issue for European Union policy makers, therefore making this study important for any Western European politician and political institution. With the rise of terrorist organizations like ISIL, isolated, minority individuals are quite easily able to find a group that accepts and

values them when they feel discriminated against by their government and purposefully excluded from the political process as well as the whole of their society. Most recently in Western Europe, coordinated terrorist attacks left 31 people dead and another 300 injured in Brussels, Belgium. The perpetrators of the attacks were brothers, as well as Belgian nationals. These attacks are yet another example of the consequences of the domestic radicalization of a minority group in Western Europe.

Democracy is founded upon the ideals of equal treatment and representation of all members of society, but the realities have shown to be much different than these ideals. Can a country claim to be a true democracy when millions of its citizens are not represented in their government institutions (e.g. Muslims in France)? Countless research on the topic of terrorist radicalization has centered upon the feelings of exclusion experienced by the would-be-terrorists from their country's majority population. My research indicates that the characteristics of the electoral systems of a country have the ability to provide greater inclusion or greater exclusion of minority groups. The alarming frequency and scale of the recent attacks in Western Europe, places EU policy makers in a situation where their constituents are looking to them to find a solution to the growing threat of domestic terrorism. The way for Western European policy makers to combat domestic terrorism is to create policies that aid in bridging the gap between the country's minority and majority populations as a way to create an environment of greater inclusion for all of its citizens. One way to accomplish this is by opening a country's electoral system, and likely making changes to some electoral laws, so that the system allows a minority group member to have the same, fair and equal chance of being elected, as does a member of the country's majority. For assimilationist countries like France, the idea of

giving significant, political power to the country's minorities would likely be met with strong opposition, but it is clear that the integration policies that are currently in place are inadequate and put simply, failures. If changes are not made to promote the inclusion of all members of society, minority or majority, in Western European countries such as France, it will not be a matter of if they will experience another terrorist attack, but of when.

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